WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

Volume V, Number 2 January 1953

Price $5.00 per year

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Address communications:

Editorial office: WORLD POLITICS, Center of International Studies, Box 176, Princeton, N.J.

Circulation and Advertising: WORLD POLITICS, Princeton University Press, Box 231, Princeton, N.J.

WORLD POLITICS. Published quarterly by Princeton University Press. January 1953. Vol. V, No. 2. Entered as Second Class matter in the Post Office at Princeton, New Jersey, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press. Subscriptions $5.00 a year (two years $8.50); single copies $1.50. Foreign postage 25 cents additional per year.

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VOL. V • JANUARY 1953 • NO. 2

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CHOICE IN THE WEST*

By S. BERNARD

THE advent of a new administration in the United States and the passage of seven years since the end of World War II make it appropriate to review the political situation which has developed in Europe during that period and to ask what choices now are open to the West in its relations with the Soviet Union.

The end of World War II found Europe torn between conflicting conceptions of international politics and of the goals that its members should seek. The democratic powers, led by the United States, viewed the world in traditional, Western, terms. The major problem, as they saw it, was one of working out a moral and legal order to which all powers could subscribe, and in which they would live. Quite independently of the environment, they assumed that one political order was both more practicable and more desirable than some other, and that their policies should be directed toward its attainment. The particular order sought by them involved the restoration of the states of Europe in much the same form as they had existed before the war, and the recreation, under the title of United Nations, of the political institutions which had been embodied in the League.

Postwar Soviet Policy

The Soviet Union, by contrast with the democratic powers, viewed the world in quite different terms. The postwar situation, in its eyes, had been determined by economic and social conditions, and was the consequence, more particularly, of capitalist anarchy and of the economic imperialism which this anarchy produces. For Stalin, as for Lenin,

* Editorial Note: The articles dealing with the postwar policies of the West which have so far appeared in *World Politics* have all been written by Americans. The members of the editorial board feel that further perspectives on the problem are warranted. They therefore present a translated and condensed version of a manuscript submitted to them by M. Bernard, in the belief that the reasoned views of a European student of politics, however controversial, will be of interest to American scholars. The opinions expressed therein are those of the author and are not to be considered as reflecting the position of the editors.

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> This frantic struggle between various groups of capitalists is remarkable in that an inevitable element of it is imperialist war, war for the annexation of foreign territory. This fact in its turn is remarkable in that it leads to the weakening of the imperialists by one another, to the weakening of the position of capitalism in general; it accelerates the advent of the proletarian revolution and makes this revolution a practical necessity.[1]

It followed, therefore, that the Communist enterprise was in line with historical necessity and that the function of Soviet leaders was to hurry this historical development whenever an opportunity presented itself.

> After consolidating its power . . . , the proletariat of the victorious country can and must build up socialist society. But does that mean that in this way the proletariat will secure a complete and final victory for socialism, i.e., does it mean that with the forces of a single country it can finally consolidate socialism and fully guarantee that country against intervention, which means against restoration? Certainly not. That requires victory for the revolution in at least several countries. It is therefore the essential task of the victorious revolution in one country to develop and support the revolution in others. So the revolution in a victorious country ought not to consider itself as a self-contained unit, but as an auxiliary and as a means of hastening the victory of the proletariat in other countries.
>
> Lenin has tersely expressed this thought by saying that the task of the victorious revolution is to do the "utmost possible in one country *for* the development, support and stirring up of the revolution *in all countries.*" (*The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, London, 1929.)[2]

Since, according to Lenin, every world war tends to weaken the international position of capitalism, the proper postwar policy for the Soviet Union was, not to resurrect the old political order of Europe, but to revolutionize the world by actively and methodically exploiting the weaknesses of its opponents. Such a policy involved pushing back the boundaries of the non-Communist world, breaking up the colonial empires of the European nations, cutting off their export markets, and dislocating their national economies—in short, slowly strangling them.

Four major actions were carried out on the basis of this policy: the first against Iran, the second against Greece, the third against

[1] Joseph Stalin, *Leninism*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1934, I, p. 15.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.

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Berlin, and the fourth against China. The first three miscarried as a result of the American policy of containment. The fourth was a complete success and could not have been otherwise. No power in the world could have kept the ancient social structure of China from breaking down and being taken over by the Communists.

A new phase of Soviet operations became manifest with the Russian effort to sabotage the Marshall Plan and with the Korean War. Communist activities no longer were directed toward the rectification of the political frontier between East and West, but toward direct intervention in areas controlled by the West. By attempting to sabotage the Marshall Plan and instigating the Korean War, the Russians deliberately abandoned the policy of liquidating the last war and started a political drive which could well result in another major conflict. This should not be taken to mean that the Soviet Union intends to start a third world war. It suggests rather that the Kremlin is subjecting the West to the greatest possible pressure in order to make maximum political gains, secretly hoping that the Western powers will be incapable of responding to this pressure effectively, but accepting the risk of war and remaining determined not to return to the ways of peaceful coexistence unless forced to do so. In brief, one of the reasons why the Russians have not allowed postwar tensions to be relaxed is that this has not appeared in their interest. Events so far have proved them right.

Postwar Western Policies

This raises the question whether the policies followed by the democracies in the immediate postwar period were of a character to persuade the Soviet Union that such a belligerent course was undesirable. In other words, supposing that an opportunity for the relaxation of East-West tension had existed between 1945 and 1948, were Western policies flexible enough to take advantage of it?

The answer must be in the negative. The failure of the United Nations, like that of the League, was not accidental. It was a political error to hope that serious international disputes could

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be settled by inviting the opponent to tie himself to an international organization where he would be in a minority and would be forced either to sabotage or desert the organization. It was an error of vision to suppose that an international society in the grip of the most profound revolutionary crisis of its history could be expected to submit to the rule of law.

There is a fundamental difference between national and international systems. A state can exist for centuries under the same body of public law without need of major modification. Anarchy is the limiting case. By contrast, revolutionary processes are commonplace in the society of nations. From its beginnings, the international system has been essentially anarchical. True, at certain periods it has been seemingly stabilized by means of pseudo-equilibria. But these have been challenged by wars and have always been too precarious to permit nations to subject themselves to a legal order.

The sharp differences between national and international systems can be attributed to two basic factors:

(1) The legal order, in national systems, merely expresses in formal language the acquiescence of individuals in the existing social process and in its operating rules. Only in times of crisis does the opposition grow numerous enough to challenge the assumption of adequate consent. When this happens, and the existing system no longer rests on a broad consensus, it can still be maintained by force until it is amended or materially changed. On the other hand, the anarchical character of the international system follows directly from the fact that it contains a very small number of members: a few dozen small and middle powers dominated by several great powers. This arithmetical fact means that the rule of law, which in national systems rests on the consent of an overwhelming majority, can be based in an international system only on the unanimous consent of the great powers. In national systems unanimity is not necessary, for the dissent of an individual or group, particularly when not organized territorially, cannot upset the legal system or deprive it of the underlying consensus of the majority. However, if a single great power

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opposes the rule of international law, it destroys both consensus and law.

(2) National systems rest on an advanced and complex division of functions which has served to maintain national cohesion over the ages. In these systems, individuals normally act in complementary fashion, and only in rare and extreme cases do conflicts of interest become sharp enough to break up their solidarity. In the international system, by contrast, conflicting interests outweigh complementary interests even in normal times. If a complex division of functions is basic to national systems, competition characterizes the international environment. The nation-states are not fused together either by the pressure of a social community which is superior to the states that compose it, or by a division of functions of the complexity found in national societies. These essential differences have thus far condemned to failure any attempt at creating a meaningful order of international law.

The consequence is that war between nation-states is not comparable to the methods by which individuals settle their differences within the state. Wars in the international system are analogous to revolutions in national societies. They represent a challenge to existing international relations by a state or states strong enough to destroy the social fabric; and the creation of an international police force in the name of the law does not suffice to meet their challenge. Generally, if an aggressor does not dispose of a military force at least equal to that of the supporters of the established order, he will not risk precipitating an armed conflict, and the problem of suppressing war does not actually arise.

To be sure, in a national system where law rests on a consensus of the majority, force can be used to reconcile a minority of refractory individuals to the existing order. But recourse to force is far less useful in the international system, where the authority of law can rest securely only on the unanimous consent of the interested powers. This consent, in turn, can result only from an international compatibility of immediate interests. What law and force are impotent to achieve today may be realized some

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day when the international conflict of interests gives way to an international community of interests. But that day had not arrived in 1945, and the formation of the United Nations merely obscured this issue.

Having created the United Nations in the image of their moral and legalistic conception of international society, the Western powers proceeded to make particularly dangerous use of it; they protested systematically—and for reasons of pure principle—against the integration of the Eastern European countries into the Soviet bloc. This extension of the Soviet zone of influence was, after all, the logical consequence of Russia's victory over Germany. By agreeing to this development in advance at Yalta, the Western powers accepted an historical calamity. Once Germany had been defeated and disarmed, Russia became naturally the leading power in that part of Europe. It would have required a war to prevent the USSR from reaping this gain, as it would now require a war to expel her from Eastern Europe.

The Western intervention in the Soviet zone was as dangerous for world peace as was the Soviet intervention in Western Europe. The Russians had no choice but to infer that the people who wanted to retake with one hand what they had given with the other at Yalta did not really desire cooperation. In common with war, revolution demands absolute discipline on the part of the troops engaged in the struggle. It also demands the complete destruction of the social enemy. Asking a revolutionary power to institute free elections in its zone of influence makes no more sense than asking that the outcome of a war be decided by a referendum among the opposing armies. An effort to push back the Soviet hegemony was doing to the Russians what we did not want them to do to us. It made the establishment of a new political order very difficult, and it represented a policy to which the West could not allocate sufficient resources.

Current Western Programs

The failure of that policy, and the growing realization in the West that the old European order could not be re-established, has led the democracies to attempt the creation of a situation of

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strength which would stand impregnable against the flow of Soviet power. After five years we are in a position to evaluate this effort and determine its utility as a means of obtaining the peace of Europe.

The effort in question has been directed to the solution of two major problems: the strategic problem, and the economic or social problem. Both merit close examination in view of the importance attached to them by the statesmen of the West.

(1) Basically, there are two ways of approaching the defense of Europe. One way would be to mobilize and commit all available Western forces to Europe in time of peace. Such a step would involve the risk of a major defeat at the outset of a conflict, leaving the Western powers stripped of reserves as was the case in 1940. Another way would be to distribute the major American forces outside the European theater, leaving Europe itself to activate, let us say, only fifty divisions flanked by symbolic American contingents. This alternative does not solve the problem of effectively defending all of Western Europe; but it makes it possible to maintain the aggregate of Western forces at a sufficiently high level to discourage direct aggression at the present time, or to retaliate in the event that war occurs.

Initially the West attempted to follow both courses at once by combining enormous American rearmament at the periphery with a large military establishment in Europe consisting almost exclusively of European divisions. Experience, however, has now shown that Europe as presently constituted is incapable of a military effort great enough to withstand the initial shock of a massive invasion. In these circumstances, the Western powers are being compelled to adopt the peripheral solution, although they speak to the contrary for politically valid reasons. Already on February 1, 1951, General Eisenhower spelled out before Congress the principle involved:

> We cannot concentrate all our forces in any one sector, even one as important as Western Europe. We must largely sit here with great, mobile, powerful reserves ready to support our policies, our rights, our interests wherever they may be in danger in the world.[3]

[3] *Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area*, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed

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Thus, the military force available in Europe can account for hardly more than a holding action, although it is true that new tactical weapons may give this force a certain capacity for autonomous defense difficult to assess in advance. Admittedly, the military weakness of Europe is only relative. The Europeans and, more generally, the entire Western world could make a greater military effort, but they have no will to do so. They accept the necessity of spending a part of their resources on rearmament, but they are unwilling to reduce their standard of living appreciably. Indeed, the only difference between Europe and America in this respect lies in the fact that the United States possesses a larger margin of resources available for defense than does Europe. But in America, as in Europe, rearmament policies are viewed critically by public opinion and legislatures.

The state of European opinion can be explained in various ways. The standard of living in Italy, France, and Germany is considered by wage earners as a precarious minimum. Public opinion in these countries does not believe that the Russians will attack Europe directly, and turns a deaf ear to all attempts to present the danger in more subtle and realistic ways. Furthermore, continental opinion does not believe any longer in Europe's ability to defend itself without the permanent presence of large Anglo-Saxon forces. Defeat of the military cover force is deemed probable in the event of a massed Russian attack, as is the breakdown of civilian morale after the destruction of the great continental cities, even if, by some miracle, the European army should make a stand between the Elbe and the Rhine. In other words, there is little hope that a satisfactory solution to the problem of European defense can be found. The expectation is that, in the event of atomic war, Europe's capacity for resistance will collapse because of her demographic structure, the density of her urban population, her geographic isolation, and her proximity to the invader.

Consideration of the military position of the United States relative to that of the USSR does not radically alter this estimate

Services, United States Senate, 82nd Congress, 1st session, U.S. Govt. Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1951.

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of Europe's defensibility. In order to prevent the Soviet Union from intervening effectively in areas outside her existing sphere of influence, the United States would have to dispose of an extra margin of power as great as Russia would need if she wanted to prevent the United States from annexing Mexico, Colombia, or Argentina. Because of the long lines of communications separating the United States from peripheral theaters of operation, and because of the relative American inferiority in manpower, the United States cannot count on enjoying such military strength in the event of war. Its present superiority, to the extent that it exists, depends therefore on its stockpile of atomic weapons.

This slim and temporary margin of superiority cannot be considered encouraging in the long run from the point of view of Europe. From the day that the Soviet capability in atomic weapons balances that of the United States, these two great powers, by virtue of their retaliatory capabilities, become more or less invulnerable, and the more aggressive of them need only employ the policy of limited expansion, so successfully practiced by Hitler, in order to impose his will on the other in Europe and in Asia. The danger of a desperate reaction on the part of the United States is at present negligible. But this danger may grow if the world position of the West continues to deteriorate, as it seems likely to do. It is when the strategic situation of a great power becomes precarious that fear, and the desire to terminate the state of insecurity, induce it to adopt a dangerous policy.

Thus, it is improbable that Russia will be able to defeat the United States in America in the foreseeable future. But it is not improbable that Russia will be able to impose her sway over Europe once she has developed a major atomic capability, and the threat of retaliation no longer holds her back.

(2) The second aspect of recent democratic efforts has been concerned with the economic integration of Western Europe. The assumption here has been that if it were possible to make a second United States out of Western Europe, including the establishment of a huge domestic market, the combined power of the two continents would be large enough to upset completely the present balance of political forces. This would permit the

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peaceful solution of all problems pending between East and West.

The economic unification of Western Europe is therefore a most attractive political idea. It must be realized, however, that a policy leading to that goal can have significance only to the extent that it promises vast results within a short time. The prospects for such a success are, unfortunately, very dim. Solving the problem of the cold war by bringing about a large-scale resurgence of power in Western Europe requires more than the relative stabilization of economic and social conditions in these countries. It requires that Western Europe become a great world power based on a much more elaborate wealth of resources than she now possesses. No one can seriously believe that such a change will be brought about, say, in ten years, assuming even that the West has ten years in which to achieve this goal.

No one in Europe or anywhere else has the political power necessary to realize such a project. Those statesmen who have identified themselves with the goal have attempted a task that surpasses their influence. Throughout history, substantial institutional changes have occurred only under pressure from the governed. At present, this sort of pressure is non-existent in Europe. In principle, of course, everybody favors unification. In practice, virtually nobody wants it seriously, and this lack of popular demand for unity condemns the attempt to failure. One cannot, at the same time, do everything to render the existence of the masses bearable within the national framework and hope that these same masses will turn their backs on the nation-state. They will reject their national systems only when these approach complete collapse, and this is not happening at present. As long as it does not happen, the masses will remain inert. Therefore, it is reasonable to hope that current efforts will succeed in stabilizing the European economy and in assuring that Europe will be more than a sick partner in the Western alliance. It is useless to hope for more and to imagine that Europe can again become a great power within a brief period of time.

This does not mean that the present program for European integration should be abandoned. It means only that we would

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be wise to attach to it a lesser degree of importance and attention than it is now receiving. The democracies are at present squandering a great deal of political energy on a task that surpasses their capacity, while they are neglecting another task which is feasible and more essential because it is more urgent and indispensable. To raise production and free Europe of her dependence upon direct American economic aid, safeguard social welfare, liberalize international trade, give Europe a modest but solid army—these are, as such, excellent objectives. But to push toward a type of political integration which cannot, at best, bear fruit for a long time, and which would have to be revised drastically if it should again become possible to expand East-West trade and unify Germany, is to aim too high. It is clear that by playing this game we risk distorting and straining those international mechanisms such as NATO which have a purely strategic function. It is clear also that this game is highly disconcerting to a public opinion which senses that what is being asked of it is beyond its capacity to deliver.

Dilemmas of the West

Perhaps current Western policy will have more favorable consequences than are predicted here. But if the foregoing estimates of the European situation are correct, it would be wise to recognize that time is working on the side of the Soviet Union, and that a new Western policy is required. Before formulating such a policy it would be well to acknowledge these aspects of the postwar experience:

(1) The USSR wants the world revolution, but promotes it by armed force only in local conflicts where revolutionary situations have developed in the enemy camp. The Soviet Union will not try to force a decision by general war as long as American power is what it is and as long as the social structure of the free world is not in complete disorganization.

(2) Meanwhile, Soviet action, if not restrained, runs the risk of impelling the democracies to resort to force. The danger for the future lies not only in direct and large-scale aggression by Russia against the West. It lies also in a preventive war started

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by the West against a Soviet bloc that is out to destroy the free world by the exercise of persistent political pressure, and by means of aggression with limited objectives.

(3) On the one hand, if Europe were to let herself slide into a neutrality of despair, it would become very difficult for the United States—lacking direct geographical contact with the Soviet Union—to find a basis for negotiating with that power. On the other hand, twenty divisions more or less in Europe will not change by very much the ratio of power in the world.

(4) Since revolutionary expansion is, in its present form, based on the military capacity of the USSR, it cannot be arrested except by the dismantling of this military power. Therefore, the supreme objective of the democratic countries must be the bilateral disarmament of East and West, if necessary by threat of war.

(5) Either the United States possesses enough atomic power to demand a settlement with good chance of success, or it lacks this power, in which event it becomes useless to enter into negotiations. Since it seems likely that the United States still possesses atomic superiority, the following policy for the West is based on this central hypothesis.

The Problem of Objectives

The cold war has in common with "hot war" that it also demands a "declaration of aims" which permits people to visualize the end of their trial and the return to a more normal situation. Public opinion will support the democratic governments more strongly if the objectives of the cold war are better defined and understood by the masses. This condition does not at present prevail.

It is often said that the democracies should re-examine the principles on which their policy is based. But this is not enough. The fact is that the democratic countries do not have a policy at all, if by policy is meant that its proponents know what they want and where they want to go. Rearmament and economic rehabilitation are policy *means*. They are by themselves not enough to solve the problem of objectives. This lack of policy is particularly

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grave, for as long as governments have not sorted out their thoughts and arrived at a system of clearly defined goals, public opinion will remain inert and condemn the actions of their leaders to failure.

It is true that it may be risky to make one's intentions known in advance. To some extent, this means tying one's hands for the future. In present circumstances, however, it would be more dangerous not to make one's objectives known or, what is worse, not to have any objectives. The West can substitute a policy of taking a forceful initiative for the almost hopeless policy of building defenses against Soviet pressure. Or it can pull back, although this will doubtless involve war. How much better would it be if Western policy-makers were to clarify their conception of coexistence while there is time and before the force of circumstances or popular impatience compels leaders to take extreme positions that surpass the means at their disposal and risk precipitating an armed conflict. To declare our aims now would perhaps be the best way of preventing ourselves from sliding into an irremediable calamity and from assuming that we enjoy the degree of initiative that the West had in 1946.

The respective merits of a defensive or offensive political strategy have been discussed frequently. Yet neither can solve the Western problem. The first cannot do so because time does not work for the West and because it leaves the initiative to Russia; and the second does not do so because it is terribly dangerous and requires a capacity for action altogether out of keeping with what is available. There is, however, an intermediate formula which recognizes the need for putting pressure on the USSR and yet uses this pressure only to secure peaceful coexistence and reliable disarmament. It is this policy which will now be analyzed.

Disarmament

Clearly, any serious *détente* will be impossible as long as the Russians are able to accumulate arms of mass destruction under conditions of absolute secrecy. It is equally evident that the Russians will not disarm just because the West asks them politely to do so. Here as elsewhere, success will require active intimidation.

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This does not at all mean that the USSR will be susceptible to unlimited demands when it comes to important matters and, especially, to matters involving the continuation of the Soviet regime. If the democratic powers can easily accept international control of their war industries, this is not so for the Russians. Their present regime, based as it is on dictatorship, requires the absolute discipline of the masses and the complete rupture of contacts with the outside world. To ask the Russians to open their frontiers, to re-establish cultural exchange and freedom of the press, to put in force a democratic constitution founded on individual liberties effectively safeguarded—all this is to ask them to change their form of government and this is obviously unacceptable to their ruling groups.

Whatever threat they face, the Russians will never accept a control mechanism which would, sooner or later, undermine their regime. The problem of democratizing Russia's system of government must not be confused with the problem of security. The former objective is beyond the limits of feasibility. The second can be achieved if it is separated rigorously from any policy of changing Soviet ideology. A practical plan for disarmament therefore requires a realistic appreciation of what can be accepted by the Communist rulers.

When the question was debated at the United Nations, the Americans proposed the internationalization of atomic industries and the international inspection of their sub-contracting centers. This was a realistic way of attacking the problem. Substantial and bilateral reduction of conventional armaments would have to be part of the plan. International control is an indispensable prerequisite, since it will be impossible to organize the reduction of armed forces and the international pooling of atomic industries as long as operations anywhere on Soviet territory are not under effective surveillance. Were it necessary for this purpose to tear down the Iron Curtain, the problem would be unsolvable. What Russia could accept would be inspection entrusted to a corps of international agents whose activity would be so regulated as to make sure that their freedom of movement on Soviet territory and their permanent presence in Russian armament centers were

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strictly confined to their job. And, obviously, inspection would have to be reciprocal. Such an enterprise would amount to no less than making military espionage a legally acceptable practice of international relations.

It may be objected that no control system can compel the Russians to disarm or prevent them from rearming after they have reduced their military strength. On the basis of past evidence, this is a plausible objection and international security cannot be realized unless the USSR genuinely accepts disarmament for one reason or another. The entire problem is precisely one of persuading the Russians to accept mutual disarmament, and this can be done only if they are persuaded that the continuation of the present state of affairs will lead to war. The function of control is not to force the enemy to disarm but to testify to the reality and dependability of disarmament once it is accepted. There is no other way of creating a healthy climate of security.

Complete elimination is a Utopian dream as far as conventional arms are concerned. But the distinction which technological development allows to be drawn ever more neatly between essentially defensive and offensive arms seems to simplify this problem. A drastic cutback in the number of heavy bombers, heavy armor, and guided missiles would appreciably lessen the offensive potential of armies without requiring the two power blocs to slash their defense forces below a level reasonably in line with their security requirements.

It cannot be reiterated often enough that disarmament is the primary and indispensable condition of any East-West settlement, no matter what other provisions such a *détente* may contain. The West can never devote itself seriously to economic and social reorganization and progress unless it is released from the obligation to arm to the teeth. If this central problem is incapable of solution, negotiation with the USSR is useless. As long as the military forces of that power remain at their high level, any political accord, no matter how much parity it embodies, will not be worth the paper it is written on.

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Spheres of Influence

Apparently, Western planners find it hard to understand that peaceful coexistence between East and West demands important political and ideological sacrifices from both parties. It must be realized that asking the Russians no longer to infiltrate the Western world is asking them to abandon the Communist movements in the West and to renounce for an indefinite time the global revolution which has been their foremost objective in the past and the *raison d'être* of their political system. They could agree to these conditions provided we let them have a free hand in the countries which they control and whose regimes are close to theirs. The peace cannot be saved if the West announces its intention to convert the Communist countries to its conception of social organization.

In brief, the present territorial status quo must not be questioned. The frontier of the West follows the Iron Curtain. It must be made secure by a settlement and not shifted in one direction or another, for this line expresses the balance of power between the two systems and neither of them disposes of sufficient power to force any appreciable change at the present time. To abandon the satellite nations certainly presents the West with a grave moral problem. But the liberation of a hundred million corpses through war poses a still more formidable problem which no responsible person dares to take on.

The dominant feature of the postwar situation has been the progressive formation, in the world, of two giant political systems, each pretending to absolute sovereignty. The only remedy for the cold war, thus, is to ratify this evolution legally by affirming in a treaty the principle of non-interference by one system in the affairs of the other. East and West must treat each other strictly as sovereigns.

Such a recommendation, of course, is easy enough to make; but will the Kremlin ever renounce its policy of interference in the Western zone? Certainly the Soviet leaders have no reason to renounce the political benefits they derive from exercising this pressure, at least as long as they are not convinced that a general territorial stabilization of the Revolution at its present

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boundaries is the sole means of avoiding an armed conflict. In other words, we must face up to the fact that they will make such a renunciation only if they fear that the West is prepared to replace talk with military action. Thus far, the Russians have certainly not been afraid of the Western countries. In fact, no policy has ever been pursued with more *sang-froid* than that of the Kremlin. If the Bolsheviks had been acting out of fear, they would not have provoked American rearmament by intervening in the Korean War, and they would not have seized every opportunity for exasperating their great opponent. Their entire behavior indicates, rather, that they believe the United States to be incapable of reacting seriously to their thrusts. Soviet leaders have felt acute fear only once since the civil war; that was in the period between 1939 and 1941. Then, without sacrificing essentials, they made sensational concessions. This precedent should be carefully weighed, not only as a clue to their political mentality, but also as a key to Western action.

The German Problem

The political frontier of the West would be easier to define if the Iron Curtain coincided, over its entire length, with the boundaries of states. Unfortunately, the Iron Curtain cuts across Germany and this places the first of the European powers in a political situation without precedent. The two parts of Germany have not been formally annexed by the two opposing camps. Indeed, the possibility of an eventual reunification of Germany remains one of the main preoccupations of statesmen.

It is impossible to formulate a program for the settlement of the cold war without taking a clear-cut position on the German problem, no matter whether the reunification or the definitive division of that country is favored. For several reasons, Germany's reunification constitutes necessarily the third condition of an amicable settlement of the cold war. Being a symbol of the present political division of the world, the partition of Germany need not survive from the moment when the two systems now in conflict decide to coexist peacefully. More important, whether the cold war comes to an end will depend on whether Germany

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can be reunified with the consent of all interested powers and on a basis which is without peril for all.

Impressed by the last two world wars, many people in Europe and elsewhere cannot understand that the chance of German hegemony has definitely passed. This possibility is a matter of the past not because Germany has been defeated, for countries can recover from defeat, but because the circumstances that permitted her to aim at European supremacy have ceased to operate. It suffices to recall the history of the last two centuries in order to realize that it was the feebleness of Czarist Russia which allowed Prussia to bid for the first role in Europe. The re-entry into the European theater of two hundred million Russians, backed by a powerful industrial structure, has put an end to this state of affairs. Wedged between the Slavic and the Anglo-Saxon bloc, Germany has ceased to count as a great power.

Yet if Germany by herself is no longer powerful enough to endanger the peace, her complete absorption into either the Western or the Eastern camp would at present be so much to the detriment of the other as to signify an intolerable disturbance of the balance of power. This eventuality poses for the world a new German problem hardly less difficult than the traditional one. In control of Germany, the Russians would also control the rest of Western Europe, which would then really be no more than an appendage of Asia. On the other hand, if Germany were to fall entirely into the Western orbit, the pressure of an integrated Germany on Poland and on all satellite states would be strong enough to challenge Russian control over central Europe. The reunion of Germany, while the cold war is in full sway, would necessarily lead to one of these two results. In fact, it is indispensable in a world as divided as at present that the reunification of Germany should not be attempted under conditions that would induce either the East or the West to do everything to attract Germany into their camp. On the other hand, it is impossible to create a neutral zone in the very heart of Europe while the cold war remains unabated.

Still, the Western powers cannot afford to abstain from making German unity one of their supreme objectives, for in the long

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run the Germany of Bonn cannot be kept in the Western alliance if this alignment means the definitive division of Germany. The Germans desire unity, and they will demand it more vigorously as time goes on. Temporarily, their aspirations have been subdued because the Germans want first to achieve legal equality and, in order to do so, they cannot make unification a condition of tying themselves to the West. Once this aim has been attained, however, the Germans will find it difficult even in their own thinking to reconcile their desire for unity with integration in the Western camp. In fact, Chancellor Adenauer has gone so far as to declare that the alignment of Western Germany with the West will eventually lead to the reunification of all of Germany. To his mind, Germany can achieve this goal only through the combined strength of Western Germany and the Western powers. The Socialist leaders, following the lead of the late Kurt Schumacher, are of a different opinion. They believe the Western orientation to be incompatible with the reunification of their country. They do not think the Western powers are strong enough to force this unification against Russian opposition. Besides, they believe this policy to be dangerous and are convinced that the alignment of Bonn with the West can only lead to an impasse. But the two parties differ only on the means by which to achieve German unity. Both hold such unity to be essential. The majority of Germans today feel probably closer to the Socialist view than to Adenauer's. What is certain is that even those Germans who support Adenauer do so in the hope that his policy will bring about the reunion of both Germanies. Should they find that this hope is unrealistic, they will undoubtedly abandon the Western camp and attempt to negotiate directly with the USSR.

At this point, it may be useful to assess Russia's German policy. Shortly before his death, Schumacher declared to a group of American reporters: "The partition of Germany is the trump card in Soviet foreign policy." What he wanted to convey is that the incompatibility of German unification with Germany's integration in the West opens immense possibilities for Soviet diplomacy. In theory, Russia could at any time rupture the mili-

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tary and economic ties binding Western Germany to the Western coalition by offering to restore the eastern provinces to Western Germany and by leaving the German Communist party to its own devices. It is unlikely that the Soviet leaders consider this sacrifice worth making at present; the military and economic weakness of the West does not justify such a radical step. Why should they give up fifteen million people and a dominating position in central Europe in order to undo the Western integration, which so far exists only on paper? Nevertheless, the Russians can resort to a subtle and powerful argument. By simply insisting, incessantly and publicly, that the integration of Western Germany into the Western coalition seals the permanent division of Germany, they can preserve indefinitely the willingness of Western Germany to seek cooperation with the USSR. As long as the Germans have one eye on Western Europe and the other on Moscow, they can be only an uncertain asset and a source of endless trouble to the West.

Such is the implication of the appeals to German unity which the Russians have addressed to German public opinion this year. This situation will not change until the statesmen of the West have understood that they cannot escape from guaranteeing to Germany that their present policy will lead to a settlement which includes German unity without undue delay and on conditions which are precise and promise success. Today it is the West which, in the eyes of the German public, is responsible for the division of Germany because the Western policy of integration ignores the issue. If the Western countries were to reverse their policy and demonstrate unmistakably that they intend to advocate reunion of all of Germany, the Russian opposition to unity would become clearly visible and there could be some hope that the Germans would reliably embrace the political program of the West.

On the other hand, there is great danger, if the West shows itself unable to promote Germany's reunification in a manner acceptable to the USSR, that the Germans will press the West to seek a solution by force and this could only mean a general war. The Germans are not supporting the West for nothing.

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Their principal objective remains German unity. In a coalition of which Western Germany becomes more and more an essential part and which, in Europe at least, can achieve nothing without this partner, Bonn will gain the position of calling the tune. Either the Germans will operate a double game, playing off East against West—in which case their support of the Western world will always be in doubt—or they will give this support firmly—in which case they will expect to be reunified, be it by means of force or by means of agreement between all interested parties. These are the alternatives which Western policy-makers must face.

Thus, it becomes necessary for the Western allies to favor German unity in order to protect themselves against the defection of Bonn. But it is equally necessary for the West to remain free to reunify Germany in accord with the Russians if it wishes to leave open the chance of terminating the cold war as soon as it is strong enough to force the Russians into a settlement. Hence, if German unity is a prerequisite of German participation in Western policy, it is also the prerequisite of a general settlement of the East-West conflict. This is the second aspect of the German problem.

The policy problem is basically simple. Russia and the West each control a fraction of Germany. Neither will give up its stake without compensating advantages. Since it is impracticable to base world policy on the permanent partition of a great nation, the only solution, acceptable to all, is Germany's reunification under conditions which guarantee that she will not be controlled by either party to the current world conflict. This solution means the political neutralization of Germany. Such a formula appears to inspire no confidence anywhere and hence has been widely rejected. This is a deplorable error. Although not feasible during a period of high tension, Germany's neutralization, along with other appropriate measures, would be an excellent way of terminating the cold war.

The formula of neutralization could be applied without risk only if certain conditions were accepted in the Peace Treaty:

(1) The recognition, on the part of Russia and the Western

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Allies, of the complete and inalienable sovereignty of the unified German State.

(2) The establishment in Germany of a democratic form of government based on effective political freedoms.

(3) Access of German exports to the markets of the East and the West.

(4) The reduction of German armaments to the level prescribed in a general disarmament agreement.

Such a statute would be in the general interest. Under conditions of general disarmament, the grant of sovereignty to Germany would render impossible any resumption of the struggle between East and West for control over that country. The economic provision would offer Germany a degree of social stability that would discourage there any tendency to embrace either Fascism or Communism. Politically and socially neutralized, and freed of its germs of extremism, Germany would cease to imperil the peace. Furthermore, once reunified on this basis, Germany would have every interest in preserving her privileged position. By leaning too much on the USSR, Germany would endanger her political regime. By identifying herself with the Western camp, she would risk the loss of the Eastern markets, which are indispensable to her economy, and would thereby undermine her social equilibrium. Neutralization, in other words, would also be in Germany's interest.

Neutralization is the only solution of the German problem that can be negotiated. To renounce this solution is to renounce all chance of negotiating a settlement of the cold war. Naturally, it is not a solution without drawbacks. For one thing, it would require a softening of the policy aspiring to the economic integration of Europe. It would also require that Germany give up any claim to having her boundaries with Poland modified. This is indeed an extreme demand which the Germans must in any case abandon. They can scarcely hope to find anyone in the West foolish enough to support Germany in an attempt to reconquer the territories she held in 1939.

To conclude, to hand over all of Germany to the Germans is to hand her over to no one else. It is the only way of removing

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the most explosive issue of the cold war. And it is urgent that this be realized before it is too late.

East-West Trade

The resurrection of world trade is clearly the fourth condition for a summary settlement of the cold war. No doubt, the Iron Curtain will remain a political boundary line. But it need not remain impermeable to the exchange of goods and services. The problem is not one either of creating a genuine world society of nations or of cutting up the world like a cake. In the economic sphere, the world is a natural unit. Without restoring this unity, without resumed contact between the productive centers of the West and the markets of the East, the international situation cannot be normalized. This condition is in no way inconsistent with those already defined. On the contrary, it completes the list of essential prerequisites. Nations can be fully sovereign and yet trade with each other. Besides, this condition is in the interest of both groups of nations. The present commercial restrictions result from strategic considerations and, once these are made obsolete by universal disarmament, there is no reason why East-West trade should not be allowed to expand.

At present Europe is confronted, on the one hand, by the United States which can do little for her in the economic field, and, on the other hand, by the saturation of her domestic markets whose further expansion and exploitation would be a time-consuming task, in turn now subordinated to the policy of European integration. In these circumstances, Western Europe's economic difficulties can be eased immediately and substantially only by the resumption of large-scale exports to the East. The same reasoning applies more emphatically to Germany and Japan. The reopening of Eastern markets would immediately make the economies of these two countries viable and would provide Europe with a degree of prosperity which she cannot attain in her present isolation. The Eastern nations, furthermore, would reap advantages hardly less spectacular, for the import of capital equipment from the West would greatly accelerate their economic development.

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The Question of Acceptability

Of these minimum conditions of a settlement of the cold war, three—disarmament, the legal delineation of spheres of influence, and the restoration of East-West trade—are immediately compatible with the policy thus far pursued by the West. Only the fourth condition—the political neutralization of a united Germany—presents a delicate problem because it is inconsistent with the absolute and irreversible integration of Western Germany into a democratic Europe. However, the danger encompassed by this policy of German integration with the West lies in its unilateral and rigid character rather than in the principle of integration. It is foolish for the West to follow the present policy and yet hope that, some day, the USSR will voluntarily and spontaneously enter into comprehensive negotiations with the West. Yet it is possible to conceive of Western Germany's rearmament and integration as a means of pressure toward obtaining a settlement, provided the West remains ready to abandon this policy as a concession.

This does not mean that a settlement would be negotiated at the expense of a Germany which, to strengthen the West, had first been attracted into the Western coalition. The diplomatic strategy here proposed would obviously require the consent of the Germans. This consent could probably be secured, especially if the German Socialists should win the next elections, as is by no means unlikely. Even now, the foreign policy platform of the German Socialists is very close to the proposed solution. This is understandable, for the Germans can hardly hope to do better than achieve unity as well as the reconstitution of their sovereignty within the framework of a relaxation of the East-West conflict. And only by a solution along these lines can Germany hope to escape the fate of Korea.

What would happen to Western European Union in the event of German unification can be assessed only if the effects of unification on the military, economic, and political aspects of the proposed union are studied separately.

If Germany were reunified simultaneously with a general accord on disarmament, she also would be disarmed to the same

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extent as all other powers. The military alignment of Germany with her Western neighbors would then be of little value. Having attained the chief end, which is peace, one could discard the means, which is military strength.

Economic integration poses a more complicated problem, especially integration proceeding under the Schuman Plan. This plan could hardly remain untouched should it really come to function, as intended, in our time. If necessary, however, it could, without being abandoned, be loosened as far as Germany is concerned and adapted to the larger perspectives of an expanding world trade—a development which would in any event require a complete revision of Western economic policy.

The political integration of Western Germany in the Western camp, however, is clearly inconsistent with Germany's reunification on the basis of absolute sovereignty, and hence would have to be undone. This is one more reason for not accelerating this integration and for preserving enough freedom of maneuver for retracing one's steps. The elimination of European trade barriers and the encouragement of trade are objectives fully compatible with the eventual reconstitution of German sovereignty. But to integrate Western Germany politically and institutionally in an irreversible manner is to present the Soviet Union with an unacceptable condition.

In short, the West would do well to speak to the Russians as follows in the course of secret conversations: "We shall incorporate Western Germany in the Western camp and rearm her. You have forced us to do so and we have no intention of reconsidering this policy under present circumstances. In fact, we are determined to push Western German rearmament to the limit. As long as the cold war continues, we shall not change that country's status. On the other hand, we are willing to offer our conditions for a general settlement of the cold war. These conditions include the political neutralization and definite reunification of Germany. All our peace aims are interrelated and not subject to separate solutions. You have your choice. Either you persist in your present game and we are forced to rearm Germany despite the risk of finding ourselves obliged to support

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against you German territorial demands that may precipitate war between us. Or you agree to negotiate in earnest and give our propositions for peace full consideration. In fact, we will make a maximum effort to impose our conditions on you should you be recalcitrant. You have the choice between negotiation on a footing of equality and negotiation forced on you and involving grave risks of war. Now it is for you to talk."

The Flexibility of Soviet Policy

Even if the above proposals make sense, it may well be asked whether the Russians are susceptible to intimidation. If they are not and the proposed policy is executed, no matter how skillfully, there is grave danger that a third world war will be precipitated as a result.

The only way of answering this query without becoming involved in endless discussion is to consult once again the basic writings that guide the Soviet leaders in matters of political tactics and to observe how these men have applied these principles in the past.

It is enough to reread *Mein Kampf* in order to understand that Hitler was the type of frantic leader who was incapable of deviating an inch from the aim he had set himself. The problem posed by the Soviet elite is of a different character. In fact, it is the reverse of the Hitlerian problem of fifteen years ago. First, Stalin is not a madman but a man of rare political *sang-froid*; secondly, there is no economic or nationalist pressure driving the USSR into aggressive war; and thirdly, the Soviet regime is not, as was Hitler's, based on prestige. Notably in matters of foreign policy, it can permit itself the most abrupt changes without being embarrassed by their effects on public opinion at home.

Stalin himself has taken great pains to develop the principle of political resilience in the face of superior counterforce. He has declared repeatedly that one must maneuver with one's reserves when the enemy is strong and retreat is inevitable; and that it is notoriously bad to accept battle when the enemy wants it. This is the rule of the game as defined by the leader of the opponent and the West must abide by it if it wants to win. To be

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strong (rearmament); to be in a position to force a battle (intimidation); to leave to the enemy the possibility of retreat—these are, in the opinion of the Soviet Marshal, the three conditions of a successful operation.

Stalin has too often protested his belief in the possibility of peaceful coexistence with the West to admit doubt of his determination to fall back on such a policy if necessary, but only if necessary. Moreover, Stalin has not limited himself to announcements of principles of strategy. It is often doubted that the Russians will some day consent—under Western pressure—to adjourn their hopes to dominate the world. How do the skeptics know? How many chances were apparent, *before 1939*, that the Soviets might support Nazi aggression against the West, send vital supplies to wartime Germany, and go so far as to use the Communist parties of the West in the service of Hitler's adventure? There were none. And yet this is what Russia did. She did this because she had no choice but to do so. To yield to Nazi demands was for her the only way of avoiding the first attack and preserving the prospects of an uncertain future. She did not back down because the German demands were as such acceptable to her. The present situation may well be, in essentials, repetitive of conditions in 1940 and 1941. If the present analysis is correct—and it is based on the very principles of strategy to which the Soviets adhere—Russia will more readily disarm and temporarily renounce any interference in the West, which apparently is not ripe for revolution in any case, than risk in a premature and pointless world war all she has built up in the East over thirty years. Western statesmen should study carefully Russia's remarkable about-face in 1939. It represents a perfect example of a revolutionary policy which is far from rigid when it comes to assuming risks and which adapts itself smoothly to all real dangers when nothing essential is endangered.

Furthermore, the four points enumerated above follow the lines of least resistance for Soviet diplomacy. The Russians have publicly accepted the principle of reciprocal disarmament, they have repeatedly stated that peaceful coexistence with the West is possible, they make frequent appeals for the resumption of

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large-scale trade, and they have themselves proposed Germany's reunification under a democratic statute. If the Allies would take them at their word and make these four points the conditions of a settlement, the Soviet leaders could hardly question the principle of negotiation. They could be evasive, maneuver, and play for time. But they could not, on essentials, propose a contrary program because the minimum Western program is, paradoxically enough, the same as theirs, and this suggests that it is the only possible program.

At the present time, the Western nations have put a power capacity, ridiculously small, at the service of demands ridiculously exaggerated, thoughtless, and ill-defined. The present situation will be greatly changed as soon as democratic statesmen understand that there is only one policy which will pay off: a policy which combines maximum power of intimidation with minimum demands.

The Question of Feasibility

The preceding complex of reflections justifies a lengthy commentary. In the following, however, no more is undertaken than a summary review of past policy and an analysis of the problem of public opinion, which is in itself at least as important as all the other problems combined.

(1) When one reviews the policy of rehabilitation followed by the Western world on American initiative during the last seven years, one can only be struck by its realism and effectiveness. The instant countermoves in Iran, Greece, Berlin, and Korea; Marshall Aid, and the constructive pressure exercised on a discouraged Europe—all these actions testify to good planning and forceful execution. Only two grievous errors were committed in connection with this series of actions: the advance of United Nations forces to the Yalu, a rash and useless step which ended in the intervention of China; and German rearmament, which, though perhaps necessary in principle, was imposed on Western Europe with a suddenness and absence of psychological preparation that could have entailed grave consequences.

Beyond doubt, a certain lack of cohesion between the United

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States and its allies has been at all times a weak spot in the Western alliance. To give only one instance of a state of affairs that is manifest in many ways: the fact that Great Britain was not invited to participate in the recent Pacific Conference, although two members of the British Commonwealth of Nations took part, is a perfect example of what should be avoided at any price, in any alliance. Policy is made neither for the past nor for the present but for the future. It will be made more effectively as soon as the foreign ministries adopt the habit of convening regularly in order to decide how they are going to act in the event that such and such possible developments take place. Like a strategic plan, a political plan must comprise as many alternatives of action as may be necessary to cope with variable and not clearly foreseeable events in the future.

On the whole, however, the errors committed in the West have generally been errors in which all nations have shared. The Europeans have the unfortunate habit of letting the United States act as it pleases until a mistake is made, which sooner or later happens to everybody, and of protesting vehemently when it is too late. This is one consequence of an inferiority complex which does Europe little credit. The situation might be improved, however, if the Europeans were asked for their opinions before irrevocable decisions are taken by the United States.

(2) With these reservations, the record of Western policy has not been bad. The means for a more forceful policy exist or are coming into being. What remains to be done is to define the over-all objective. Until now the public has been told that rearmament is necessary for defense in the event of imminent aggression. This exaggeration of the danger of war may have been useful. Of course, the danger of war does exist. But it does not exist in as simple a form as is being pretended. For this reason, the bugbear of a general and imminent war of aggression is a slogan in which no one believes any more. It has become generally understood that the commander of NATO in Europe is preparing for a campaign in which he himself does not believe. All informed people know that the West is actually rearming in order to open negotiations on the basis of strength. This is the

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real objective. But if this is so, then the policy proposed above is the only logical policy. It is useless to prepare for negotiations if the Russians are to be confronted with demands they cannot accept. It is equally useless to make reasonable demands on the Russians unless there is sufficient determination to enforce them. Is it wise, in these circumstances, to continue telling the public that Western policy has a purely defensive aim although military power will be thrown into the balance when the moment for negotiation comes? Either the West continues to wage cold war for another twenty years, with possibly fatal results, or it gets ready to terminate the conflict by a negotiated settlement, and if there must be recourse to military power in order to induce the USSR to negotiate, then it is better to prepare public support for this course of action.

(3) There is nothing wrong with rearmament, and it is certainly indispensable to define policy objectives clearly. But the best-conceived policy is worth nothing if public opinion is not prepared to support it, and this is a major weakness of the West's policy.

What can be expected from public opinion at the present time? Beyond doubt, public opinion is ready to support any defense effort necessitated by Russian aggression, be it local or general. The Korean case proves this. Public opinion is not at this time ready, however, to support negotiations in which the Western governments are determined to force a decision within the framework of a given policy. This deficiency must be remedied if any serious step is contemplated along the lines indicated. It is the function of political leaders to give proper orientation to the vague demands of the public and to see to it that public reflexes do not conflict with public interests. In free countries, particularly, this function is performed by taking the public into confidence. Curiously enough, the Western leaders—who seem to understand so well the role of propaganda and public discussion in the field of domestic politics—persist in regarding foreign policy as the province of specialists and as an art which does not require close contact between government and the governed. When spectators at a football match take passionate sides for one

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team or the other, they are able to do so because they know the rules and techniques of the game. By contrast, public opinion in the West is largely uninterested in foreign politics because it is ignorant of the real issues, of the attitudes of the parties to the conflict, and of the role which the general public might play. This public apathy is not at all surprising, since the statesmen themselves do not seem to know where they are going and miss no occasion for confessing their incertitude. It is not enough for them to give a discourse, every six months, in order to justify what has been done. It is necessary that they speak up all the time and on all levels in order to justify what they are about to do.

Therefore, the first objective must be to explain the problem of the cold war correctly to the people. At present they are being told, with much repetition and at great length, that rearmament will solve all difficulties and that, behind this costly shelter of military might, a prosperity without precedent will be created. But few people are willing to give credence to these assertions. It would be far more effective to explain to the people, and especially to the lower-income majority, that the permanent defense effort necessitated by Russian intransigence renders any further economic and social betterment impossible. Except for the United States, which can afford a measure of rearmament without cutting consumption levels, the Western nations face extremely dim economic prospects. The very day that this has been understood by the public, the idea of finding a way out of the dilemma will obtain powerful support.

The second job is to inform the public of the objective to be pursued. To lead means to lead toward something other than the perpetuation of a situation which is bearable only because it is temporary. Everyone can understand that there can be no security without disarmament and no long-term prosperity without the rehabilitation of world trade. The problems which preoccupy the general public from day to day must be related to such positive, simple, and obvious facts. To do so requires candor and frequent affirmation. It is not enough to declare once every year that the democratic nations favor disarmament. It must be re-

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peated incessantly that the democracies will not relax their efforts until disarmament has become a reality.

On the other hand, although the free nations desire real peace, there is a danger that they will lose patience. It is necessary, therefore, to canalize and utilize this latent restlessness in order to support a reasonable program. The men in the armed forces must know that they will remain in uniform indefinitely if this pleases the Russians. Taxpayers must know that taxes will rise if this pleases the Russians. Industrialists must know that normal commercial relations between nations will not return unless the Russians change their policy. The working masses must know that they cannot hope for a substantial improvement in real wages if the Russians continue in their present course. Everybody in the West must know that he has a part to play if there is to be a change in these grim prospects. Nor must the Western leaders conceal from the public that they cannot insure security against external aggression once the Soviets have developed an atomic potential large enough to deprive the West of its present superiority in this field. They must admit frankly that time is not working for the West and that their present security is highly precarious. Instead of announcing again and again that rearmament will solve the problem of world peace, they would do better to admit that this problem cannot be solved at all if it is not solved in time.

Finally, once the elements of a positive policy have been made fully public, there will remain the task of reorganizing the propaganda effort of the West. The Bolshevist responsibility for the cold war must be stressed incessantly. It is necessary to explain that, if the West does not have an unblemished record in social affairs, this does not justify the efforts of the Soviet Union to solve the world social problem by means involving the fatal risk of war. It is necessary to publish and comment on the basic texts from which Russian policy derives its inspiration. The propaganda effort of the West must not be lodged on the other side of the Iron Curtain but on this side, in America, in Europe, and wherever public opinion is in need of guidance. In fact, the main effort is required in Europe, where public opinion is the

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target of Communist propaganda. European counterpropaganda must be carefully planned by new institutions, although the chief effort can be carried out best by the main interest groups. Thus, anti-Communist pamphlets are far more effective when published by workers' organizations than by agencies which are unknown to the reader or which he has reason to distrust.

Above all, propaganda must be truthful. The man in the street is more sensible than is often assumed. He easily recognizes hollow arguments. If so many people today do not believe in the Soviet danger, this is partly because of the manner in which this danger has been presented to them. The present picture defies reality to such an extent that the average voter declines to take it seriously. The people must also be prepared against the danger of a spectacular *détente* staged by the Russians to dodge the need of giving dependable guarantees once Western pressure begins to bear fruit. Such a maneuver will always be open to the Russians. They cannot be deprived of this possible strategy unless the West formulates in advance conditions which cannot be satisfied by a temporary and purely tactical relaxation of tensions.

To repeat, three indispensable jobs need to be performed in the field of propaganda. The problem of the cold war must be correctly stated; a sound solution of the problem must be proposed to the public; and public morale must be elevated to a level required by the policy objectives.

(4) The tactics of putting pressure on the Soviet Union must be worked out. In this respect also, the problem must be seen in its full complexity. The cold war cannot be brought to an end by presenting to Stalin some afternoon an ultimatum which will elapse the following morning. Exercising political pressure intelligently is always a matter of progression. Instead of incessantly protesting their peaceful intentions, the Western democracies would do better to declare squarely to Moscow that prolonged rearmament means war unless the present conflict is resolved. The USSR must be made to understand that the Western powers will not question the territorial status quo now in existence, but that they will refuse to enter into negotiations which lack a precise program for disarmament. A policy that remains deaf to all

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distracting maneuvers and quietly follows its logical course should have a good chance of success. This means the need for shaking off the Soviet initiative which constantly forces the Western leaders to enter, for propagandist reasons, into semi-negotiations in the success of which they have no reason to believe.

What must be done is to open the door to negotiation for a comprehensive settlement while shutting it to all conferences on isolated and partial problems, with the exception of the Korean question. It is useless to seek partial solutions from an opponent who does not seek them himself. When the democracies are actually ready to negotiate, they must be prepared to mount combined political, psychological, and military pressure. By such measures as placing advance air bases under a state of alert, and by the progressive mobilization of army reserves—far better than by a harsh memorandum which cannot be withdrawn—Russia can be given to understand at the proper time that the moment has come for changing her game.

(5) The future of the Western world is somber but not desperate. At present, Communism is favored by powerful historical forces and no Western initiative short of war can prevent its further development in the areas now dominated by the USSR. Conversely, the ancient nations of Western civilization are handicapped by the same historical trends. Their colonial empires are in ruin and Europe is no longer the seat of great powers. Only the United States is in full vigor. But for how long can its power compensate for the weakness of its allies?

Since the end of the war, the balance of forces between the East and West has definitely shifted in favor of the Communists. It is for this reason that security for the West cannot be found in the reciprocal balance of two huge military establishments. Those Western leaders who seek a way of upsetting the Soviet system have understood this. But they draw the wrong conclusions from their analysis of the present state of affairs. Politics is the art of the possible, and there is no possibility that we can wrest from the Russians what they have taken. To risk a war in order to disrupt the Communist Empire now in formation would be criminal and useless. Even a victorious war could not prevent

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Asia, for which we can do little, from organizing herself against us and from finding in some kind of revolutionary dictatorship the remedy for the frightful social problem which that continent is facing. Without the development of atomic power, the West's prospects would be bleak, for the Asiatic countries are immune to the means of classical warfare and, hence, cannot be intimidated by them.

One chance, however, remains to the West. For a little while yet it will have the greater power because of its superiority in the atomic field. Although not decisive, atomic weapons permit us to threaten Russia with a terrible war which she will want to avoid, provided we know how to moderate our demands. The Soviet game is not difficult to comprehend. It consists of making democratic prosperity impossible by imposing on the West a political pressure strong enough to force it to rearm, but not strong enough to provoke a dangerous Western reaction. Presumably, also, the Russians hope to enjoy the initiative until, their lag in atomic development overcome, they can resume their forward march in Asia and Europe without having to dread retaliatory action.

The only way to checkmate this grand strategy is by throwing the West's atomic potential into the balance after Western public opinion has been prepared for such a move. The objective is not to push the Russians back but to pull their teeth and compel them to accept coexistence with the West. To be sure, such an accord, even though it comprises disarmament, will not bring about a settlement that can be expected to last forever. There are no definite solutions in politics. But there are provisional solutions and, at the beginning of the atomic era, a real pause in world conflict might have inestimable benefits for the future of civilization. There is a good chance that within half a century—equivalent to the span of time since the emergence of the automobile—the means of mass destruction will have reached a scale of development that will make resort to war impossible. We must try to hold on until then, and we can hold on only if we convince the Russians that a continuation of their present policy will lead to war in the near future.

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THE GROWTH OF NATIONS: Some Recurrent Patterns of Political and Social Integration*

By KARL W. DEUTSCH

AT many places and times, tribes have merged to form peoples; and peoples have grown into nations. Some nations founded empires; and empires have broken up again into fragments whose populations later attempted again to form larger units. In certain respects, this sequence appears to describe a general process found in much of history. This process shows a number of patterns which seem to recur, and which to a limited extent seem to be comparable among different regions, periods, and cultures.

Such recurrent patterns of integration, like other relative uniformities in history, raise the problem of the comparability or uniqueness of historical events. Yet the search for such relative uniformities in politics and history is essential to the pursuit of knowledge in these fields. No historical or political analysis can be written without the use of general concepts in which some notions of uniformity are necessarily implied.[1] Indeed, such re-

* The substance of this paper was read at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association at New York, December 28, 1951.

[1] The alternative views that all history is random, or that all important historical events are unique, involve grave philosophic difficulties. Historians who criticize the search for certain historical uniformities by their colleagues use in effect other uniformities which they prefer. Similar considerations apply to much of the debate about uniformities in other fields of social science. All knowledge involves the matching of patterns, and thus requires at least some similarities between some aspects of the events or processes studied. It thus requires some degree of relative uniformity among the processes to be investigated, in order to enable each science to proceed beyond the relatively simple and the relatively uniform to the recognition and study of those situations which are relatively complex and unique. Simplicity and uniformity, in this view, are not sweeping metaphysical assumptions about all aspects of all processes. They are properties of those aspects of processes which were first selected for investigation, or first investigated with success. With the growth of each science, this concern with the simple and the uniform reveals itself as a steppingstone to the study of more difficult matters. Cf. H. T. Pledge, *Science Since 1500*, New York, 1947, which supersedes, in this respect, the view of E. A. Burtt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science*, London, 1932, and J. H. Randall, Jr., *The Making of the Modern Mind*, 2nd ed., Boston, 1940, pp. 227-29.

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current patterns offer a background of similarities against which differences can stand out, and against which investigators can evaluate the specific and perhaps unique aspects of each particular case of national or supra-national integration.

At the same time, the study of the growth of nations may reveal cumulative change. It may suggest that the present period is unique in respect to both the extent of nationalism and the potentialities for supra-national organization. To the student of contemporary politics, it may further suggest specific problems of research and policy in the on-going process of social and political integration on the national as well as the international level.

Before discussing the recurrent problems of national integration, it may be well to note the use of a few terms. For the purposes of our discussion, a distinction is made between a *society*, which is defined as a group of persons who have learned to work together, and a *community*, which is defined as a group of persons who are able to communicate information to each other effectively over a wide range of topics.[2] A similar distinction is adopted between a *country*, which denotes a geographic area of greater economic interdependence and thus a multiple market for goods and services, and a *people*, which is a group of persons with complementary communications habits. A *nation* is then a people which has gained control over some institutions of social coercion, leading eventually to a full-fledged *nation-state*; and *nationalism* is the preference for the competitive interest of this nation and its members over those of all outsiders in a world of social mobility and economic competition, dominated by the values of wealth, power, and prestige, so that the goals of personal security and group identification appear bound up with the group's attainment of these values.[3]

While peoples are found at almost any period in history, nationalism and nations have occurred during only a few periods. A nation is the result of the transformation of a people, or of

[2] Cf. K. W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, Cambridge, Mass., and New York, 1953 (in press).

[3] *Ibid.*; and "Nationalism and the Social Scientists," in L. Bryson, *et al.*, eds., *Foundations of World Organization: A Political and Cultural Appraisal*, New York, 1952, pp. 9-20, 447-68. On recent studies in this field, cf. K. W. Deutsch, *An Interdisciplinary Bibliography on Nationalism, 1935-1951*, Boston, 1953 (in press).

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several ethnic elements, in the process of social mobilization. Thus far, however, the processes of social mobilization and communication have at no time included all mankind. The "universal states" listed by A. J. Toynbee as stages in the disintegration of particular civilizations[4] were superficial short-cuts, rather than solutions to the problem of the unity of mankind.

Periods of "universal states" have left behind them, however, a number of widespread languages, such as Latin, Greek, or Arabic; and a measure of cultural assimilation among certain social groups such as the nobility, town population, or the clergy of some "universal church."[5] The results have somewhat resembled a *layer-cake pattern*, with a high degree of cultural assimilation and participation in extended social communication among the top layers of society; a lesser degree on the intermediate levels; and little or no assimilation or participation among the mass of the population at the bottom.[6]

In several parts of the world, the cycle—from local isolation to "universal" empire and back to a new age of localism[7]—has been traversed more than once. Yet the cycle has usually shown a net gain, in the sense that there has been a gain in man's technological and scientific command over nature,[8] and that some of the most important cultural, intellectual, moral, and spiritual traditions of the earlier civilization have tended to survive that civilization in which they arose, and continue, often as a "universal church" or religion, to influence the development of new peoples and new regions.[9]

[4] *A Study of History*, London, 1939, IV, pp. 2-3.

[5] For examples of such limited assimilation during and after the expanding phase of certain civilizations or universal states, see *ibid.*, Vols. I-VI, *passim*, and the appendix on "Lingue Franche" in Vol. V, pp. 483-526. Cf. also A. C. Woolner, *Languages in History and Politics*, London, 1938; and H. A. Innis, *Empire and Communication*, Oxford, 1950, and *The Bias of Communications*, Toronto, 1952. On particular languages, see Woolner, *op.cit.*, pp. 109-48, 156-67; H. A. R. Gibb, *The Arabs*, Oxford, 1940; George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, Philadelphia, 1939, p. 16; P. K. Hitti, *History of Syria Including Lebanon and Palestine*, New York, 1951, pp. 483-89.

[6] Cf. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Nationalism*, London, 1939, p. 9; A. P. Usher, *Economic History of England*, Boston, 1920, pp. 20-21.

[7] For a discussion of the chances of linguistic disintegration following upon the dissolution of a universal empire, see Ramón Menéndez Pidal, *Castilla, la tradición, el idioma*, Buenos Aires, 1945, pp. 191-94.

[8] For the Graeco-Roman and medieval civilizations, this point has been stressed by Gordon Childe, *What Happened in History*, Harmondsworth, Eng., Penguin Books, 1950, pp. 279-82.

[9] Toynbee, *op.cit.*, V, p. 79, and *passim*.

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As a result, much of world history has consisted of recurrent "feudal ages" in various parts of the world, though such periods in most cases were "feudal" only in the loose sense of the word. They were characterized by intense localism and dispersion of agriculture and settlement, as well as of military and judicial power, and by sharp distinctions between the class of scattered power-holders and the mass of the peasant population. At the same time, these "feudal" periods were marked by a certain universalism of political and cultural traditions, by memories of a past universal state, or by the knowledge of a highly developed civilization in some other area.[10] Such unifying memories or traditions were no mere disembodied thoughts: they were carried and disseminated by the institutions of organized churches and monastic orders, by a thin but far-flung network of trade relations and routes of pilgrimage, and sometimes by the movement and resettlement of small numbers of persons with special skills, industrial or military, over considerable distances.

From the point of view of nationality, all these were variations of the common layer-cake pattern. Assimilation to a common standard among the upper classes might be feeble, as during the "dark ages" in Western Europe; it might be somewhat more strongly developed, as among the European nobility at the time of the Crusades; or it might be almost complete, as in a universal state, as it had been in that of Imperial Rome. In any case, it would touch the masses of the people in the villages only indirectly and slowly. And even where it did touch and assimilate them in the course of centuries, there their continued passivity and lack of direct participation in affairs of wider import seemed to make it irrelevant for long periods of time whether the underlying population in the villages had been assimilated at least imperfectly to a common standard as in Italy, or whether they had remained as sharply differentiated as Czechs and Germans

[10] A Conference on Feudalism was held on October 31 and November 1, 1950, at Princeton University under the auspices of the Committee on Uniformities of the American Council of Learned Societies. For the point made in the text, see the papers submitted to the Conference and the abridged report on its proceedings issued by the Council (Washington, D.C., multigraphed). A volume on *Feudalism in History*, containing these papers, with an analytical essay by the editor, Professor Rushton Coulborn, is in process of publication.

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in Bohemia, or as Malays and Chinese in Malaya.[11] Only when this relatively passive population was mobilized in the processes of economic growth and political organization, did its cultural and social characteristics acquire in each case a new and crucial importance in the process of nation-building.

The processes of partial social mobilization and of nation-building have been recurrent phenomena in history, at least in certain general characteristics. What uniformities can we find in this growth of nations in the past? And in what ways is our own age different in respect to the growth of nations from any age that has gone before?

Some Possible Specific Uniformities

Uniformities which have been found in the growth of nations include the following:

1. The shift from subsistence agriculture to *exchange economies.*

2. The social mobilization of rural populations in *core areas* of denser settlement and more intensive exchange.

3. The growth of *towns,* and the growth of social mobility within them, and between town and country.

4. The growth of *basic communication grids,* linking important rivers, towns, and trade routes in a flow of transport, travel, and migration.

5. The differential accumulation and *concentration of capital* and skills, and sometimes of social institutions, and their *"lift-pump" effect* on other areas and populations, with the successive entry of different social strata into the nationalistic phase.

6. The rise of the concept of *"interest"* for both individuals and groups in unequal but fluid situations, and the growth of *individual self-awareness* and awareness of one's predispositions to join a particular group united by language and communications habits.

7. The awakening of *ethnic awareness* and the acceptance of *national symbols,* intentional or unintentional.

[11] Cf. Elizabeth Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans,* London, 1938; Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya,* London, 1948; Rupert Emerson, L. A. Mills, and V. Thompson, *Government and Nationalism in Southeast Asia,* New York, 1942; etc.

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8. The merging of ethnic awareness with attempts at *political compulsion,* and in some cases the attempt to transform one's own people into a privileged class to which members of other peoples are subordinated.

Some of these similarities may be discussed briefly.

THE SHIFT TO EXCHANGE ECONOMIES

The shift from subsistence agriculture to an exchange economy seems to have characterized all cases of wider national integration which I have been able to find. Where the exchange economy came to embrace the bulk of the population and to bring many of them into direct contact with each other in the interchange of a wider variety of goods and services, there we find a tendency to "national" or at least regional, linguistic, and cultural "awakening," provided only that sufficiently large numbers of individuals enter the exchange economy and its more intensive communication *faster* than they can be assimilated to another "alien" language or culture.

Where these shifts take place, the ethnic and in part the linguistic situation becomes, as it were, loosened or softened, and capable of settling again into new and different molds. The awakening of the Slavic population of the Balkans, and the rise of regions of greater intensity of trade and exchange around which the revived Serbian and Bulgarian languages and nationalities were constituted, may perhaps serve as illustrations.[12]

FURTHER SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND INTEGRATION IN CORE AREAS

The shift to an economy and culture based on wider interchange takes place at different times and different rates of speed in different regions. The result is often the existence of more

[12] "By the end of the [eighteenth] century many village notables (*knez*) began to come into contact as hog exporters with foreign lands, especially with the supply services of the Austrian armies. Among this class the leaders of the Serbian uprising of 1804 were found . . . [who] started the movement for Serbian independence and beyond that for Southern Slav unification . . ." (Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism,* New York, 1944, p. 549). Cf. also S. Mladenov, *Die Geschichte der Bulgarischen Sprache,* Berlin, 1929; Alfred Fischel, *Der Panslawismus bis zum Weltkrieg,* Stuttgart, 1919; etc. For some general social and political aspects of the shift to an exchange economy, see Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation,* New York, 1944.

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"advanced" regions side by side with more "undeveloped" ones. The former are then often in a position to function as centers of cultural and economic attraction for some of the populations of the latter, and thus to become nuclei of further integration. The "when" is thus often as important and sometimes more important than the "where," and the processes of social mobilization and partial integration are truly historical in the sense that each step depends to a significant extent on the outcome of the step that went before.

Political geographers have sought to identify *core areas* around which larger states were organized successfully in the course of history. Characteristic features of such core areas are unusual fertility of soil, permitting a dense agricultural population and providing a food surplus to maintain additional numbers in non-agricultural pursuits; geographic features facilitating military defense of the area; and a nodal position at an intersection of major transportation routes. Classic examples of such core areas are the Ile de France and the Paris basin, or the location of London.[13]

It should be noted that the density that makes a core area is one of traffic and communication rather than mere numbers of passive villagers densely settled on the soil. Thus the dense population of the Nile valley seems to have been less effective as a wider center of integration than the sparse population of the Arab territories beyond Mecca and Medina, who more than compensated for their smaller numbers by their proportionately far greater mobility, activity, and traffic.

The theory of core areas, however, cannot account for the persistence of some states and the failure of others. What counts for more may well be what happens within each core area, and perhaps particularly what happens in its towns.

THE GROWTH OF TOWNS, MOBILITY, AND TIES BETWEEN TOWN AND COUNTRY

There is no developed nation, it appears, without towns which

[13] For core areas and population clusters, see D. Whittlesey, *The Earth and the State*, New York, 1939, pp. 11-12, 142-52; and Preston James, *Latin America*, New York, 1942, pp. 4-8. For the nodal location of London, see Sir Halford Mackinder, *Britain and the British Seas*, New York, 1902.

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have or have had a period of considerable growth, of mobility within the towns, and of increasing ties of social mobility, communication, and multiple economic exchange between town and country.

There have been towns, of course, where one or more of these conditions did not exist, and to that extent national development has been incomplete, absent, halted, or retarded. On the other hand, to the extent that there was such growing mobility and communication within towns and between town and country, national development was accelerated.

THE GROWTH OF BASIC COMMUNICATION GRIDS

Most nations do not seem to have grown from single centers. Many nations have had several capitals and have shifted their central regions several times in the course of their history. Even the classical example of growth around one center, France, has long had two capital cities, Paris and Orléans; and some significant phases of the unification of the French language took place at the Champagne fairs and along the trade routes leading through that region—not to mention the role of the North-South routes and connections in helping the North to consolidate its victory over separatist and Albigensian elements in the Midi during the religious wars of the thirteenth century.[14]

A more extreme case, Germany, has no single core that could be easily identified,[15] and it seems more helpful to think of Germany as essentially a grid of routes of traffic, communication, and migration. The basis of this grid is a pattern in the shape of the capital letter E, in which the back and the bottom strokes are formed by the valleys of the Rhine and the Upper Danube between Cologne, Basel, and Passau, while the middle stroke is formed by the river Main and the routes going eastward from Mainz to Frankfurt and beyond, and the top stroke is formed by the routes following the *Börde*, the strip of fertile and easily

[14] Whittlesey, *op.cit.*, pp. 138-39, 151. Cf. W. von Wartburg, *Evolution et structure de la langue française*, Leipzig, 1934, and *Les origines des peuples romans*, Paris, 1941.

[15] This is illustrated by the divergent views of such writers as Whittlesey, *op.cit.*, pp. 166-70; Josef Nadler, *Das stammhafte Gefüge des deutschen Volkes*, Munich, 1934, pp. 104-9; Theodor Frings, *et al.*, *Kulturräume und Kulturströmungen im mitteldeutschen Osten*, Halle, 1936, p. 312; etc.

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traversable land from Wesel on the Rhine to Magdeburg on the Elbe.

To this basic pattern which was already established well before A.D. 1000, there were then added the North-South routes from Augsburg and Munich to Nuremberg and Bamberg and northward to Brunswick, or northeastward to Leipzig and Halle or Meissen and Dresden. These routes became important chiefly during and after the twelfth century, and the Frankfurt-Leipzig and Nuremberg-Leipzig connections gained steadily in importance through the sixteenth century. All these northeastward and eastward communication lines were tied together once more by the river Elbe, which cuts them all, and all of them, when prolonged across the Elbe, came to a common focus in the region of Berlin, near the narrowest part of the North German plain between the Bohemian mountain massif and the North Sea. From Berlin these routes fanned out again southeastward into Silesia and northeastward to East Prussia and the German cities on the coast of the Baltic countries. The succession of language centers, the shift of the centers of printing, publishing, and journalism, the migrations of merchants, nobles, and settlers all followed the main lines of this grid, or a very few minor routes which form secondary parts of the same basic pattern.[16]

The same notion of a basic grid seems to be applicable to the unification of China, Russia, Switzerland, Canada, and the United States.[17] It would be interesting to investigate the relationship of such a grid to the incomplete unification and more

[16] Adequate references to this summary would amount to a separate paper. In addition to the works cited in the preceding note, see e.g. Ludwig Salomon, *Geschichte des deutschen Zeitungewesens*, I, Oldenburg-Leipzig, 1906, pp. 10-17, and *passim*; Gerhard Lüdtke and Lutz Mackensen, *Deutscher Kulturatlas*, 5 vols., Berlin, 1928-36; etc.

[17] Cf., on China, G. B. Cressey, *The Geographic Foundations of China*, New York, 1934; Percy M. Roxby, "China as an Entity: The Comparison with Europe," *Geography*, XIX, No. 1 (1934), pp. 1-20; John de Francis, *Nationalism and Language in China*, Princeton, N.J., 1950; etc. On Russia, see Robert Kerner, *The Urge to the Sea: The Role of Rivers, Portages, Ostrogs, Monasteries and Furs*, Berkeley, Calif., 1942; V. O. Kluchevskii, *A History of Russia*, Vol. I, New York, 1911; J. W. Thompson, *Economic and Social History of the Middle Ages, A.D. 300-1300*, New York, 1931; etc. On Switzerland, see Aloys Schulte, *Geschichte des mittelalterlichen Handels und Verkehrs zwischen Westdeutschland und Italien*, Vol. I, Leipzig, 1900; Lüdtke und Mackensen, *op.cit.*; Hans Nabholz, *Geschichte der Schweiz*, Vol. I, Zurich, 1932; C. Englert-Faye, *Vom Mythus zur Idee der Schweiz*, Zurich, 1940; Richard Weiss, *Volkskunde der Schweiz*, Zurich, 1946; etc.

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recent separation of the areas that now comprise India and Pakistan.

It is not suggested that a grid in itself can make a nation. Also necessary, as a rule, are a minimum of cultural compatibility and, in many cases, sufficient similarity between spoken dialects to permit the emergence of a common language for large sections of the population. The cultural and linguistic data in themselves are given by history, of course, at each stage of the process. Yet we know how much of a difference in language or culture has been bridged successfully in the emergence of such nations as the Swiss, the British, or the Canadians, provided that enough tangible and intangible rewards and opportunities were present, ranging from greater wealth, security, freedom, and prestige to the subtler attractions of new common symbols, dreams, and ways of life.

THE DIFFERENTIAL CONCENTRATION OF CAPITAL, SKILLS, AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

A major factor in national differences and national pride today are the differences in the general standard of living. To some extent such differences tend to cut across the differences between social classes; there is a social, moral, or traditional component in what is considered "bare subsistence" in a given community, or in what counts as "luxury" in another; and a significant part of what is considered the poor population in a relatively wealthy community may be appreciably better off in terms of physical goods and services than even many of the relatively well-off members of a poor or economically backward people. This difference between the generally prevailing standards of wealth, comfort, and opportunity among different regions or peoples has sometimes been called the *Kulturgefälle* ("the drop in the level of culture") by German writers who have employed this concept to bolster claims to German supremacy or exclusiveness vis-à-vis the populations of Eastern Europe and the Balkans.

Behind the differences in the standards of living lie differences in levels of productivity and in the supply of factors of production, that is, in the material means to pursue any one of a wide

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range of conceivable ends regardless of the difference in importance assigned to some of these ends relative to others in some particular culture. These differences in productivity may involve geographic factors such as soils, water supplies, forests, mineral deposits, and the absence of obstacles to transportation. All such geographic factors, however, depend on specific technologies to give them significance. Every concentration of natural resources requires, therefore, a concentration of productive skills and knowledge if men are even to know how to use them; and resources as well as skills require a concentration of invested *capital* if they are to be used in fact.

It should be clear that, as technology progresses, the relative importance of the man-made factors of production, such as capital and skills, has tended to increase relative to the importance of the few natural facilities which once were the only ones that more primitive technologies could exploit. There is reason to believe that present-day differences in living standards are due far less to differences in natural factors of production, and far more to differences in the supply of skilled labor, schools, housing, and machinery.

Particular peoples and nations may then tend to crystallize, as it were, around particular concentrations of capital and technology, or of particular social institutions which offer individuals greater opportunities for the pursuit of the goods or factors which they have learned to desire.

Thus we find in very different parts of the world the growth of peoples around specific social institutions or specific concentrations of economic opportunity. The combination of trade routes, cities, Alpine passes, and peasant freedom did much for the integration of the Swiss people; and so perhaps did the combination of dikes, fertile land, fishing, trade, and cities for the Dutch and Flemish peoples. The growth of the Bulgarian tobacco industry in the late nineteenth century may have had a somewhat comparable effect on the Bulgarianization of some of the populations on the Bulgarian-Macedonian border;[18] and there may have been similar relations between the growth of the

[18] Cf. Hermann Wendel, *Makedonien und der Friede*, Munich, 1919.

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American tobacco trade and the British loyalties of Glasgow merchants at the beginning of the eighteenth century;[19] and again between the growth of the nineteenth-century cotton trade and the emergence of a set of separate cultural and political loyalties among the populations of the "Cotton Kingdom" in the South in the United States.[20] Elsewhere we find the emergence of distinct peoples not so much around specific economic opportunities but rather around a combination of material opportunities with a new and distinctive way of life. Thus the Cossacks on the Russian-Tartar border and the Sikhs in the areas of Hindu-Moslem conflict in India each unite individuals into a people by offering them more freedom and dignity through a life of martial valor in a situation where such valor is rewarded.

The effects of differential standards of living and of productivity operated long before the Industrial Revolution, but they were increased by its coming. Where large economic or industrial developments have taken place, they have had a "lift-pump" effect on the underlying populations. They have induced migrations of populations to the regions of settlement, employment, and opportunity, and put these newcomers into intensive economic and political contact with the locally predominant peoples, and with each other. This physical, political, and economic contact had one of two cultural and linguistic consequences: either it led to national assimilation, or, if national assimilation to the dominant group could not keep pace with the growing need for some wider group membership for the newcomer, then the "lift-pump" effect would tend to lead eventually to a new growth of nationalism among the newly mobilized populations. Eventually, it might result in the assimilation of some previously separate groups, not to the still-dominant minority, but to the "awakening" bulk of the population.

This rebellious nationalism of the newly mobilized population rejects the language or culture of the dominant nationality. Yet it shares many of its values and it desires to share or acquire its wealth and opportunities. The motives for this secessionist na-

[19] Cf. Andrew Dewar Gibb, *Scottish Empire*, Glasgow-London, 1937.

[20] Cf., e.g., William E. Dodd, *The Cotton Kingdom: A Chronicle of the Old South*, New Haven, Conn., 1919.

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tionalism are thus to a significant extent the same motives that would lead, under different circumstances, to national assimilation. Nationalism and assimilation are, therefore, ambivalent in the economic as well as in the psychological sense. The same wealth and prestige are pursued by either method: in national assimilation they are to be attained through sharing, while in national resistance they are to be attained by power.

Both national assimilation and national resurgence thus respond in a "lift-pump" situation to the power of the "pump." The intensity and appeal of nationalism in a world of sharply differentiated income and living standards perhaps may tend to be *inversely proportional to the barriers to mobility between regions and classes,* and *directly proportional to the barriers against cultural assimilation, and to the extent of the economic and prestige differences between classes, cultures, and regions.*

Seen in this light, the rise of nationalism and the growth of nations have some semi-automatic features, even though they have other features which are by no means automatic. As the distribution of scarce rewards is made unequal by economic or historic processes; as men learn to desire the same kinds of rewards; as they fail to be assimilated to the language and culture of the dominant group; and as they succeed in becoming assimilated with other men who possess cultural and language habits more compatible with their own—as all these processes go on, situations conducive to nationalism are created without anyone's deliberate intention.

THE CONCEPT OF SELF-INTEREST AND THE EXPERIENCE OF SELF-AWARENESS

The concept of a nation is bound up with that of a national interest. Already the non-national or proto-national institutions of the city-state and the princely state imply the notion of group interests and interests of state, and all these notions of national, state, or city interests imply in turn the interests of individuals. But this concept of individuals with interests has itself gained its present importance only gradually in the course of certain

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developments of history.[21] Even today different regions and civilizations ascribe to it different degrees of significance, and it may lose again in the future much of its present importance.

At bottom the notion of interest perhaps implies a situation in which men are pitted against each other in a competitive situation in which some of them can improve or even maintain their positions only at the expense of others. The word "interest" denotes then the ensemble of an individual's chances for improving or maintaining his position against all competitors, and thus, indirectly, the amount and effectiveness of disposition of his resources applicable to the competitive situation in which he finds himself. Such competitive situations may be relatively vague and unpredictable, or they may be formalized and hence in part predictable to a more or less high degree. The more predictable they are, the more easily can they be recognized as competitive by the participants. Among the most highly formalized competitive situations are games.[22] Most real-life situations tend to differ from formalized games in their far greater range of possibilities for changes in the rules and even in the very units of the competition—a difference immortalized by Lewis Carroll in Alice's croquet game in Wonderland.

Nevertheless, there is perhaps one characteristic similarity between games and competitive social or economic situations, and that is the distinction between objectively "rational" behavior, i.e. behavior rewarded by the intrinsic rules of the game, or the "logic of the situation," as against subjectively convenient behavior, i.e. behavior that is most probable because of the previously acquired personal memories and habits of the players. Most individuals and groups learn only to a limited extent from playing games, regardless of experience; much of their behavior may remain an experience of their previously acquired and slow-changing personalities or habits, rather than of any strategy objectively conducive to winning.

Actual performance in a competitive situation is thus a series

[21] Cf. Charles A. Beard, *The Idea of the National Interest*, New York, 1934, pp. 22-25. I am indebted to Professor Hans Kohn for valuable suggestions on this point.

[22] Cf. John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern, *The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, Princeton, N.J., 1944.

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of compromises between acting out one's character and "playing the game," but if one learns enough to be able to stay in the game at all, the continued experiences of the cues and rewards which the game offers may lead to cumulative learning of new habits and thus to modifications of character in the direction of the traits rewarded by the game.

Markets and power contests resemble such "games." They reward certain kinds of behavior on the part of the players; and they may teach them certain patterns of habits and values. The simplest result of this process has been stated vigorously by Ruth Benedict: a highly competitive culture, such as modern Western civilization, has often tended to elevate to positions of power and prestige individuals with such markedly aggressive and competitive behavior that other cultures might at times even doubt their sanity.[23]

The late Professor Joseph Schumpeter has suggested almost the opposite observation: according to his view, the competitive games of the free market and of laissez-faire industrialism have functioned very well in Western society, but in the course of the decades and generations since the Industrial Revolution these competitive economic institutions have inculcated something like a psychological revulsion from competition and insecurity among the people who grew up to live under them. Competitive institutions, according to Schumpeter, unwittingly have taught people a non-competitive and even anti-competitive set of desires and behavior norms which center on security: the continued operation of such institutions is gradually becoming impossible due to the state of mind which they have engendered, and which already has led to the widespread replacement of laissez-faire private enterprise by various institutions of socialism or the "welfare state."[24]

These seemingly contradictory observations perhaps illuminate two sides of the same reality. As men leave the relative security of villages and folk cultures for the mobility and uncertainty of travel, towns, and markets, and for the competition of wealth-getting, politics, and warfare, they may find greater op-

[23] Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*, New York, Penguin-Mentor Books, 1946, p. 256.
[24] Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 2nd ed., New York, 1947.

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portunities and rewards for aggressiveness and self-assertion; and at the same time they may come to feel more poignantly the loneliness, the loss of security, and the loss of context and meaning in their lives which the transition to the new ways of life entails.

Nationalism is one peculiar response to this double challenge of opportunity and insecurity, of loneliness and power. Men discover sooner or later that they can advance their interests in the competitive game of politics and economics by forming coalitions, and that they stand to gain the firmer these coalitions can be made, provided only that they have been made with individuals and groups who have to offer in this game the largest amount of assets and the least amount of liabilities. To form the firmest possible connections with the most promising group of competitors would seem to be sound long-run strategy. With which group such firm connections can be formed is by no means arbitrary: in politics and economics such coalitions will depend to a significant degree on social communication and on the culture patterns, personality structures, and communications habits of the participants. Their chances of success will thus depend to some degree on the links that make a people, the ties of nationality. Machiavelli's advice to princes to rely on soldiers native to their kingdom was sound: a policy along these lines became the basis of the military power of the rulers of Brandenburg-Prussia in the century that followed, with results that were to lead eventually to the emergence of a German nation-state.[25] The victory of the ethnic Turkish elements over the largely Slavic-speaking Janissaries in the struggle for the control of the Imperial Ottoman Court in the seventeenth century, and the emergence of the ethnic Turkish elements in the reform of the Ottoman Empire after 1908, and again in the salvaging of a much reduced Turkish state after 1918, may be other cases in point.[26]

Organization along ethnic or national lines is by no means the only type of alignment which may be tried in the competitive game. Yet of all these probable patterns of organization, ethnic or national alignments often combine the greatest strength and

[25] Cf. Sidney B. Fay, *The Rise of Brandenburg-Prussia, 1640-1786*, New York, 1937, pp. 52-53.

[26] Cf. Toynbee, *op.cit.*, v, pp. 486, 518-19.

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resilience with the greatest adaptability to a competitive world. So long as competitive institutions continue to prevail, nationalism can mobilize more people and organize them more firmly than can many competing types of organization. The potential rewards of nationalism then grow in proportion to the potential resources of wealth and power to which members of a particular people have, or can gain, access on preferred terms.

To develop thus the economic, intellectual, and military resources of a territory and a population, *and to knit them together in an ever tighter network of communication and complementarity based on the ever broader and more thorough participation of the masses of the populace*—all this is sound power politics; and those who carry out such policies tend to be rewarded by the long-run outcome of this contest.

What may fit the necessities of the competitive game may also fit some inner needs of its participants. Ages of social mobilization, of rapid changes in the traditional social contexts, tend to be ages of increasing self-doubt and self-awareness for the individuals who live in them. The questions: Who am I? Whom do I resemble? In whom can I trust?—are asked with a new urgency, and need more than a traditional answer.

As a man seeks answers to these questions he must try to take stock of himself, of his memories, his preferences, and his habits, of the specific images and indeed of the specific words in which they were conveyed and in which they are now stored in his mind. As old cultural or religious patterns, beliefs, and ceremonies become questionable, self-searching must lead back to the childhood memories and the mother tongue, in terms of which so many experiences have been acquired, and out of which, in a sense, the individual's character and personality have been built up. When men seek for themselves, they thus may come to find their nationality; and when they seek the community of their fellows, they may discover once again the connection between ethnic nationality and the capacity for fellowship. Instances of this process can be found even in antiquity: it is well known that Socrates enjoined upon his pupils the imperative, "Know thyself," and that Socrates' pupil, Plato, proposed that

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all Greeks should henceforth cease to plunder or enslave their fellow Greeks, but should rather do these things to the barbarians.[27]

The phase of self-doubt and self-survey may end in conversion to a new religion or ideology, perhaps even one complete with a new language and traditions, such as was once the case in the matter of conversion to Islam, and sometimes to the Arab language; or in deliberate assimilation to a new nationality, as in many cases of emigration overseas, or in deliberate assimilation even in one's original country to the language and traditions one has now chosen to accept (e.g. Indians learning to speak Spanish and accepting Peruvian or Mexican national loyalties). In any case, the phase of self-doubt and self-appraisal tends to be followed by a phase of decision and of conscious or even deliberate identification with a group; and with the loosening of the ties of religion or status that group is likely to be a group delimited at least in part along national lines, in terms of habits of language and communication.

Our hypothesis finds some confirmation in a well-known pattern in the history of nationalism and the biographies of nationalist leaders. Many emotionally, culturally, and politically sensitive individuals react to a sojourn abroad, i.e. away from their native region or culture, with a far stronger assertion of nationalism and of allegiance to their own language, culture, and people. This precipitating crisis in the lives of many nationalists has been dubbed the *Fremdheitserlebnis* ("the experience of strangeness"), and it has been described repeatedly in the literature of nationalism.[28]

FROM GROUP AWARENESS TO THE NATION-STATE

Individual awareness of one's language and people may appear

[27] ". . . our citizens should . . . deal with foreigners as Greeks now deal with one another" (Plato, *Republic*, v, 469-70, Cornford trans., New York, 1945, p. 174). Cf. also Glenn R. Morrow, *Plato's Law of Slavery in Its Relation to Greek Law*, Urbana, Ill., 1935.

[28] Cf. Kohn, *op.cit.*, pp. 98, 601 (Petrarch); p. 127 (Machiavelli); pp. 239, 659 (Rousseau); p. 294 (Jefferson). On the problem of individual self-awareness and identification with groups, cf. also Chr. Bay, I. Gullåvg, H. Ofstad, and H. Toenessen, *Nationalism: A Study of Identification with People and Power: 1. Problems and Theoretical Framework*, Oslo, Institute of Social Research, 1950, mimeographed.

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to be a matter of personal psychology, even though there are social situations which make such awareness more probable. Group awareness, on the other hand, seems clearly a matter of social institutions. Some secondary symbols are attached to some aspects of group life and are repeated and disseminated over and over again by an organization or institution, often for a purpose that has nothing to do with nationality, or which might even be opposed to it. After a time, the institution may change or disappear, the organized repetition of the symbols may cease—but if there were enough of a primary reality capable of being symbolized, *and if there had been going on that basic process of social mobilization* which has been described earlier, then the results of the dissemination of those symbols may well prove irreversible. A stream of memories has been started that is partly self-regenerating, and so long as the foundations for the ethnic group exist, and social mobilization and communication continue to weld its members together, national group awareness may be there to stay. It can hardly be expected to give way to a wider supra-national allegiance until a basis for the appeal of wider symbols has again developed in the realm of objective fact, in experiences at least as real, as frequent in the daily life of individuals, and as relevant to their personal concerns, to their language, their communications, and their thoughts, as were those experiences which provided the basis for the awareness of nationality.

Given these underlying conditions, symbols and institutions of group awareness may be produced quite unintentionally. A process of social mobilization may even transform the function of existing symbols or institutions so as to turn them into agencies of group awareness, regardless of their original purposes. Thus nationalism was promoted sometimes by a supra-national church. Early medieval church provinces, such as Gallia and Anglia,[29] could not in themselves produce the unity of France or England, but they contributed to it, in conjunction with the other factors discussed earlier in this paper. The names of patron saints of provinces and regions, such as St. Stephen for Hungary, St.

[29] Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Nationalism*, p. 11, with reference to G. C. Coulton, "Nationalism in the Middle Ages," *Cambridge Historical Journal*, v, No. 1 (1935), pp. 15-40.

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Wenceslas for Bohemia, St. Patrick for Ireland, or the Virgin of Czenstochowa for Poland, turned into patriotic battle cries.

Similar nationalistic effects might follow upon dynastic accidents, passing combinations of territories by the fortunes of war, inheritance, or marriage, but these nationalistic effects themselves were by no means accidental. Almost every territory in Europe has been combined at some time or other with almost every one of its neighbors, but only certain of these combinations have endured and kindled the loyalties and imaginations of their peoples. The combinations which endured in fact or sentiment were those which were reinforced by other elements in the process of social mobilization and integration, and they would themselves in turn strengthen this process by adding to it political memories, symbols, grievances, and "historic rights."

The same considerations hold for the long-range effects of earlier administrative divisions in some empire or kingdom of the past. Even then, most administrators would pay some attention to population clusters, transport, and communication lines in laying out their districts. Yet many long-standing administrative divisions or provinces have disappeared without giving rise to corresponding peoples or nations. Uruguayan nationalism destroyed the unity of the old Spanish Viceroyalty of the River Plate, despite the occasional attempts of Argentine governments to revive its memories; and neither the memories of the Spanish Viceroyalty of Nueva Granada nor Bolívar's short-lived vision of Gran Colombia have kept together the different economies and peoples of Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, and Ecuador.[30]

Even symbols of insult may serve this organizing function, if the other conditions for national awakening are given. The term *les gueux*—"the beggars"—once applied to insurgent Netherlanders by their Spanish rulers, became a term of honor in Dutch history. The memory of the convicts transported to Australia in the early days of her settlement has been transformed by a contemporary poet into a blazing symbol of Australian nationalism.[31]

[30] Cf., e.g., J. Fred Rippy, *Historic Evolution of Hispanic America*, 3rd ed., New York, 1945. On the limited significance of administrative divisions in the last-named country, see George Blanksten, *Ecuador: Constitutions and Caudillos*, Berkeley, Calif., 1951.

[31] Sheila Sibley, "Ballade of the Convict's Daughter," in *Jindyworobak Anthology*,

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Reinforcing the impact of these symbols there appear the institutions of modern economic life and of the modern state, all of which require more direct communication with large numbers of peasants, artisans, taxpayers, or conscripts than was the case before. In the eighteenth century, Austrian officers were taught Czech, so as to command better their Czech-speaking soldiers, and the revival of the teaching of the Czech language followed. Landowners in Wales and Scotland, interested in raising the productive skills of the population on their estates, founded societies to study the resources, languages, and cultures of their regions, and made the century of the "agricultural revolution" also the century of the "discovery" of the works of "Ossian."[32]

No growth of nationalism was foreseen or desired in many of these cases, any more than in the more recent use of the Indonesian language by the Japanese in the administration of the Dutch Indies during World War II, or in the compilation of grammars and dictionaries of Hausa and other African languages by colonial administrators. Yet the growth of nationalism was facilitated by the consequences of these acts.

Once the process of group consciousness has started, however, there appear also the deliberate pioneers and leaders of national awakening. There appear grammarians who reduce the popular speech to writing; purifiers of language; collectors of folk epics, tales, and songs; the first poets and writers in the revised vernacular; and the antiquarians and historians who discover ancient documents and literary treasures—some genuine, some forged, but all of them tokens of national greatness.

Side by side with the awakeners of national pride and fashioners of symbols appear the first organizers. There arise the first social circles and literary societies where the formerly despised native language is read or spoken. There follow the first benevolent societies, fraternal orders, credit cooperatives, and all the devices of mutual credit, support, or insurance, which now begin to collect the financial resources of the awakening nationality.

Melbourne, 1945; reprinted in A. C. Garnett, *Freedom and Planning in Australia*, Madison, Wis., 1949, pp. 243-44.

32 Cf., e.g., the data in Kohn, *op.cit.*, pp. 236, 352, 464, 637, etc.

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There appear the organizers of the first schools, singing societies, athletic organizations, agricultural colleges, which herald the array of all the organizations for cultural, physical, and technological improvement which characterize every full-fledged modern nation.

Together with all this activity we find the gradual acceptance, or the deliberate proposal, of national symbols, of national colors, flags, animals, and flowers, of anthems, marches, and patriotic songs, from the "Rule Britannia" and the "Marseillaise" of the eighteenth century to the *"Nkosi sikelel i Africa"*—"God Save Africa"—of today's nationalist South African Negroes.[33] How all these symbols, maps, anthems, flags, and flag-salutes are then taught and impressed upon the populations and their children by informal group pressure and the media of mass communication as well as by all the coercive powers of the state and its system of compulsory public education—this is a story that has been told often and well by students of these late stages of the nation-building process.[34]

What does this process accomplish, and what does it aim at? When a nation has been built up, and when it has been reinforced finally by the full compulsive power of the state, then four things have been accomplished.

(1) A relatively large community of human beings has been brought into existence who can communicate effectively with each other, and who have command over sufficient economic resources to maintain themselves and to transmit this ability for mutual communication to their children as well. In other words, there has been brought into being a large, comprehensive, and very stable human network of communication, capable of maintaining, reproducing, and further developing its channels.

(2) There has been both an effective accumulation of economic resources and a sufficient social mobilization of manpower

[33] Detailed documentation here would be unnecessary. On the Swiss symbols, see Englert-Faye, *op.cit.* For a novelist's description of the singing of the Negro anthem in South Africa, cf. Alan Paton, *Cry the Beloved Country: A Story of Comfort in Desolation*, New York, 1948.

[34] Cf. Carlton H. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism*, New York, 1926, and *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*, New York, 1931; F. L. Schuman, *International Politics*, 3rd ed., New York, 1941, pp. 300-65; etc.

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to permit the social division of labor necessary for this process and to permit its continuation.

(3) There has been a social accumulation and integration of memories and symbols and of individual and social facilities for their preservation, transmission, and recombination, corresponding to the level of mobilization and integration of material and human resources, or even pointing beyond it.

(4) There has been at least some development of the capacity to redirect, re-allocate, or form a new combination of economic, social, and human resources as well as of symbols and items of knowledge, habit, or thought—that is to say, of the capacity to learn. Some of the social *learning capacity* is developed invisibly in the minds of individuals; some of it can be observed in the habits and patterns of culture prevailing among them; some of it finally is embodied in tangible facilities and specific institutions. Together, all these constitute the community's capacity to produce and accept new knowledge or new goals, and to take the corresponding action.

On all four counts, it should be evident, the nation represents a more effective organization than the supra-national but largely passive layer-cake society or the feudal or tribal localisms that preceded it.

On all these counts, there may be considerable contrasts between different nations. The social models accepted for imitation, the established institutions, the economic practices, and the methods of compulsion within each nation are all intimately connected with the cultural traditions and leading social classes currently prevailing there. Whether a leading class of businessmen or farmers or wage earners will prove more hospitable to accumulation of resources and to efficient dynamic innovation in their use may depend not merely on the general outlook to be found prevailing in each particular stratum, but also—and perhaps sometimes crucially—on the particular cultural goals and traditions which have become accepted by that particular class in that particular nation.[35] Yet, the impression remains that even

[35] For some problems of conservative aristocratic leadership in undeveloped nations, cf., for the Arabs, the writings of H. A. R. Gibb; for an example from Tibet, Nicholas Mansergh, "The Asian Conference, 1947," in *The Commonwealth and the Nations,*

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the worst-led nation represents, relative to its numbers of population, a greater amount of social communication facilities, of economic resources, and of social learning capacity than any pattern of ethnic or social organization preceding it.

Where does this process aim? The nation has been valued as a means of social advancement. In a world of extreme differences between living standards, men have tended to use the nation as an instrument to improve their own standards relative to those of their neighbors. The intrinsic bias of this process has been, where the opportunity offered itself, to produce in the temporarily most successful nation a sociological pattern reminiscent of a *mushroom cloud.* The stem of this social mushroom was formed by the "national solidarity" between the poorest and the lower-middle strata of the nation; the poorest strata, both rural and urban, however, tended to be somewhat less in relative numbers, and offered their members greater chances for "vertical mobility" than was the case in other less "successful" nations. The middle and upper strata, on the other hand, tended to form the crown of the mushroom; they tended to be somewhat larger in number than the corresponding group in other nations, with a greater propensity to spread out horizontally into new positions of privilege or control over new territories, populations, or capital resources, and correspondingly with at least somewhat greater opportunities to accept in their midst newcomers from the less favored strata of their own nation.

It is perhaps this sociological explosion into a mushroom cloud that has been at the heart of the transitory popularity of empire-building. Nationalism typically has led to attempts at empire or at least at establishing privileges over other peoples. The essence of this empire-building has been perhaps the attempt at ruling without sharing, just as the essence of nationalism has been the attempt at improving the position of one's "own" group without any sharing with "outsiders." To the extent that this

London, 1948, pp. 115-16; and for Southeast Asia, Cora Du Bois, *Social Forces in Southeast Asia,* Minneapolis, Minn., 1949, pp. 33-36, 59. On the contrast, e.g., between French and American business investment policies, cf. David S. Landes, "French Entrepreneurship and Industrial Growth in the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of Economic History,* IX (May 1949), pp. 45-61.

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process was successful it could only tend ultimately to transform the whole nation into a privileged class, a *Herrenvolk* lording it over servant peoples, as the Nazis dreamed of it, or a small, select population monopolizing vast natural resources or accumulations of technological equipment regardless of the fate of the rest of mankind. In reality, this state has probably never been achieved; and where it was even partially approximated, the results in the long-run were anything but lasting. Invariably, thus far, the same nation-building process which had permitted one nation to get temporarily on top of its neighbors subsequently raised up other nations to weaken or destroy it.

From this it might seem at first glance that the whole process of the rise and decline of nations has been cyclical, with only the names of the actors changing in an endlessly repeated drama. Closer scrutiny may show that this is not the case, and that some tentative inferences may be drawn from the events and processes surveyed.

The Uniqueness of the Present Period

Our survey offers no support for the belief of many nationalists that nations are the natural and universal form of social organization for mankind. But neither does it confirm entirely the opposite view held by many thoughtful and distinguished observers —the view that nations are exclusively the product of the modern period and of Western civilization.[36] Perhaps the impression that remains might be summed up by saying that the West has gone much farther on a road which all the world's great civilizations have traveled to some extent.

At this moment we might well pause to question the ease with which we accept the designation of our present-day civilization as exclusively "Western." By Western civilization we mean a civilization which arose from the mingling of the Graeco-Roman tradition with the Celtic, Teutonic, and Slavic barbarian cultures north of the Mediterranean; but this Western civilization was Semiticized and Orientalized by the twin influences of

[36] Cf. Toynbee, *op.cit., passim*; Kohn, *op.cit., passim*; Carlton H. Hayes, "Nationalism," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*; etc.

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Judaism and of Christianity, even if we allow for the very appreciable element of Greek tradition in the latter.[37]

Subsequently, this Hellenic-Barbarian-Judaeo-Christian civilization was partially Arabicized during more than five hundred years of culture contact from the seventh to the thirteenth century. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, this Arabicized Western civilization was then Mongolized and Sinicized. The details of the origin and acquisition of almost all of these innovations offer room for controversy, but there should be little controversy about the cumulative picture. Nor should there be much controversy about the massive "Amerindianization" of that Western-Arabic-Mongolian world from the sixteenth century onward, once the Indian culture plants of corn and potatoes permitted an entirely new balance of populations on the land, and once the availability of plentiful sugar, cotton, and tobacco transformed man's food, clothing, and consumption habits. What we call today Western civilization is in a very real sense a World civilization, not merely in what it brought to other countries, but also very significantly in what it received from them. Perhaps its "Western" peculiarities lie, then, not only in its ability to originate, but also in its ability to innovate, that is, to learn actively from others.

All these traits of creativity and of the ability to learn are present in all great civilizations of the world, and the West here, too, has perhaps gone faster and farther on a road traveled to some extent by all. In a real sense, Western civilization is carrying on some—though certainly not all—of the traditions of all other civilizations, and its crisis in the world today is also their crisis, and not merely in externals.

It is this universal aspect that also characterizes the growth of nations in the present. During the last fifty years, there seems to have been growth in all the important regions of the world. Everywhere there has been growth in population, in gross economic wealth, and in national awareness. In no region has there been a decline to compensate for an advance elsewhere. Many

[37] For this tradition of the poorest strata of the Hellenic world, see the intriguing case presented by Toynbee, "Christus Patiens," *op.cit.*, VI, pp. 376-539.

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of these advances in widely different areas have been the continuation of long-standing trends, which have been helped and speeded by the new resources and possibilities offered by the diffusion of science and technology during those last fifty years.

The result is that today all peoples are involved in the growth of national awareness, and that soon there will be no peoples left to play the role of submerged nationalities or underlying populations, or passive bystanders of history, or drawers of water and hewers of wood for their better organized neighbors.

The process has gone further. Within each people, all social strata have been mobilized, socially, economically, and politically, or are in the process of being so mobilized before our eyes. Wherever this social mobilization has progressed, it has undermined the patterns of authority and privilege inherited from an earlier day. The time can be envisioned now when the majority of all mankind will have shifted to non-agricultural occupations. There has never been a period like this in the history of the world.

Some Questions for Research

The experiences and prospects of supra-national federations or unions must be evaluated against this background. For evaluating the future prospects of any one of these, be it an existing federation[38] or a project, old or new, our survey may suggest a series of questions:

(1) What is the immediate relevance of integration? Is there a clear-cut economic or political *advantage* in the union? For which group?

(2) What are the cultural and social prospects for integration? Can there evolve a single people, at least in the sense in which the English, Welsh, and Scots are British? How *compatible* are the cultures and the social and economic institutions of the participating peoples, and how much actual communication and migration among them has occurred thus far? What are the present levels and what are the prospects of communication, of future growth, of social mobility, and of the ease of mutual cooperation

[38] On some of these, cf. K. C. Wheare, *Federal Government*, 2nd ed., New York, 1951; Oscar I. Janowsky, *Nationalities and National Minorities*, New York, 1945.

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and substitution among the bulk of the individuals and groups making up the population?

(3) What are the prospects for substantial *new investments* to tie the economy together and for the accumulation of new capital to keep it going?

(4) What are the *costs* of integration? How large and important are the *mutually incompatible investments*, i.e. the investments in plants or resources which are likely to be made obsolete or partially worthless by the economic results of the union? How effective are the specific institutions and resources, if any, which would be used to deal with such destructive results?

(5) Has this union or federation become associated with a better *way of life* in terms of the potentialities and aspirations of the individual? Will it actually provide higher standards of health, education, and of living?

(6) Are there *leaders, leading groups,* and *symbols* to give expression to the actually existing facts and trends referred to in the four preceding points?

(7) Are there any great *constructive tasks* for this federation, tasks imaginable now as well as practicable enough so that the first steps toward their fulfillment can be taken immediately with the resources actually available?

The answers to these seven groups of questions in regard to cases of successful federations in the past might prove of some interest to historians and social scientists. As regards any existing or proposed federations today, answers to those questions might go some distance toward indicating their prospects for success or survival in the future.

Whatever the fate of any particular federation or project at this time, there seems to be little doubt that the numbers of fully mobilized nations, as well as of attempts at federation, will increase. The world-wide awakening of nations as well as the world-wide search for wider federations are characteristic of our unprecedented age. Both are steps in the world's new and groping search not for a shallow "universal state" but for an enduring world community based on the social and technological mobilization of all mankind.

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TAFT AND MacARTHUR, 1900-1901: A Study in Civil-Military Relations

By ROWLAND T. BERTHOFF

WHEN the United States stumbled into possession of the Philippine Islands in 1898, Americans had not operated a military government since Reconstruction, and the task of ruling a populous alien colony was an unprecedented one for them. Because of the insurrection waged by Filipino guerrillas after February 1899, martial law could give way to civil control but gradually. The long transition provoked a civil-military conflict which, because the chief antagonists were famous fathers of now famous sons, has recently acquired a new interest.[1] But the rivals of 1900-1901 should be judged for their own deeds. How and why did Major General Arthur MacArthur and Commissioner William Howard Taft fall out?

In April 1900 President McKinley and Secretary of War Elihu Root moved toward supplanting the military regime by the appointment of a five-man civilian commission which in September would become part of the Philippine government. Although the commanding general was to continue as chief executive with full control over civil administration as well as over the military campaign, the Commission would legislate, appropriate funds, and appoint the Military Governor's civil subordinates. Root would settle any serious conflicts between this new legislature and the Governor.[2]

MacArthur, who succeeded General Otis as Military Governor on May 5, 1900, had been in uniform for thirty-eight of his fifty-five years. A twenty-year-old lieutenant colonel of volunteers at the close of heroic Civil War service, he had remained in the army. In 1898 he took part in the occupation of Manila and in 1899, as a division commander against the insurrectos, became a

1 E.g., Richard Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The General and the President*, New York, 1951, p. 25; Clark Lee and Richard Henschel, *Douglas MacArthur*, New York, 1952, pp. 21-24.

2 William McKinley to Elihu Root, April 7, 1900 (Root Papers, Library of Congress); cf. Philip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root*, New York, 1938, I. pp. 354-57.

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hero to newspaper readers at home. Few Americans could claim to know the Philippines better than he.[3]

Taft, the president of the Commission, was a lawyer who during his forty-three years had been an Ohio judge, the United States Solicitor General, and since 1891 a Federal circuit judge. Though he had held judicially aloof from Republican party affairs, his political connections and friendships made him unlikely to defer to any military man's judgment in politics—even Philippine politics. In fact, he had helped Root draft the new plan of government for the islands.[4]

"Cordial greeting and warm welcome await the Commission" —MacArthur's cable cheered Taft, as the commissioners' ship touched at Hong Kong, with the prospect of friendly cooperation.[5] Upon their arrival in Manila Bay on June 3, the general sent his launch to bring the five ashore; an artillery battalion escorted them to headquarters in the Ayuntamiento, where MacArthur formally but "most cordially" welcomed them. An hour later he came out to the ship to return their call. Taft thought him "a pleasant looking man, very self contained."[6] The next day the two men lunched informally at Malacañan Palace.[7] The general helped Taft find a suitable residence, and, though suggesting that the Commission find offices elsewhere than the Ayuntamiento, he provided them a room there which was "pleasant and cool," though cramped, and soon arranged separate offices for each commissioner.[8] No one questioned the propriety of the Military Governor's continuing to live in Malacañan; he willingly granted $2,500 to repair and furnish Taft's house.[9] "I find him a very satisfactory man to do business with," Taft confided to his brother after a week in Manila.[10]

[3] *Dictionary of American Biography*, XXI, pp. 521-22.

[4] Henry F. Pringle, *The Life and Times of William Howard Taft*, New York, 1939, I, pp. 93-162, 181-84.

[5] William Howard Taft to Mrs. W. H. Taft, May 31, 1900; Taft to Charles P. Taft, June 2, 1900 (Taft Papers, Library of Congress).

[6] Taft to Mrs. Taft, June 3, 1900 (Taft Papers).

[7] Taft to Mrs. Taft, June 5, 1900 (Taft Papers).

[8] Taft to Mrs. Taft, June 13, 1900; Taft to C. P. Taft, June 23, 1900 (Taft Papers).

[9] Taft to Root, June 15, 1900 (Root Papers).

[10] Taft to C. P. Taft, June 12, 1900 (Taft Papers). Pringle's story of MacArthur's frosty reception of Taft is dramatic but imaginary, being drawn from published memoirs which telescope into a single incident an antagonism which in fact developed only gradually.

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But by the end of June Taft began to doubt, in letters to his wife, that MacArthur was politically "keenwitted" or "clear headed" in negotiating with Filipino factions.[11] As for the general's censoring of a reporter's dispatch which criticized these dealings—"revolting" and "utterly unAmerican."[12] And when MacArthur seemed to resent the Commission's efforts to investigate other matters, Taft foresaw trouble ahead.[13] He was sure of it when he learned that the Military Governor was asking the War Department to lessen the Commission's authority.[14]

"The more I have to do with M. the smaller man of affairs I think he is," Taft concluded late in July. "His experience and his ability as a statesman or politician are nothing. He has all the angularity of military etiquette and discipline, and he takes himself with the greatest seriousness."[15] The situation was now bad enough to justify a complaint to Secretary Root. A recent hitch in relations with the Filipinos might have been avoided, Taft reported, had the general condescended beforehand to "a little fuller discussion" with the Commission.[16] Disagreeing with MacArthur's plans for the currency, the Commission especially deplored his rebuffing of their own inquiry into the problem.[17] And despite his earlier offer, the general now tried to make the Commission pay for renovating Taft's house.[18]

The two authorities differed still more fundamentally over policy toward the Filipinos. The basic plan—determined in Washington—was clear enough: suppress the insurrection and eventually set up civil rule. But how quickly? While the Commission hoped that many towns and provinces might soon be given civil governments, soldiers fighting a grim jungle war were skeptical. Alarmed by widespread Filipino disaffection, MacArthur frowned on the Commission's optimistic notion that a native constabulary would inspire popular support for the

[11] Taft to Mrs. Taft, June 27, 1900 (Taft Papers).
[12] Taft to Mrs. Taft, July 5, 1900 (Taft Papers).
[13] Taft to Mrs. Taft, July 8, 1900 (Taft Papers).
[14] Taft to Mrs. Taft, July 18, 1900 (Taft Papers).
[15] Taft to Mrs. Taft, July 29, 1900 (Taft Papers).
[16] Taft to Root, July 26, 1900 (Root Papers).
[17] Taft to Root, August 11, 1900 (Root Papers).
[18] Taft to Arthur MacArthur, August 3, 1900 (Taft Papers).

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campaign against the guerrillas.[19] The general, Taft informed Root, "regards all the people as opposed to the American forces and looks at his task as one of conquering eight millions of recalcitrant, treacherous and sullen people." Despite lip service to the theory of civil control, MacArthur seemed to trust only "the strong hand of the military."[20] Since the Commission believed that they had full authority to establish a constabulary, the general, thinking the matter purely military, resorted to evasion.[21] "We have been much embarrassed in considering these questions," Taft wrote to Root in mid-August, "by the indisposition of General MacArthur to enter into a discussion of the subject or to co-operate in any way."[22]

"There has been no breach," the Commissioner reported a few days later, but the general was avoiding direct relations and discouraging his civil subordinates from answering the Commission's inquiries without formal authorization from his headquarters. This obliged the Commission "to consult always the rules of that military etiquette which permits no subordinate to have an opinion except as he expresses it in a report to his superior. . . . Within the last two or three weeks," Taft grumbled, "I have conducted what business I have had with the General through the medium of formal correspondence, and have observed with great strictness the line of military propriety."[23]

Yet for all his flintiness MacArthur actually was much more sympathetic than most soldiers toward the Commission's policy on the Filipinos. Striving no less than did Taft to conciliate the people, he frowned on army officers and their wives who drew the color line in Manila, and he restrained the troops from retaliatory atrocities against captured guerrillas. Taft thought him a good, if unspectacular, soldier and "a very courtly, kindly man." But he was also

> lacking somewhat in a sense of humor; rather fond of profound generalizations on the psychological conditions of the people; politely lacking in any great consideration for the views of any one as to the real situa-

[19] Taft to J. B. Bishop, November 30, 1900 (Taft Papers).
[20] Taft to Root, August 18, 1900 (Root Papers).
[21] Taft to John C. Spooner, September 3, November 30, 1900 (Taft Papers).
[22] Taft to Root, August 11, 14, 1900 (Root Papers).
[23] Taft to Root, August 18, 1900 (Root Papers).

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tion who is a civilian and who has been here only a comparatively short time, and firmly convinced of the necessity for maintaining military etiquette in civil matters and civil government.[24]

As the first of September approached, the Commission formally expressed their desire for harmony with the Military Governor.[25] Responding graciously to an invitation to attend Commission sessions, he proposed a conference to resolve ambiguities in their relationship.[26] At this point a cable from Root assured the Commission that their power of appointment included that of removal; at the same time the Secretary confirmed the Military Governor's otherwise full control of civil officials.[27] Thus bolstered, the two authorities conferred on August 30.

> The General expressed himself [Taft reported to Root] as disliking much the cutting down of the power of the Military Governor and transferring it to the Commission, but he said that he was very anxious to assist in every way the Administration and to carry out its purposes, but that the Commission was an anomalous body and that the plan was likely to result in discord unless there was hearty co-operation, which he proposed to give, and that he was willing to abide any construction put upon the [President's] instructions.

Nevertheless, on a matter of policy like the constabulary question, MacArthur was still "very, very sensitive."[28] And Taft was scornful of him for being "weak enough to express great personal humiliation in having his power as Military Governor cut down in this wise and to give us the opportunity to know how anxious he had been to avoid the transfer."[29]

Before the end of the Commission's first ten days as the Philippine legislature, the Governor again proposed a precise formula for the division of power. The five civilians preferred to deal with specific questions as they might arise.[30] As for MacArthur's request that they delegate to him their power to appoint his civil subordinates, they offered instead to consider his recom-

[24] *Ibid.*
[25] Taft to MacArthur, August 23, 1900 (Root Papers).
[26] MacArthur to Taft, August 24, 1900 (Root Papers).
[27] Root to Taft, August 28, 1900; cf. August 8, 1900 (Root Papers).
[28] Taft to Root, August 31, 1900 (Root Papers).
[29] Taft to C. P. Taft, August 31, 1900 (Taft Papers).
[30] *Executive Minutes of the United States Philippine Commission* (MS.), September 10, 1900 (National Archives).

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mendations when they filled these jobs. Though the general had no right to reject their legislation, he returned their first bill in a manner which suggested a veto. The Commission took no notice.[31] They did observe his wishes in addressing to him their requests for information from various administrative officers and did not try to subpoena them; apparently MacArthur complied.[32]

The Commission's relations with the Military Governor thus grew more correct and less close. Though his first "itemized" request for appropriations proved too vague for the Commission, they feared to press him lest he suspect a reflection on his efficiency. "We are doing everything that we can to maintain . . . harmony," Taft assured Root.

> . . . I am obliged to say that the authorities conferred upon the Commission are not agreeable to [MacArthur] in that he regards the office of Military Governor as "mediatized," to use an expression in his letter, and that he looks at it in the light of personal humiliation. . . . This makes him especially sensitive, and while we are very anxious to regard his feelings we do not feel that we can yield authority . . . merely to avoid hurting his feelings.[33]

By early October Taft ceased to forward to the general's office communications which Filipinos had misdirected to the Commission, fearing that his recommendation would only prejudice MacArthur against the writers.[34] On the other hand, the Military Governor referred a similar letter to the Commission only to have them return it as an administrative matter.[35] Social life, too, was strained. Though several of the commissioners invited the general to dinner, he entertained only "a select military circle" at Malacañan.[36]

Now began a series of jurisdictional squabbles such as MacArthur had proposed to avoid by an advance understanding. In looking into customs procedure, Commissioner Moses made some suggestions to one of the general's staff colonels, who took them as an order which only the Governor could give. MacArthur remonstrated that Moses had usurped executive authority. The

[31] *Ibid.*
[32] *Ibid.*, September 4, 1900, *et seq.*
[33] Taft to Root, September 18, 1900 (Root Papers).
[34] Taft to Root, October 3, 1900 (Root Papers).
[35] *Executive Minutes*, October 4, 1900.
[36] Taft to C. P. Taft, September 21, 1900 (Taft Papers); Mrs. William Howard Taft, *Recollections of Full Years*, New York, 1914, p. 108.

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Commission replied that no order had been intended, disagreed with the general's repeated complaint of ill-defined jurisdictions, and, thoroughly irked, now claimed that, though the President's instructions did not specify their right to demand information from executive officials, nevertheless, like Congress, they could do so. Furthermore, they rebuked MacArthur for suggesting that Moses had intentionally invaded his bailiwick; they had not thus stood on the letter of their authority when he had arbitrarily increased the salaries of certain officials.[37]

This retort was the more stinging because of another clash during the same week. For lack of American civilians it was still necessary to place army officers in many purely civil jobs. On October 4 the Commission appointed a certain infantry lieutenant to a post in the Forestry Bureau and requested MacArthur to detail him to the special duty.[38] The general returned the request with a military-style "1st Endorsement" saying that it was "not acceptable to this office in that it names a particular officer," that the lieutenant could not be relieved from important military duties, and that the Commission ought merely to request the Governor to detail whomever he saw fit to spare.[39] To the five civilians this seemed "military etiquette gone mad."[40] Taft snapped that the captain who headed the Forestry Bureau had recommended the lieutenant as the only qualified man in the islands; the recommendation even bore MacArthur's formal endorsement! As for their right to pick which military man should fill a civil post, McKinley's instructions limited them in no way.[41] The general retorted that as military commander only he could place an army officer on special duty. He offered to supply another suitable soldier.[42] The Commission had to retreat; upholding a theoretical right to ask for a particular army man, they conceded that his detail was the Military Governor's prerogative. Anyway, a competent civilian forester had turned up![43] Mollified,

[37] *Executive Minutes*, October 6, 8, 1900; MacArthur to Taft, October 6, 1900; Taft to MacArthur, October 8, 1900 (Root Papers).
[38] Taft to MacArthur, October 4, 1900 (Root Papers).
[39] MacArthur to Taft, October 7, 1900 (Root Papers).
[40] Taft to Root, October 7, 1900 (Root Papers).
[41] Taft to MacArthur, October 9, 1900 (Root Papers).
[42] MacArthur to Taft, October 11, 1900 (Root Papers).
[43] Taft to MacArthur, October 12, 1900 (Root Papers).

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MacArthur promised to consider *requests* for the detail of particular officers.[44]

The Commission's power to appoint the Governor's civil subordinates provoked a more basic dispute than the technical question of military details. In October the Commission decided to delegate to MacArthur's civil department heads the power to appoint their own subordinates, subject only to the Commission's review. The general attached another quasi-veto, questioning whether the Commission's appointing power extended down to these minor offices. It might, but to bypass him by delegating it to his subordinates had the "appearance of an official expression of lack of confidence in the Chief Executive of the Islands." Since he was responsible for civil administration, he demanded that his subordinates not be made in any way independent of him.[45] Though the Commission, in replying, upheld their right to appoint all civil officers, they once again had to concede MacArthur's principal argument; a hastily passed amendment specified that all appointments by department heads would be "subject to the approval of the Military Governor."[46] This, MacArthur replied, was "satisfactory to this office."[47]

Midway through these October skirmishes and impatient for the day when a Civil Governor would supplant the general, Taft in a letter to Root again let off steam against MacArthur:

> It is not at all too strong an expression to say that he is sore at our coming. He is sore at the diminution of his authority . . . and his nerves are so tense on the subject that the slightest inadvertence on the part of any one of the Commission leads him to correspondence which shows it only too clearly. . . . General MacArthur in his correspondence assumes the position of lecturing us every time he gets an opportunity on the military necessities, and the obligation we feel under courteously to answer his communications involves a great waste of time and energy. . . . It would seem as if he were as sensitive about maintaining the exact line of jurisdiction between the Commission and himself as about winning a battle or suppressing the insurrection.[48]

[44] MacArthur to Taft, October 13, 1900 (Root Papers).
[45] MacArthur to Taft, October 9, 1900 (Root Papers).
[46] Taft to MacArthur, October 13, 1900 (Root Papers).
[47] MacArthur to Taft, October 15, 1900 (Root Papers).
[48] Taft to Root, October 10, 1900 (Root Papers). Cf. Taft to Howard C. Hollister, October 15, 1900 (Taft Papers).

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To his brother, Taft excoriated MacArthur as "a military martinet."[49] The commissioner was willing, however, to charge the general's attitude partly to an illness of the past ten days.[50]

And, in fact, with better health and his victory in at least two of these three jurisdictional disputes, MacArthur settled into happier relations with the Commission.[51] He even asked their opinion on several questions which lay wholly within his administrative realm.[52] During November the two authorities clashed only on the constabulary plan. In a conference with Commissioner Wright, MacArthur tried unsuccessfully to discover which army officers had spoken favorably of the plan to the commissioners; their ambition for appointments to officer the new force was likely to "demoralize his regular establishment." Offended when Wright implied that he was allowing the matter to "drift," MacArthur refused to detail an officer to study British experience with colonial troops. Though he did attend a session of the Commission on the question, he held that, Filipino disloyalty having increased during the past five months, constabulary plans should be postponed a year or more. Any recommendations now, he feared, might give Congress an excuse to reduce the essential American garrison.[53]

MacArthur's pessimism seemed excessive. Conceding "his honesty, his candor, his genial manner and kindly disposition," Taft complained to Root

> that he lacked any vigorous initiative; that with him almost everything new was premature; that he was naturally timid and that he had greater fear of consequences than dash and energy in achieving results on original lines; that he is unwilling because of timidity to delegate matters to Lieutenants; that he is very set in his opinion; that he is exceedingly sensitive at his subordinates having any different view from himself, and that he regards [the defeat of the anti-imperialists by McKinley in the November election] as carte blanche in army matters and as dispensing with the necessity for native troops. . . .[54]

[49] Taft to C. P. Taft [October ?], 1900 (Taft Papers).
[50] Taft to Root, October 10, 1900 (Root Papers).
[51] Taft to Root, October 16, 21, 1900 (Root Papers).
[52] *Executive Minutes*, October 16, 17, 22, 1900.
[53] *Ibid.*, November 7, 10, 14, 1900; Taft to Root, November 14, 1900 (Root Papers).
[54] Taft to Root, November 14, 1900 (Root Papers). Cf. Taft to Spooner, November 30, 1900; Taft to Bishop, November 30, 1900 (Taft Papers).

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Taft surmised, "He has been in an Adjutant General's office so long [during the 1890's] that it is difficult for him to get over . . . deliberateness and redtapeism."[55]

The commissioner thought, moreover, that a pro-American party might be organized throughout the islands except for MacArthur's blunders in arresting suspected insurgents. The general, he felt, lacked "political sagacity and experience."[56] The methods of a soldier—even an American soldier—were too abrupt; "he does not seek to give . . . that appearance of fairness, which is as important as actual fairness, itself, in dealing with a suspicious people used to all sorts of official arbitrariness and injustice."[57] On the other hand, it was the Commission and not the general who wished to deport captured insurgent leaders to Guam, to make guerrilla banditry a capital offense, and to suppress seditious Manila newspapers.[58]

The Commission and the Military Governor approached the end of 1900 in a state of uneasy truce. MacArthur again objected to the Commission's request that he detail a particular army officer, this time for a road survey, although this time the Commission could produce explicit orders from Root granting them extraordinary authority.[59] But their suggestions on various executive affairs still seemed only to heighten the general's pique. Not even attempting to cooperate, the rival authorities separately investigated a case of customs house fraud. Too busy to bicker, Taft ignored the Governor's "didactic and querulous" complaints and looked forward ever more impatiently to the advent of a Civil Governor. And though MacArthur's invitation to his New Year's Day reception gave Taft his second and the other commissioners their first look into Malacañan, he did not ask them to the breakfast which followed.[60]

Taft soon cheerfully applauded, however, when the reception, to which the general welcomed the Filipino public, turned out

[55] Taft to Horace H. Lurton, November 30, 1900 (Taft Papers).
[56] Taft to Root, December 27, 1900 (Root Papers).
[57] Taft to William R. Day, December 10, 1900 (Taft Papers).
[58] Taft to Root, October 31, November 14, 1900 (Root Papers).
[59] *Executive Minutes*, December 7, 1900.
[60] Taft to Root, December 27, 1900 (Root Papers); Taft to Day, December 10, 1900; Taft to Henry Cabot Lodge, January 7, 1901 (Taft Papers).

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to be a democratic triumph.[61] And for a similar affair three weeks later MacArthur invited the commissioners' wives to receive with him.[62] But he seldom consulted the Commission unless he thought their legislative interests were clearly involved, as in a new monetary exchange ratio or a dispute between army officers and the new civil regime in Benguet province; occasionally he did try to place some executive problem, such as an American's squatting on Igorot land, in their unwilling hands.[63] The Commission felt that by asking their advice he might have avoided Filipino resentment over the manner in which he had deported certain insurgents to Guam. Of his plan to close the hemp ports in order to hamper the insurrectos, the Commission first learned when an impatient cable arrived from Root. And Taft could not answer the Secretary's inquiry into the amount of civil funds spent for military purposes, because "General MacArthur has been so strenuous against our looking into the lump sums which he has sent to the District Commanders, . . . that we have yielded." Such behavior indicated to Taft "a small man in a place of large responsibility."[64] Small but pompous—when the general postponed a Palace ball in deference to Queen Victoria's death, Commissioner Wright snorted, "In view of the death of a royal sister, he must pay her memory proper respect."[65]

Early in 1901 the military and civil authorities clashed over establishing local civil governments. The Commission had laid plans to visit pacified provinces to set up the new regimes. But MacArthur, reluctant to lend them the transport *Sumner*, followed his usual practice, Taft complained, "of not earnestly cooperating with our plans, but of treating us exactly as he would any subordinate. . . ."[66] It apparently took a cablegram from the Adjutant General to secure the Commission the ship.[67]

Yet MacArthur was concerned only with possible military need

[61] Taft to Root, January 9, 1901 (Root Papers).
[62] Taft to Root, January 13, 1901 (Root Papers).
[63] *Executive Minutes*, January 5, 16, 21, 1901; Taft to H. Phelps Whitmarsh, January 22, 1901 (Taft Papers).
[64] Taft to Root, January 9, 1901 (Root Papers); Taft to C. P. Taft, January 9, 1901 (Taft Papers).
[65] Taft to C. P. Taft, January 23, 1901 (Taft Papers).
[66] Taft to Root, January 21, 1901 (Root Papers); *Executive Minutes*, January 21, 1901.
[67] W. H. Corbin to MacArthur, February 19, 1901 (National Archives: A.G.O. 369538).

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for the vessel. In March, when the army appropriation for the coming year was safely through Congress, he declared his approval of Taft's policy on civil government—to the consternation of anti-imperialists back home who had cited his earlier laments over Filipino disloyalty.[68] He willingly reorganized Pampanga according to the Commission's new provincial government act.[69] In fact, although the military commander in Southern Luzon recommended only one province there for civil rule, MacArthur himself added three more in the belief that the transition would speed the army's job of pacification.[70] Nor did the general side with the obstreperous army men in Benguet.[71] While some general officers saw no way to civilize Filipinos except "with a Krag," Taft praised Wheaton, Hughes, Kobbe, and MacArthur himself as signally successful at conciliating the population.[72] In February the Military Governor even suggested to Taft that a central civil government for the islands could be set up by June.[73]

Early in March Taft's concern over the civil-military wrangle in Benguet led him to confer with MacArthur on the whole jurisdictional problem.[74] This the Spooner Amendment, just enacted by Congress, put in a new light. Hitherto the Philippine regime had rested merely on the President's constitutional power as commander-in-chief; the new act delegated him unassailable authority over the colony. MacArthur assured Taft that this change reduced their dispute of the past six months to "an academic question."[75]

For, as Taft was startled to learn, the general firmly believed that McKinley's instructions of April 1900 had been "an unconstitutional interference with his prerogative as Military Commander in these Islands." Taft told Root:

[68] Henry W. Taft to Taft, February 19, 1901; Taft to Edward Colston, April 24, 1901; Taft to Bishop, April 25, 1901 (Taft Papers).

[69] Taft to Root, February 24, 1901 (Root Papers).

[70] *Executive Minutes*, February 20, 1901; "Affairs in the Philippine Islands," *Senate Document*, 57th Congress, 1st session, no. 331 (April 10, 1902), p. 885; Dean C. Worcester, *The Philippines Past and Present*, New York, 1914, pp. 337-40; Mrs. Taft, *op.cit.*, p. 155.

[71] *Executive Minutes*, January 16, 1901; Taft to Root, January 21, 1901 (Root Papers).

[72] Taft to Root, March 17, 1901 (Root Papers).

[73] Taft to James B. Thayer, February 23, 1901 (Taft Papers).

[74] Taft to MacArthur, March 6, 1901 (Root Papers).

[75] Taft to Root, March 17, 1901 (Root Papers).

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> He thinks the President has no power to divide the military authority here into a legislative and an executive and confer the legislative on civilians. . . . He thinks that the instructions were *ultra vires* under the constitutional limitations upon the powers of the President as a Commander in Chief. It has always been a curious phase of political human nature to me to observe that men who have not had the slightest knowledge of legal principles . . . feel entirely at home in the construction of the constitution and in using its limitations to support their views and to nullify action, the wisdom of which they dispute. The constitution has not often been used to maintain undiminished the absolute legislative, executive and judicial power of a subordinate military commander as against the express orders of his constitutional Commander in Chief. . . .[76]

The general went on to unburden himself of personal objections to his relationship with the Commission:

> He said [wrote Taft] that the strain to which he had been subjected by reason of the cutting down of his powers and the transfer to us of our legislative functions and of some of the executive functions was so great that he could not endure it much longer. The humiliation to which he was subjected, he said, was extreme and he would be glad to have an end brought to it.

Within a few months, according to War Department plans, a Civil Governor would assume the commanding general's civil functions. Rather than endure another reduction in authority, MacArthur told Taft that he wished to leave the islands at that time—which he hoped would come soon. Taft could only voice his astonishment that the commander of 65,000 men and head of a large civil government should so easily feel humiliated; as for the present divided regime, it had proved its worth by reconciling many Filipinos to American dominion.[77]

A few days later Taft had his "pleasantest and most satisfactory" interview with MacArthur, who

> seemed to be in good humor, and did not once refer to any feeling of humiliation, and expressed himself as entirely satisfied with the date fixed [July 1], and was very anxious to cooperate with us in every way in continuing to establish civil governments. He said that the effect had been exceedingly good and was anxious to have it in all the provinces.

The military situation had markedly improved, with a steady stream of insurgents surrendering. No longer so sensitive about

[76] *Ibid.* [77] *Ibid.*

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his prerogatives, MacArthur accepted without demur the Commission's request that he detail a certain colonel as governor of Tayabas.[78]

Secretary Root, who had followed every turn of Taft's tussle with MacArthur, had already decided to hand the general's remaining military functions over to Major General Adna R. Chaffee, whom he instructed to "get the Army out of the business of government and restore it to its proper and natural place as an adjunct of civil government." Hoping that Chaffee, who had never exercised civil power in the Philippines, would be free from "the inevitable tendency of human nature to look with disfavor on a reduction of power," Root delayed changing the command until Taft became Governor.[79] Taft was less optimistic about getting along with any army man.[80]

Only a few altercations marred the final three months of Philippine government under the system of 1900-1901. Disliking MacArthur's scheme for a proclamation by the captured Aguinaldo, Taft warned Root in April, "I have no great confidence in General MacArthur's political sense"; the general's opinion "that we are here only to prepare these people for independence" was all very well but might be dangerous if thus set forth.[81] But, overruled by Root, who thought Aguinaldo's address "admirable,"[82] Taft soon owned that its effect "most agreeably surprised" him. MacArthur's plan to send Aguinaldo on a tour of the United States, however, Taft opposed and McKinley and Root did not encourage.[83]

Taft also was irritated by the general's apparent sponsorship of certain army officers, aspirants to civil judgeships, who were campaigning in Manila newspapers against rival "carpet-baggers" and "spoilsmen" from the States. Again, MacArthur hesitated to release military property to civilian use; the Commission had difficulty securing the Manila Exposition Grounds, occupied by

[78] *Ibid.*

[79] Root to Taft, February 28, 1901 (Root Papers); Taft to C. P. Taft, May 17, 1901 (Taft Papers).

[80] Taft to Hollister, May 26, 1901 (Taft Papers).

[81] Taft to Root, April 3, 1901 (Root Papers).

[82] Corbin to MacArthur, April 11, 1901; Root to Taft, April 11, 1901 (Root Papers).

[83] Taft to Root, April 27, 1901 (Root Papers).

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the artillery, as quarters for American schoolteachers. The general's rebuking of reporters who sent home critical dispatches still smacked too much of censorship for the Commission's taste. And when a major, known in the army as a fool, squabbled with the civil governor of Bataan, MacArthur at first ignored the Commission's protests, then offered to remove his man if they removed theirs, and finally reprimanded both officials alike. Taft sighed that MacArthur lacked "breadth of view. He cannot separate himself from the narrowing military prejudice to reach a just and judicial conclusion on such an issue."[84]

But on the Fourth of July, 1901, Taft at last moved into Malacañan Palace as Civil Governor with full executive authority over all the pacified provinces.[85] "I think General MacArthur was pleased with our farewell hospitality to him," Mrs. Taft later recalled; ". . . his feelings toward Mr. Taft, when he left the Islands [that] day, were exceedingly friendly."[86] Though in his inaugural address the new Governor failed to praise the old, he spoke of the danger of civil-military friction as though none had yet occurred.[87] Taft held a reception in MacArthur's honor at Malacañan and accompanied him to his embarkation.[88] The general, arriving at San Francisco, betrayed no ill will; the new civil regime he pronounced welcome both to the Filipinos and to the military, "to whom the civil task was hard and tedious. . . . The two departments are well set apart."[89]

"We have had a long, hard year with General MacArthur. . ." sighed Governor Taft, "—and now we have General Chaffee."[90] The new commander seemed to Taft "an upright and downright kind of man." Yet Taft soon found Chaffee as sensitive as his predecessor about the commanding general's right to detail army officers who were needed for civil jobs.[91] After a first-class set-to in September, Taft concluded:

[84] Taft to Root, May 24, 1901 (Root Papers); Taft to Hollister, May 26, 1901 (Taft Papers); *Executive Minutes*, May 21, 1901.

[85] Taft to Root, June 17, 1901; Root to Taft, June 18, 21, 1901 (Root Papers).

[86] Mrs. Taft, *op.cit.*, p. 210.

[87] William Howard Taft, *Present Day Problems*, New York, 1908, pp. 8-9.

[88] *New York Daily Tribune*, July 5, 1901. [89] *Ibid.*, August 19, 1901.

[90] Taft to John Warrington, July 19, 1901 (Taft Papers).

[91] Taft to Root, July 14, 1901 (Root Papers). Cf. Taft to Hollister, August 27, 1901 (Taft Papers).

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> It is perhaps unreasonable for us in the Commission to feel impatient, for . . . in transition periods there is always friction, . . . and it is altogether too much for us to expect that with the head of an Army, any army I suppose, we could expect that loving cooperation with civil government which would make us feel that we had not two forces to oppose or deal with, those of disorder and those of our own lawful allies. Still I do not know why I should complain of this phase of the situation, which was in it when we came out here and which will remain until civil government is completely established.[92]

When a week later Chaffee disputed a civil court's right to compel him by writ of *habeas corpus* to deliver up a military prisoner, the new President, Theodore Roosevelt, felt it necessary to intervene.[93] Actually Taft and Chaffee, who respected each other, got along comparatively well.[94] But as long as civil and military officials still ruled side by side anywhere in the islands, some strain was bound to be felt.[95]

As for Arthur MacArthur and William Howard Taft, early in 1902 both testified before a Senate committee investigating the Philippines. Each glossed over all hints of discord, and indeed the fact that no anti-imperialist senators delved into the personal differences between the two indicates how little either MacArthur or Taft desired to exploit these for political ends.[96] Nor did the two bear grudges. After MacArthur's retirement for age in 1909, newspapers suggested that as a lieutenant general since 1906 he had resented serving under a major general Chief of Staff.[97] Though Taft was Secretary of War at the time, he can hardly be blamed; he recommended MacArthur for Chief of Staff at least twice.[98]

It would be easy to attribute the friction between Commissioner Taft and Military Governor MacArthur solely to the

92 Taft to Root, September 26, 1901 (Root Papers).

93 Chaffee to Corbin, October 2 (A.G.O. 401125), October 4, 5, 1901; Corbin to Chaffee, October 5, 1901 (Root Papers); Theodore Roosevelt to Taft, October 8, 1901; Roosevelt to Chaffee, October 8, 1901 (Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress).

94 Taft to Root, October 4, 1901 (Root Papers); Mrs. Taft, *op.cit.*, pp. 218-21; Pringle, *op.cit.*, I, pp. 211-12.

95 E.g., Root to Taft, October 25, 1902 (Root Papers).

96 "Affairs in the Philippine Islands," pp. 59, 63, 80, 85-87, 136; cf. *Reports of the Philippine Commission*, Washington, 1904, p. 31.

97 *New York Times*, September 6, 1912; Mrs. Taft, *op.cit.*, pp. 210-11.

98 Taft to Corbin, December 31, 1905; Taft to Roosevelt, September 16, 1906 (Roosevelt Papers).

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general's personality. Accustomed to a military commander's absolute authority and proud of his grasp of all phases of Philippine affairs, he could hardly speak without making a political and economic as well as military pronunciamento. In his grandiose periods, America's whole future hinged on its Philippine policy:

> The presence of America in these islands is simply one of the results, in logical sequence, of great national prosperity, and in remote consequences is likely to transcend in importance anything recorded in the history of the world since the discovery of America. To doubt the wisdom of the United States remaining in the islands is to doubt the stability of republican institutions, and amounts to a declaration that a nation thus governed is incapable of successfully resisting strains that arise naturally from its own freedom, and from its own productive energy.[99]

He believed that he understood perfectly the "psychological" and "ethnological" traits of the Filipinos and saw his regime as a stage in the march of the "Aryan race," planting "republicanism" and "Americanism" among less favored peoples.[100] MacArthur was no man to brook a rival, particularly a civilian fresh from the States.

Taft was indeed a different sort. Though he thought the general stiff-necked and "pseudo-profound," the politician and judge was by nature fairly impervious to provocation.[101] An admirer wrote:

> On one occasion he received a communication from the military end of the government. It was the culmination of a series of manifestations of spite and jealousy. Governor Taft scanned the paper absentmindedly, then he straightened up in his chair and his feet struck the ground. His face flushed and then the red deepened. There was a frown on his brow. Then he whirled suddenly in his chair, broke into a merry infectious laugh, and turning to a subordinate said: "Read this. It's about the funniest of all funny things from that service."[102]

If anyone could get along with the high-flown and crusty general, it was the corpulent and equable Taft. Perhaps a Military Gov-

[99] *Annual Report of the Military Governor in the Philippine Islands,* Washington, 1901, pp. 47-48.

[100] "Affairs in the Philippine Islands," pp. 868-70.

[101] Taft to Root, January 9, 1901 (Root Papers); Taft to C. P. Taft, January 9, 1901 (Taft Papers).

[102] "Stories of Governor Taft in the Philippines," *World's Work,* VII (1903), p. 4231.

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ernor with an equally sunny personality would have cooperated wholeheartedly, while if Theodore Roosevelt and not Taft had been sent to the Philippines to establish civil government, the whole world might have heard the battle with MacArthur.

But more than personalities was involved. Though MacArthur frequently made genuine cooperation impossible, ultimately he and Taft were able to resolve their disputes without appeals to the Secretary of War. And even MacArthur's occasional complete intransigence sprang not simply from jealousy over power. On such matters as the constabulary plan, which could jeopardize the military campaign for which he was responsible, there was room for honest disagreement. As Taft himself observed, during this delicate and unprecedented transition period friction between civil and military was inevitable.

Furthermore, while the most perfect governmental mechanism requires willing hands to work it, the Philippines system of 1900-1901 contained flaws which invited discord. First, it kept the commanding general as chief executive but allowed the legislative Commission to appoint and remove his civil subordinates. Second, despite the continuing military campaign it was unclear whether the Commission might not even disrupt the general's command by choosing which army officers should be detailed to civil jobs. This problem continued after Taft became Civil Governor in July 1901. Finally, though the Commission had the appointing power, the President's instructions failed to state whether, as the legislature, they could investigate the conduct of civil officials. The Congressional analogy was perhaps as obvious as they assumed, but MacArthur had some reason to regard their inquiries as usurpation of his executive authority. While MacArthur precipitated the disputes on all these points, Taft was overly slow in seeing the justice in the general's objections. Indeed, as Root's collaborator in 1900 in devising the system, Taft shares with MacArthur the blame for their difficulties.

A grandiloquent, imperious professional soldier and a prosaic, affable judge-politician, each with definite views on policy, trying to govern in an unprecedented situation under a confusingly divided authority—it is surprising that the friction between Taft and MacArthur was not hotter still.

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LANDS ATHWART THE NILE

By DERWENT WHITTLESEY

OVER a period of many months, both before and since the abdication of King Farouk, responsible heads of government in Egypt have been voicing a claim to the entire Nile Basin, although practical measures to convert the claim into control have been pointed chiefly toward that part of the Basin included in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.[1]

It is the fashion nowadays, especially in the United States, to assume that river basins are coherent, nature-given units of the earth's surface, without questioning their fitness for unified political administration or sovereignty. According to that fashion, even the extreme Egyptian claim seems cogent. The Nile Basin is a drainage unit and clearly appears so on the map (FIG. 1).

A closer inspection discloses striking varieties of climate, terrain, and vegetation within the Basin that deserve consideration along with the unity of drainage (FIGS. 2, 3). Moreover, the inhabitants are as diverse as their different natural settings—in origin, way of life, viewpoint, and contact with the outside world. The political events upon which the Egyptian claim largely rests took place both inside and outside the Nile Basin, and were shaped by the diversity of places and peoples involved. The validity and practicality of the claims now being put forward depend on the forces that favor or resist their realization. Those forces are exerted in a multi-regional mold of commingled nature and culture. An understanding of the regional grouping sets the stage for the current and forthcoming play of events in the Nile lands.

[1] A proclamation of Egyptian sovereignty of the Sudan early in 1952 was moderated in November by a proposal that Britain and Egypt undertake measures looking toward Sudanese self-determination.

FIG. 1 (*facing page*): The Nile Basin is outlined, its six geographic regions are marked off and numbered, and principal surface transport lines and political boundaries are shown, both in the Basin and in the neighboring lands. Places mentioned in the text are named and located on this map.

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

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The political pattern of northeastern Africa now being challenged is the outgrowth of forces and conditions that made themselves felt between 1820 and 1920. Among them: discoveries in interior Africa, particularly in the upper Nile Basin; opening of the Suez Canal, making a shortcut between the East African coast and Europe; steam-driven ships on sea and inland waters; railways; advances in engineering techniques that made it possible to dam the Nile and create large-scale irrigation and hydroelectric power; a rapidly expanding world market; European introduction of the technological revolution; partial replacement of parochial Animism by the widely practiced Islam and Christianity. The changes affected different parts of the Basin unequally at the outset, and the inhabitants have continued to respond to them at different rates and with varied results. Over the years some regional contrasts have been reduced, while others have been heightened.

Much of the conditioning at work before 1920 continues, and there have been potent additions and alterations. Motor transport and all-weather roads now supplement waterways and railways, knitting tentative political areas into unprecedented unity. Surface connections have been augmented by airways. One of three main air thoroughfares that traverse Africa from north to south follows the Nile, with principal stops at Cairo, the head of the delta; at Khartoum, the confluence of the two principal Nile branches; and at Entebbe on Lake Victoria, the accepted headwater of the whole river system. A secondary airlane from Cairo skirts the Red Sea coast, regains the Nile Basin in Abyssinia, and crosses all the surface and air routes between the Nile and the coast. Airways traversing Africa from west to east cross

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FIG. 2 (*facing page*): The highlands modify climate, making them cooler than are lowlands in the same latitude, and subjecting them to more irregular rainfall. Most borders between climates are not lines, as indicated on the map, but transitional zones of varying width. These are broad on lowlands, and narrowest on steep slopes of mountains and plateau margins. The "rainlands," where commercial crops are grown without irrigation, lie between the Nuba Mountains and the Abyssinian Plateau. Irrigation is practiced in stream valleys, chiefly in the "dry climate."

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

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the north-south lane at Cairo and Khartoum. Air traffic, by tying together in a few hours regions formerly accessible to each other only by slow surface routes, intensifies the tug between diverse regions that has been increasing for more than a century.

Egypt Versus the Nile Basin

Of all the political units wholly or in part within the Nile Basin, only Egypt has ever made sweeping claims to hegemony over the lands drained by the Nile. The aspiration is not new; a century ago it was backed up by territorial conquests. These were cancelled, before they were completed, by forces rooted in the regional diversity of the Basin. On today's political map Egypt is a roughly square chunk of the African continent lying "athwart the Nile" or, more accurately, athwart its lowermost course (Fig. 1). But the visitor to Egypt sees little of the national domain save the "land along the Nile." This is a strip of farmland—green, gold, and black—nowhere more than ten miles wide except at the north end, where riverborne silt fans out into the Mediterranean Sea in the shape of a Greek-letter delta.

Aside from valley floor and delta, and four tiny oases some miles west of the river, political Egypt is an unpeopled desert waste, useless except at the northeast, where it reaches out across the Isthmus of Suez and its interocean canal. The Nile strip, in contrast to the negative wasteland, is a land of positive superlatives. In all the world its history is the longest, its ancient monuments are the most fabulous, and its present-day farmers are the most closely packed. Its capital, Cairo at the nexus of valley and delta, is the most populous city in Africa. Egypt exists because the river has laid down the fertile farmland and brings to it water that has fallen as rain in distant and different climates. Egypt is unique, because nowhere else on earth does a desert

Fig. 3 (*facing page*): Natural vegetation, here shown, takes no account of crops. For instance, the narrow Nile Valley is no longer forested, and in parts of the "small bush" much of the original cover has been replaced. The trees that yield gum arabic are scattered over the lowland small bush, from the desert to the east-flowing Gazelle River. Borders between vegetation types are transitional zones, as in the case of climate.

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

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river maintain flow throughout the year sufficient to supply man and beast, supplemented by a reliable seasonal flood that both irrigates and fertilizes the valley floor.

The flow and regulation of Nile water has inevitably been the chief concern of Egyptians from earliest times. The origin of the water came to their knowledge piecemeal and at first as legends. Ancient Egyptian governments did what they could to conquer lands upstream. After many centuries they learned that their floodwater came from a remote highland, and at times tried to propitiate the highlanders with gifts. When, in the mid-nineteenth century, the last of the Nile sources was revealed by European explorers, the Egyptian government undertook to annex the entire vast Basin, in the hope of controlling the Nile water. Deprived of irrigation, the Egyptian strip along the Nile would relapse into desert. No other country in the Basin is entirely dependent on water from foreign sources. Today's demands, concerned immediately with the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, have political roots in the nineteenth-century conquest and reconquest of that country. But the underlying motive is the ever-present urge to dominate and regulate the Nile waters.

All the inhabitants of the Nile Basin have a vital interest in the river, but the nature of that interest springs from the character of the region occupied by each group. Hence their concern may tally with the Egyptians', but is more likely to oppose it.

No very long river traverses country uniform throughout in all respects, especially if it runs north or south, across the climatic zones. The Nile is the longest river on earth and flows almost due north for most of its 4,000 miles, cutting across thirty-four degrees of latitude (FIG. 1). From its source, a little south of the Equator, it reaches more than a third of the distance to the North Pole. Such a stream must pass through several types of climate and correlated types of soils, vegetation, animal life, and water supply, to say nothing of a presumption that it traverses a variety of land-forms and mineral resources as well.

Africa north of the Equator is in fact the classic example of climatic zonation. Maps portraying temperature, rainfall, and winds are striped with east-west lines denoting differences im-

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posed by the rhythmic seasonal oscillation of the earth beneath the sun (Fig. 2). Vegetation and soil, both closely associated with climate, strengthen the impression that significant natural differences slice the Nile Basin into distinctive regions (Fig. 3). Terrain complicates the variety by isolating certain parts of the drainage basin and accenting, through elevation, the contrasts of the lowlands (Fig. 2). Finally, the river itself is beset by barriers of falls and rapids that mark off its basin into segments. Some of these factors, such as the cataracts, the highlands, and the vegetation, are visible to the traveler. Others become evident to those who observe the annual round of the seasons. The inexorable sway of east-west natural zones is undisputed over most of northern Africa.

The Nile alone challenges that exclusive authority, scratching a wet mark across the whole gamut of zones. Along the riverbanks, water is to be had regardless of climate or season. On quiet reaches boats can make their slow way across the banded landscape. Nowhere has nature set the stage for a more dramatic antithesis between east-west and north-south. From source to mouth the inhabitants have reinforced contrasting natural conditions with distinctive cultural landscapes. In places and at times, adjacent societies have been almost completely severed. Conversely, several are closely associated with lands beyond the river basin and through those lands make contact with the outside world. Between some regions there is overlap, especially where fostered by communication along the stream's life-giving course. In few places do the boundaries of political units coincide with regional cleavages, although some parts of the two patterns do roughly correspond (Fig. 1). The amount of correspondence and the degree of regional coherence throw light on the prospect for fulfilling the Egyptian hope of political unification.

The six principal regional divisions and the linkages between them are discussed in the following pages.

1. The Desert Nile Region (Fig. 1)

The lower half of the Nile's course crosses the broad east-west band of desert familiar as the Sahara. In this entire distance of

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some 2,000 miles, it receives no perennial tributary. Only one, the Atbara, contributes floodwater worth mentioning. It is seasonal and unreliable, and throughout much of the year it lies shrunken to pools in an otherwise dry bed.

A sharp division separates the Desert Nile Region into two parts, each covering about eight degrees of latitude. As far upstream as the First Cataract (at Aswan, FIG. 1), the river is navigable at all seasons and, until the coming of the railroad late in the nineteenth century, it was the sole means of communication except for desert trails eastward to the Red Sea and westward to the offside oases. Sailboats and rowboats are still numerous. On both banks the valley floor is continuously wide enough to farm by irrigation, except for a few spots where the stream flows against one or the other valley wall.

This lowest Nile Valley is and has always been the coreland of Egypt, where nearly all Egyptians live, and which they show little disposition to leave, in spite of high and rising population pressure. Farming is possible only with irrigation. Minerals, aside from building-stone along the valley walls, scarcely exist. The application of water to the land has therefore never ceased to be the overwhelming preoccupation of Egyptians. Most of the farm workers live in hamlets, on land above the reach of floods and at the same time useless for agriculture. A string of them lies on each desert margin of the cropland, while others perch on bits of high ground among the fields, generally on natural levees along the waterside. Market towns and the principal cities cling to the river to engage in its traffic. A common urban site is a ridge of rock jutting out of the silt deposited on the valley floor.

Between the First Cataract at Aswan and the Second at Wadi Halfa the valley resembles Egypt proper, but is much less populous because of less favoring conditions, and its inhabitants are racially distinct from the Egyptians. The valley floor is narrow and discontinuous, contact with the valley downstream is interrupted by the First Cataract, and no railroad or road has been built to parallel the stream. The river is easily navigable, but the only regular service is provided not by the Egyptian govern-

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ment, but by that of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Politically the country is part of Egypt, as it has nearly always been. Remains of temples, forts, and trading stations attest its long cultural community with the valley to the north. Since 1912, when some of the farmland was flooded by the storage reservoir created by the Aswan Dam, and especially since 1934, when the dam was raised, the population and the base for livelihood have been reduced. This segment of the Desert Nile Region is little more than a frontier barrier crossed by occasional boats that take advantage of the easily navigated stream.

Just below the Second Cataract the political boundary between Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan crosses the Nile (FIG. 1). From there to the southern confines of the Desert Nile Region, the river describes a gigantic S-bend within which it is constricted to successive gorges and tumbles over rapids no less than four more times (Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Cataracts). At a number of places the stream fills the valley, leaving no room for farmland. The interrupted valley floor is irrigated by water lifted from the river, mainly by time-honored devices operated by men or animals, although there are a few power pumps. Navigation is interrupted at each cataract, except that at high water boats can pass over the Third. The roundabout course of the stream further reduces its usefulness for movement, and winds retard sailing craft on some of the reaches.

Desert routes have always been used as alternatives to this segment of the Nileway. Before the days of railroads, camel caravans followed the Forty Days' Track, one of five main routes across the Sahara. It took off at Assiut, well below the First Cataract, and ran south-southwest to El Fasher, 1,100 miles away (FIG. 1). Other desert routes cut off one or the other of the members of the S-bend. A railroad, built just before 1900, strikes across the desert from the Second Cataract to the center of the bend, thence following the river to and beyond the southern limit of the desert. It has supplanted the camel routes except for local traffic.

The region of the S-bend was known as Ethiopia in ancient times, but since the fifteenth century A.D. it has usually been

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called Nubia.[2] Its contacts with Egypt go back to neolithic times, but they have been interrupted for long intervals. On navigable reaches between the cataracts are forts and temples resembling those in ancient Egypt, showing that Nubia was an outpost of empire and a base for the frontier trade. Products from the humid tropical lands farther south and gold from the Nubian Desert were sources of prosperity, and for one brief period Nubia turned the tables on Egypt by extending its sway downstream well beyond the First Cataract.

From a time a little before the Christian era, immigrants from the south and east have been filtering into the country of the S-bend. They long ago supplanted the Egyptian culture and have continued to modify the racial strain. Once Christianized, Nubia held out against Islam until the fourteenth century, suggesting that relations with Moslem Egypt were tenuous for at least six hundred years. Again, with Turkish conquest of Nubia in the sixteenth century, Egyptian influence faded, to revive about 1820, when Egypt began a vigorous conquest of countries up-Nile. Several tribes of the bend region continue to speak languages other than Arabic, after five hundred years of contact with Arab society.

The claim of Egypt to Nubia rests on the history here sketched. Its potency lies in the emotional response it awakens among the claimant people, since, practically speaking, a claim based on force exerted in the past is valueless, unless new force can be applied. Viewed as part of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Nubia's history and location indicate that it is a transitional region, lying as it does on the southern margin of the desert and occupying a part of the Nile Valley marked by barriers to movement on the stream that reinforce the inhospitality of the Sahara itself.

The part of the Nile Basin closest to Egypt, and very like it as to natural conditions and economic pursuits, Nubia has become politically separate. It is sparsely peopled, low in production, and difficult to traverse. If annexed to Egypt it would contribute nothing toward solving the vital problem of water, because, like Egypt, its entire water supply comes from lands farther upstream.

[2] These designations need to be distinguished from Ethiopia, the official name of Abyssinia since World War II, and from Nuba, people who live in the Nuba Mountains, much farther south.

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2. The Nilotic Sudan Region (Fig. 1)

In the vicinity of the Sixth Cataract, at the upper end of the S-bend, the landscape changes from desert to a type of vegetation called in Africa "small bush" (Fig. 3). It is made up of low trees and coarse grasses and herbs, in a variety of combinations that to the uninitiated look monotonously alike. Small bush grows in a climate as rainless as desert for part of the year, generally from six to nine months, alternating with downpours during the remaining months.

Nomads move about the small bush with their livestock, in search of grass and water. Occasionally they venture into the desert after a rare desert rain. The Nile and other streams powerfully attract them, but many tribes live too far away to water their stock at the rivers and must depend on wells and on shallow ponds dug to hold rainwater for use during the dry season. Several nomadic groups plant a crop in the hope of some return. Other farmers are settled cultivators depending primarily on crops. They are restricted to the narrow range of field crops that can mature during the short season while the ground is moist, with the addition of a few products from native trees that dot much of the countryside. Along the streams there is the possibility of irrigation, just as in the Desert Nile Region. Water is as critical in the Nilotic Sudan as in the Desert, but is more abundant and more widely spread. Hence the population is not confined to the vicinity of the rivers but is dispersed over the whole area. Most concentrations that could be called towns or cities are on the waterways, but several lie far from any perennial stream, at points where ponds or wells provide the necessary minimum of water.

The Nilotic Sudan is part of that larger Sudan which extends across Africa in the widest part of the continent. It is a rolling lowland, with a few mountain masses, but no barrier ranges. The vegetation is light, and in the dry season tracks can be followed from sea to sea. There is generally some sort of forage for animals, and water is available at close intervals. These conditions have made the entire Sudan a route of movements. Tribes have migrated along it. Novel ideas have followed it, including the Moslem way of life. Every year pilgrims to Mecca from the

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west move through the Nilotic Sudan, and many remain there. During World War II it was a principal airlane between America and the Middle East, and in the ensuing peace it remains one of three east-west airways in Africa.

Near the Red Sea the characteristic Sudan climate and vegetation is blocked in the south by the lofty Abyssinian Highland, and deflected northward along the low coastal mountains (FIG. 2). The coast range presents no serious obstacle, and caravan routes have found terminals at Red Sea ports from early times. Six years after the present Sudan government was set up, the Nilotic Sudan was connected with Red Sea traffic by rail, an outlet that has ever since handled most of the imports and exports of the region, and a fair share of the passenger traffic as well (FIG. 1).

Within the region, the Nileway is more prominent than anywhere else south of Egypt. Here the Nile is no longer a single artery without tributaries. Only fifty miles above the Sixth Cataract, the Main Nile is formed by the confluence of its two principal sources—the White Nile and the Blue (FIG. 2).

Flowing almost due north, the White Nile brings down its year-round contribution of milky-gray water from the long basin beyond the belt of scrubby bush. In the Sudan it flows slowly across a nearly level plain. Here and there water is pumped from it to irrigate a patch of riverside land. All year it bears native boats and the flat-bottom steamers and barges operated by the government railway as an extension of its rail service. Thirty miles above the confluence, a long, low dam impounds water that is not needed when the Main Nile is in flood, to be used for irrigating Egyptian fields at low Nile. The reservoir inundated some cropland, the occupiers of which were moved, by cooperation of the Egyptian and the Sudanese governments. The work, completed in 1937, is at once a proof of Egypt's need for a voice in the use of all Nile water and an example of harmonious cooperation by the Sudan.

The right fork, or Blue Nile, flows in a valley somewhat deeper than its sister stream, across the same flat plain, and on a course roughly parallel to within a few miles of the confluence. It is

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navigable throughout its traverse of the plain for a few months during high water. The rest of the year sandbars hamper navigation, for this powerful stream carries both the water and the silt on which the agriculture of Egypt and Nubia has always depended. While it is filling the broad valley of the Main Nile with its torrential red flood it belies its name, but during the months of its gradual subsidence its bright blue water flows for some distance alongside the contribution from the White Nile before they mingle. The Blue Nile flood is slightly augmented from two right-bank tributaries which cease to flow and shrink to pools each dry season. A dam was built in 1924 at Sennar, about halfway along the plains course of the Blue Nile, to store surplus floodwater that would otherwise escape into the Mediterranean Sea. From it canals spread over the adjacent third of the flat land between the two Nile forks. The fertile, deep, black soil thus irrigated produces subsistence crops and much of the cotton which is the chief export of the country.

The natural focus of the Nilotic Sudan Region is the confluence of the White and Blue Niles. There stands the largest settlement of the Basin south of Cairo, the fourth most populous urban area in the whole of Africa. It is the capital of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, the chief center of both large-scale manufacturing and handicrafts, the seat of its higher education, and the scene of all the military climaxes in its modern history. The river routes that converge there are reinforced by a railroad and joined by an overland track from the west.

The urban area is divided by the broad streams into three settlements. Khartoum, between the two forks, faces the Blue Nile a mile above the confluence. Its site safely above the highest floods, it is the twentieth-century successor to a nineteenth-century military camp, and later capital, of invading Egyptians. Less than ten miles upstream are ruins of the capital of an early Christian state, and on the highest ground within the present city are neolithic remains. Khartoum is basically a European town, the seat of political administration and of big business. Its shopping center specializes in goods from Europe and India, and many merchants are Levantine and Indian. They, and nearly

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all the Europeans of the area, dwell in Khartoum. Back from the river are rows of huts occupied by clerical and manual employees of Khartoum government and business. All are African, most of them Sudanese.

Khartoum North, directly across the Blue Nile and connected by a bridge, is a small satellite where European-type factories are being established, following the lead of a shipyard and railroad shops.

On the opposite side of the Main Nile is the very different community of Omdurman. It grew up during the nineteenth century as the seat of a religious leader who later touched off a revolt of the Sudanese of this region against their Egyptian conquerors. More than half of the total population of the three towns lives in Omdurman, a widespreading city of one-storey, flat-roofed buildings reminiscent of any part of the Near East. An Omdurman compound may be used for residence, for handicrafts, or for both. Goods are displayed in a market or bazaar, rather than in stores on the European model. The waterfront, lacking any equipment, is busy with traffic of sailing vessels carrying wood and other local produce. Omdurman is the center of Sudanese life, a different world from Khartoum, to which it is linked by a bridge across the White Nile at the confluence. The triple-town is the transport center of the country, although it never has been a railroad junction and it is no longer the terminus of up-river steamboats.

The Nilotic Sudan Region and the part of the Desert Nile Region within the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan are penetrated by the government railroad system. It traverses all the major producing regions of the entire country: three irrigated districts, an area of surplus millet production in the so-called "rainlands," and the vast plains dotted with acacia trees that yield nearly the whole of the world's gum arabic (Fig. 3). Where the east-west line of rails crosses the White Nile, nearly two hundred miles above Khartoum, a boat terminal connects with steamers that ply the river to the Sudanese head of navigation, near the southern border of the country.

Away from the rails and the Niles, surface transport in the

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Nilotic Sudan is restricted to tracks, some for wheeled vehicles, others for pack animals only. Throughout the dry season they are passable, and they crisscross the flat and rolling terrain in every direction. On sandy soil, a route becomes a broad interlacing of tracks seeking hard ground. On clay, tracks may be graded to encourage runoff and permit traffic during the period of occasional showers that usher in the rainy season. At the height of the rains most of the tracks become quagmires and many are officially closed to prevent destructive rutting by motor trucks. No move has been made to pave or macadamize roads outside the towns, because of the high cost of importing road metal into this region of deep soil, and because farmers are busy on their fields during the rains, and townsfolk who must move about can travel by air.

The Nilotic Sudan is the political focus and the economic heart of the country, and from the fourteenth century onward its mode of life has increasingly followed the pattern of Arabia. Arabic is the dominant language, universal in the centers, and spoken by the men of the remotest tribes. All the people are in some degree Moslem, and this region was the breeding ground of a fanatical Moslem cult that precipitated twenty years of revolution and rapine at the end of the nineteenth century. Before that, the Arab slave trade was carried on through the Red Sea ports and the inland towns of the region. The clothing evolved by the desert Arab has been generally adopted, although outlying tribes may not wear the full complement of Arab garments. Most groups, however black-skinned, lay claim to Arab origin and descent, for the sake of prestige. Even where such claims are not legendary, infusion of blood from Arabs who filtered into the country across the Red Sea or by way of Egypt has altered the physical types only slightly.

Emphasis by Sudanese on their Arabic heritage suggests to outsiders a uniform way of life and masks the distinct and sometimes clashing attitudes and practices that variegate the pattern of society. One manifestation of divergence is the flourishing of Islamic cults that have sprung up about the persons of natural leaders, revered as "holy men." The Sudanese Moslems have

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traditionally been sharply divided by devotion to cults. While some have been ephemeral, others have lasted a century or more.

Another and more enduring subdivision is tribal variety, most marked among nomads and other groups on the margins of the region, i.e., the edge of the desert, the Red Sea hills, and the far west. Those people speak their own languages among themselves and retain many tribal customs. Even when a tribe is decimated by disease, slave-raiding, or loss of livestock through epidemics, it maintains its communal and territorial coherence. Detribalization is associated with urban living, where Moslem society and European economy continuously bear upon the individual and the family, while they are separated from their tribal associations.

Ancient Egypt never controlled the Nilotic Sudan Region, although briefly the independent power seated in adjacent Nubia may have extended its authority upstream as far as Sennar on the Blue Nile. What little is known of the subsequent history indicates that federations of tribes repeatedly exerted control over areas larger than is usual in Africa. Beginning in 1820, the Egyptian government made a conquest of the region as part of an unprecedented drive to rule the Nile Basin, along with nearby Red Sea ports. Disaffection was followed, after a few decades, by open revolt and the enforced withdrawal of all Egyptian garrisons. Continued turbulence led, just before 1900, to reconquest jointly by a combined expedition of Egyptian troops and supplies and British officers and engineering skills. At that time an undefined condominium was set up as the "Anglo-Egyptian Sudan," with its political capital at Khartoum. For twenty-five years Egyptians and British shared the administration, but for the past quarter-century Egyptians have not participated in the government, although they maintain a token force of troops and engage in education.

Since 1920 the Nilotic Sudan has become a competitor of the Desert Nile Region (mainly Egypt) for irrigation water. Additional potential irrigable soil of the two regions is now believed to exceed the total area that can be farmed with the aid of Nile water. In the face of a limit to irrigation, the Sudanese popula-

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tion is rapidly growing, chiefly through decrease in the death-rate resulting from peace, sanitation, and medical care. Over-population may be postponed by two developments of recent years. The output of farm and range is rising, especially in the "rainlands" (FIG. 2), thanks to methods of production devised as modifications of Occidental farm practice. Secondly, the surplus yield of crops and livestock products is being sold in the world market, thanks to unrestricted use of the Suez Canal.

The Nilotic Sudan threatens to hamper Egypt in two ways: it has already begun to compete for Nile water, and most of its chief export, cotton, moves by way of the Suez Canal to Europe, where it competes with Egyptian cotton. Increase in prosperity and population anticipated by the Sudanese depends upon using additional water. Part of this can be stored from local rainfall and drawn from underground, but most of it must originate in Nile drainage farther upstream. This need, coupled with the political dominance of the Nilotic Sudan within the condominium, makes the region the crux of Egypt's current challenge to the political structure of northeastern Africa.

3. THE ABYSSINIAN NILE REGION (Fig. 1)

Abyssinia is here used to designate the plateau country which is officially styled Ethiopia. Its core is a mountainous highland, much of it above 8,000 feet (FIG. 2). From it the Blue Nile and all the other streams that flood the eastern Nilotic Sudan plunge through deep and narrow gorges that have dissected the plateau as well. The highland blocks are cut apart by hot and disease-ridden valleys, and their inhabitants have tended to separatism. Most of them are Coptic Christian, some are Moslem, and a few, especially along the rugged borders, are Animist. Division has been offset to a marked degree by the similarity of the parts, and by their common lot as highlands cut off from neighboring lowlands by formidable declivities and by surrounding desert and semi-desert.

The highland is deluged with rain during a three-month season and its rivers, most of which flow north and northwest, carry the floods of the Nile, as well as of streams that never reach the

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Nile but fructify piedmont plains that fringe the west side of the highland. The ancients recognized the plateau as the source of the annual Nile rise, as well as of distinctive products in trade. Coptic Christianity early spread over it, and was only partly dislodged by Islam a thousand years later. In recent centuries Turks maintained trading ports on the desert coast of the Red Sea. But not until the nineteenth century was the highland threatened by an invading army.

Then, Egyptian armies engaged in Nile conquest moved to the northerly base of the plateau, seized the desert ports, and advanced up the easy Rift Valley to the southern outpost highland (well beyond the Nile drainage basin, FIG. 2). The conquests were short-lived, because the Sudanese revolt compelled the Egyptian government to abandon the positions of its armies everywhere south of Egypt itself.

By the time the Anglo-Egyptian forces re-established themselves on the lowlands of the Blue Nile, the Abyssinian Highland had become a magnet for European colonial ambitions. France held the port opposite the Rift Valley and was projecting a railroad to the highland. Italy held remaining Red Sea ports and the northernmost unit of the dissected highland itself, as well as its bordering foothills. Rail links to the sea turned the country away from the Nile (FIG. 1). For a generation the jealous balance of French, Italian, and British forces insured independent political and military action on the plateau, which became unified to a degree under a native ruler. When France and Britain declined longer to block Italian ambition, the entire highland was conquered for the first time in history. New weapons were used —bombing from the air supported by ground troops having high firepower. Italy's domination was soon overset by World War II, and the subsequent allotment of the north end of the highland to the Abyssinian government is one more step in identification of physical and political units. In October 1952, this district (Eritrea) became an autonomous unit of Ethiopia. In the light of eighty years of history, the Egyptian claim to the entire Nile Basin appears unrealistic as applied to the Upper

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Blue Nile and other highland streams, in spite of their transcendent importance to Egypt's future.

The hopelessness of political domination by Egypt does not preclude treaty arrangements. While the shifts in power recounted above were taking place, Britain treated with successive overlords of the highland to prevent diversion of water from Lake Tsana, a nature-made reservoir that aids in regulating the flow of the Blue Nile, and from the Gash and Baraka, streams that feed the other Sudanese oases (FIG. 2). This was done in behalf of Egypt as well as of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Proposals to dam Lake Tsana in order to increase its capacity and regulate its flow are among the several items that both Britain and Egypt are urging for the sake of improved control of Nile water.

Aside from severing political suzerainty of the source of Nile floodwater from its utilization, the boundary between Abyssinia and the Sudan is not wholly satisfactory. Several border tribes are divided by it, and those which are nomadic pay little attention to it in moving about with their herds. In the valley of the Sobat, the most northerly of the three Nile tributaries that draw their water from Abyssinia, the boundary reaches far out onto the Sudanese plain. As an offset, the Sudan government holds a concession for a trading post at Gambela at the head of navigation, nearly 100 miles east of the border.

4. THE NILE SUDD REGION (Fig. 1)

The basin of the White Nile, south of the Nilotic Sudan, is nearly as distinct as is the highland from which the Blue Nile flows, but in a different way. It is a flat plain hardly more than 1,300 feet above sea level. The masterstream makes two of its few notable bends, with a short east-flowing reach that receives a tributary at each end (FIG. 2).

From the Abyssinian Highland comes the Sobat, with its seasonal flood alternating with water too low to permit navigation. Both it and the Nile downstream from the confluence flow between low banks, on which the inhabitants of the region build their huts. The lesser streams that plunge off the Abyssinian Highland, both to north and to south of the Sobat, lose them-

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selves in a series of marshes on the level lowland plain. The Nile itself between latitudes 5° and 9° flows through a vast morass that reaches westward along the Gazelle River almost to the Congo watershed. These streams and their tributaries thread their way across land so wet that the channels are hard to distinguish. For about 150 miles the Nile is paralleled by the Giraffe River, which takes off from and rejoins the masterstream. Loss of water by evaporation is high; the Gazelle contributes very little to the total flow of the White Nile.

On all the wetter areas floats massive herbaceous vegetation known as "sudd." If let alone, it overgrows the stream channels as well as the backwaters. After the political turbulence that paralyzed navigation toward the end of the nineteenth century, the main streams had to be reopened by cutting the sudd into chunks that could float downstream. Once open, the rivers serve as routes between *terra firma* to the north and the south. For 400 miles no wood is available for steamers, trees being rare and far from the stream banks. The rivers merely provide a means of crossing one of the major barriers in Africa.

This amphibious country is not uninhabited. Wherever there is a ridge of slightly higher land, tribesmen locate their villages of mud huts. Many settlements are on mounds that appear to have been built up by centuries of hut-building and accumulation of the debris of village life. As the water recedes toward the main channels during the dry season, the able-bodied follow the grazing, for they are cattle people and live on the most intimate terms with their herds, from which they derive their subsistence. The annual rhythm of their movements is attuned to the level of water. Their habitat is literally a backwater. In it they have developed a distinctive mode of life and a conservatism probably exceeded nowhere in Africa. In their unique habitat, they have resisted prolonged slave-raiding by Arabs, pressure from tribes migrating from the southwest, and even the fury of the Sudanese revolt in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. At that time some groups may have been pushed upstream from the slightly higher river banks north of latitude 10°, and into the marshier terrain. There they have steadfastly turned a deaf ear

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to religious persuasion, whether Moslem or Christian. No contrast in Africa is more striking than the sharp line separating the flowing robes of Arabicized Sudanese to the north from the nakedness of the marsh-dwelling tribes. The outward contrast is an expression of differences in language, customs, and economic life. Few of their ways have been modified even in river towns where some of them have viewed the lures of the outside world.

The Arabic, Moslem world stops abruptly along the northern frontier of the Sudd Region. Only the Nile itself, navigable throughout the year, invited penetration, an invitation accepted by invading Egyptian forces, both before and after the revolt of the Sudanese. The region is administered as a part of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. For some twenty-five years the Egyptian Irrigation Department has maintained a station at Malakal, just below the Sobat, to study the regimen of this part of the river, with the hope of discovering ways to increase the water available for irrigation in Egypt. More recently the British administrators of the Sudan have set up a project to canalize the Nile through nearly 200 miles of its sudd course, thus conserving water that would otherwise be evaporated. This water would be available in either the Nilotic Sudan or the Desert Nile regions. The canal will not be dug unless studies now in progress show that it will not disrupt the lives of the backwater dwellers of the area. Whatever the outcome of the studies, the Nile Sudd Region seems destined to remain what it has always been—the sharpest natural and cultural demarcation anywhere along the course of the mainstream of the Nile.

5. The Sudan South (Fig. 1)

Above its deployment under the sudd, the Nile flows in a defined channel, and about 150 miles upstream emerges from a gorge through outlying peaks and ranges of the East African Highland. Rapids at the foot of the gorge set the upper limit of navigation in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan—at Juba when the water is high; at Mongalla, thirty miles downstream, at low water (Fig. 1). Between these rapids and the Sixth Cataract (be-

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low Khartoum) lies nearly a thousand miles of waterway, three-fourths of which is regularly plied by steamboats (from Kosti, where the railroad crosses the White Nile). The river's course in the southernmost Sudan, and especially in the gorge above Juba, lives up to its name, Mountain Nile.

Natural conditions within the belt of land between the marshes and the southerly political boundary of the Sudan vary widely, but each distinctive district is of a piece with adjacent country across the political border (FIG. 2).

East of the Nile the bastion of the East African Highland lies on the Sudan side of the line, and is associated with the variety of vegetation and land-use characteristic of mountains, in contrast to the monotonous grassland or small bush that covers much of the Sudan. Between these mountains and the Abyssinian Plateau, lower-lying terrain reaches out to and beyond Lake Rudolf. Deprived of rain by the bordering highlands, this is a harsh, semi-arid country of nomadic tribes, where the authority of the suzerain nations is often flouted by forays of the sort common throughout Africa before the establishment of European government (FIGS. 2 and 3).

West of the Nile, the Belgian Congo boundary runs along the Nile-Congo watershed. The divide is broad and low, less conspicuous than a good many hills standing up between the headwater streams of the Nile. The entire area receives considerable rain, and is woodland, including tall trees, that merges into forest on the watershed and extends without notable breaks into the dense "big bush" of the Congo Basin. All this land on both sides of the line is inhabited by a tribe of cultivators who recently pushed across the divide into the Nile headwaters. The tsetse fly rules out cattle, and the foreign origin of the tribe, combined with the forest in which they are settled, differentiates their mode of life from that of any other peoples within the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

Nearer the Nile, on both sides, the country ranges from 1,400 to 10,000 feet, and some of the tribes are akin to the cattle people to the north and east. They are only a degree less impervious to innovation than their kinsmen, and they keep cattle

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wherever the tsetse fly is absent. Elsewhere they live by tillage.

The political boundary formerly ran along the Nile for many miles below and above the head of the rapids in the Sudan and the foot of navigation in Uganda (FIG. 1). In 1913 riparian lands were exchanged in recognition of that significant break in the stream course. Uganda now controls both banks of the navigable reach above the rapids. Sudan administers both sides of the rock-strewn rapids, which not only halt navigation, but where, during every dry season, tree trunks, mats of vegetation, and silt accumulate to form a crossing some 150 yards wide, making a handy escape route for smugglers and other malefactors who could formerly elude the police by crossing to the other jurisdiction.

This exchange was the last of a number of territorial shifts in the Sudan South Region, a country very unlike the coreland of the Sudan and very similar to Uganda and the Congo. Ruins of Egyptian forts along the stream attest the presence of Egyptian forces during the nineteenth-century expansion up-Nile. These were cut off by the succeeding revolt, during which the only practicable outlet was via the Congo Basin. From 1894 until 1910 the king of the Belgians was allocated an isthmus of territory connecting the Belgian Congo with the ends of the two navigable reaches of the Nile. On reversion, this district was divided between the Sudan and Uganda. Contact of the whole Sudan South with the outside world was commonly made through East Africa before the Nileway was reopened by cutting away the sudd.

The tenuous and shifting political connections of the Sudan South call attention to its location as the remotest part of the Nile Basin. It is barred from direct access to the sea by the Abyssinian Plateau and deserts, and must seek outlets to north or south of that double barrier. Juba is almost equidistant from Port Sudan and Mombasa, the nearest port of East Africa (FIG. 1). Established surface routes lead both ways, but most of the traffic in goods and people moves through Port Sudan. Unity of administration favors that route; moreover, it requires only one transshipment, instead of four.

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Except for being politically incorporated in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and commercially linked to it, the region of the South is radically different from the country north of the Sudd Region. Because tracks are impassable much of the year in the rainy climate, and gravel and stone are readily available for surfacing, a system of all-weather roads with bridges connects with navigable points on the Nile and on its tributaries from the west, the only such system in the condominium. The people are Animist, where they have not been Christianized. The *lingua franca* is English. Arabic is spoken only in the principal centers, Islam has not taken hold anywhere, and there is no tradition or infusion from Arabia. In this atmosphere Northern Sudanese feel alien and look down upon the southerners as the source of slaves (which they were for a long period). Employees of government and business firms dislike assignments that compel them to live in the south. That two such contrasted areas should be joined rests on an interplay of environment and history. The Egyptian surge up-Nile in the nineteenth century, seeking control of the Basin, swept to the head of navigation on the reach that lies mainly in the Nilotic Sudan. The reconquest after the Sudanese revolt carried an obligation to include the territory that had been occupied earlier. The vague terms in which the condominium was formulated favored on-the-spot decisions as territorial problems presented themselves, rather than a comprehensive plan that would give due consideration to the local interests.

6. The Great Lakes Nile Region (Fig. 1)

The farthest headwaters of the Nile spring from the vicinity of the Equator. This location predisposes to an even distribution of rain throughout the year. The high highland of equatorial East Africa insures abundant total rainfall (Fig. 2). This climate of year-round copious rains provides the water that crosses the Sudan and Egypt during the long season between annual floods, in spite of extravagant dispersion and evaporation, especially in the transit of sudd-covered marshes. The flow is further regulated by five lakes through which the headstreams pass.

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Navigation on the lakes is easy, but the three largest of them are separated by waterfalls that render the river links useless to boats (FIG. 1). Water transport has been articulated with rail and road to facilitate north-south movement, connecting on the Sudan border with a road link to boats on the Sudanese Nile. Traffic in that direction is light, compared to that on the east-west road and rail lines that tie the lakes to the Indian Ocean at Mombasa. The region of the Great Lakes is in fact another of the lands athwart the Nile.

Most of the headstreams originate in British East Africa, but the farthest Nile source rises in the Belgian Congo as the Kagera, and discharges into Lake Victoria. Lake Albert and connecting lakes farther south have been made the boundary between British and Belgian suzerainty. This is the only part of the Nile system that is used as a boundary line by European governments, although a number of native tribes are separated in this and other parts of its course, where marshy banks or swift current make it a barrier.

The people of all these headstreams are tribesmen mainly of Bantu stock, with some groups cognate to people of the Sudd Nile and Sudan South. Most of them are sedentary farmers producing export crops in addition to subsistence. Among them live tribes that depend on cattle without being nomads. The largest and most powerful tribal group had a highly centralized government of its own before Europeans entered the country. They have been encouraged by the British suzerain to carry on along the same lines. As a result of missionary teaching, they have given up Animism for Christianity. Neither they nor any of the other tribes of the Great Lakes Nile Region have ever been under Egyptian domination. Here, as in the Abyssinian Highland, a region that makes a major contribution to the regimen of the Nile lies wholly outside Egyptian control. There is no local need for irrigation, but the falls hold out promise of waterpower in a land devoid of coal and petroleum. One power dam, at the outlet of Lake Victoria, is being built. Egypt's interest in this harnessing of the Nile appears in an agreement that permits raising the level of the lake about one meter, if the Egyptian gov-

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ernment cares to pay the cost of increasing the reservoir capacity of this, the second largest lake on earth. Dams farther downstream have also been proposed, and the British government of East Africa recognizes that Egypt has a legitimate interest in how they affect the flow of the river.

Nile Geopolitics

In the long view of history, the current political tension in Egypt, with its repercussions farther upstream, opens a vista in a political geography as old as the occupance of northeastern Africa by the human race. Always the most powerful urge to cross and unite those zones has come from the lower course of the river, the most productive region of all up to the present time, and the one completely at the mercy of upstream neighbors, not only for its prosperity, but even for its existence. As those upstream regions have learned of the outside world, they have pushed eastward from the several segments of the Nile Basin to make contact with the world-ocean along Africa's east coast through seaports of their own. Their new-found position as parts of a world economically interdependent has stimulated production for export, partly in exchange for goods from the outside world. New jobs have become the means of satisfying some of the new wants, especially in the upper reaches of the Nile most recently brought into the orbit of world business. The interaction of these factors guarantees economic and social change, but change uncertain as to kind and unpredictable as to rate.

Political tutelage by European governments from about 1880 onward has created in nearly every region of the Nile Basin the experience of peaceful rule and an aspiration for autonomy and perhaps independence. This has been paralleled by contention and warfare among European states interested in northwestern Africa—strife that has deflated their prestige. Since 1920 Egypt, Abyssinia, and several countries neighboring the Nile Basin have become independent. It is not surprising that the improvements instigated and largely carried out by European technology and government have stirred the literate minorities in Nile Basin countries to demand political control of the new sources of

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wealth and power. The stated objective of both the foreign administrations and the aspirant native minorities is to continue along progressive political and economic lines until the masses shall reach the point of sharing both the wealth and the government. Whether the tiny fractions of the local peoples lately trained in the new methods can and will continue in the direction set by outside administrators and pioneers infinitely more experienced, remains an unanswered question. Egypt, occupying a place between the European interests and those of the Nile Basin denizens, intends to figure in the answer.

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Review Articles

SCHOOL FOR STATESMEN?

By WILLIAM W. KAUFMANN

William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940*, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1952, pp. xv, 794. $7.50.
Charles Callan Tansill, *Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933-1941*, Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1952, pp. xxi, 690. $6.50.

THE history of international relations has lent itself to many uses. Its narrators have employed the tangled web of intention, maneuver, alliance, and war to vindicate or besmirch men's reputations, prove the guilt or innocence of nations in conflict, enrich traditions, furnish precepts for the present, and provide guides to the future. Their activity has gone on for a very long time and the product of their research has grown enormous. Presumably such a vast and varied output reflects a number of needs and interests. But is its perusal a useful way of gaining insight into the varied problems of international politics? More, as diplomatic history customarily is written, does it constitute an effective training ground for statesmen?

Although these questions have been much debated, no precise or conclusive answers are at hand. As is so often the case with discussions of this order, the outcome in any given instance seems to depend on the literary experience of the participants. Certainly, if one of the debaters had read only *Back Door to War*, by Charles Callan Tansill, he would be hard put to justify the existence of diplomatic history as a branch of useful knowledge. If, on the other hand, he had followed this painful experience by reading *The Challenge to Isolation*, by William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, he might well reverse his initial judgment and wonder why the questions should have arisen at all.

I

At first glance the verdict on *Back Door to War* may seem

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unduly harsh, Tansill, after all, did spend five years on his book and, in the course of its preparation, consulted the confidential files of the State Department, the National Archives, and the Library of Congress (but not, apparently, the papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt at Hyde Park). Ordinarily one might assume that an author having engaged in such arduous labors would know something about his subject and that his opinions would have merit. But there are reasons why in this case such assumptions would prove false.

It should be understood at the outset that what Tansill has written is a war-guilt book, a fact which by itself diminishes greatly the utility of his work for the student of politics. Probably the least profitable method of coming to grips with the issues that confront statesmen is through a trial conducted by historians. The judges in such cases are usually so anxious to reach a verdict that they ignore the motives of the contestants; and the principles behind their judgments tend to be as mysterious as the dicta of *1066 and All That*. So it is with *Back Door to War*. The author not only suffers from a kind of hyphenated xenophobia; he has a most peculiar way of trying his case.

Tansill's principal endeavor is not to examine the varieties of available evidence prior to rendering a verdict but to demonstrate that Franklin D. Roosevelt, Henry L. Stimson, and other "one-worlders" deliberately engaged in a conspiracy to lead the United States into a war that was none of its concern. He would have his readers believe, further, that the substitution of "internationalist" policies for acts based upon the traditional precepts of international law makes war inevitable, and that the best policy for the United States has been and remains one of isolation.

What are the proofs offered by Tansill in support of his case? Where distinguishable from invective, they appear to be approximately as follows: (a) American intervention in World War I bore no relation to the true interests of the United States and actually prevented Europe from reaching a satisfactory compromise peace; (b) the Versailles Treaty, largely the work of the first "one-worlder," Woodrow Wilson, made World War II inevitable by reason of the injustices that it inflicted on Germany,

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Italy, and Japan; (c) the policies of Stimson, Hull, and Roosevelt tended to aggravate rather than remove these injustices and thereby made the inevitable more inevitable; (d) Germany, Italy, and Japan did not really threaten the interests of the United States, or, where they did, Roosevelt, Hull, and Stimson goaded them to it; (e) in fact, Japan was our natural ally against the real menace, the Soviet Union, while Hitler and Stalin, if left alone, would have destroyed one another; (f) and, finally, despite the absence of a threat to American interests, Roosevelt deliberately maneuvered Japan into the attack at Pearl Harbor.

Unfortunately, the evidence marshaled to support these assertions, while often novel, is not impressive. Indeed, what is surprising about the material contained in *Back Door to War* is not that it demonstrates so much but that it proves so little. Even Tansill seems to reach this conclusion, for at the end of his work he throws evidence to the winds and resorts to questioning insinuation. The following passages may convey something of his thought and method:

> In the early hours of the American Revolution, Paul Revere went on a famous ride to warn his countrymen of the enemy's approach and thus save American lives. In the early hours of World War II, General Marshall took a ride that helped prevent an alert from reaching Pearl Harbor in time to save an American fleet from serious disaster and an American garrison from a bombing that cost more than two thousand lives. Was there an important purpose behind this ride? This question looms constantly larger as we look further into the Pearl Harbor hearings (pp. 651-52).

And again:

> Was the General under Presidential orders to break military regulations with regard to the transmission of important military information? Did he thinks that the President's political objectives outweighed considerations of national safety? Was the preservation of the British Empire worth the blood, sweat, and tears not only of the men who would die in the agony of Pearl Harbor but also of the long roll of heroes who perished in the epic encounters in the Pacific, in the Mediterranean area, and in the famous offensive that rolled at high tide across the war-torn fields of France (p. 652)?

Although Tansill does not answer these questions, he leaves the

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inference that the worst possible interpretation should be placed upon the motives of the President and General Marshall.

If, after encountering this device, the reader is not aware of the special point of view represented by *Back Door to War,* let him examine the assumptions and logic behind some of Tansill's major themes. He will discover, for example, that if the United States "had not entered the war in Europe in 1917, World War I would have ended in a stalemate and a balance of power in Europe would have been created. Our intervention completely shattered the old balance of power and sowed the seeds of inevitable future conflict in the dark soil of Versailles" (p. 9). Yet despite these assertions he will find, in Tansill's discussion of the Munich crisis, that if the meeting at Berchtesgaden "had not occurred there were forces in Germany ready to challenge the authority of Hitler and possibly to depose him. Chamberlain's passion for peace ruined the best-laid plans of plotters who might have saved the world from the agonies and destruction of World War II" (p. 408). So the second war apparently was not inevitable after all; and the sin of American leaders may have been not that they meddled too much, but that they intervened too little.

In this connection, the reader is asked to believe that the Axis powers did not threaten the interests of the United States, whereas the Soviet Union did. Here the reasoning and evidence become especially vague. Germany, Italy, and Japan are described as having been intolerably humiliated by the Versailles settlement, as having set out merely to right these wrongs, and as having served, meanwhile, as barriers to the spread of the Soviet menace. Nevertheless, when they actually disturbed American interests (which, for the purposes of this particular argument, Tansill has defined primarily in commercial and financial terms), they did so because of the blind tactlessness or overt hostility of Stimson and Roosevelt. For example, in September and October 1939, "Hitler had high hopes that America might be induced to accept the role of mediator and thus bring to an early close a war that he had entered with many misgivings" (p. 606). "If the President had possessed real courage and vision he would have welcomed these German overtures and staged a peace con-

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ference that would have saved both Poland and Czechoslovakia. But he and Secretary Hull were fearful that a move towards peace might benefit Hitler and discourage the Allies so they rejected the German peace feelers and thus prepared the way for eventual Red domination over both those countries" (p. 607).

Nowhere does Tansill consider the possibility that the Axis powers, by upsetting the existing political order in Europe and Asia, and by displaying an appetite for unlimited expansion, might have jeopardized the security of the United States. Nowhere does he present any evidence of the actual thinking that prompted the various decisions of the Roosevelt administration—supposition, insinuation, and epithets are his substitutes. Nowhere does he indicate that statesmen operate in an atmosphere of uncertainty, without the dubious advantage of Tansill's kind of hindsight, and make their decisions on the basis of probabilities to which numerical weights cannot be assigned. Nowhere, finally, does he show any awareness of the real and difficult dilemmas which beset Stimson, Hull, and Roosevelt during the period covered by his book.

The result, inevitably, is not a serious representation of an epoch but a combination of fantasy and broadside, 652 pages long, disguised beneath the conventional apparatus of scholarly research. To say this is not to imply that American foreign policy during the last four decades has been an unbroken succession of wise strategies and effective tactics. Certainly there is much that we can learn about the making of decisions and the conduct of foreign policy from studies of this era. But it is hardly likely that the nature of past errors will be revealed, or an understanding of their causation achieved, by Tansill's methods and logic.

Since Tansill had access to documents not available to other scholars, the specialist seeking odd bits of information may wish to consult *Back Door to War* by way of its index. Students desiring insight into the foreign policies of the Roosevelt administration would do well to go elsewhere. Fortunately, for the period between 1937 and 1940, they have another place to go, namely *The Challenge to Isolation*.

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II

Langer and Gleason, like Tansill, are concerned with the reasons for American involvement in World War II. But, unlike Tansill, they contend in an answer taking up 776 pages of text that pressures from the outside and the requirements of security, not some "one-world" plot, eventually impelled the United States into the conflict. It is true that in making their case they ignore the period of the twenties and early thirties. As a consequence, the problem of how and why the world reached the state it was in by 1937 does not absorb their attention. Their concern is with the competition for power that had broken out in such unrestrained fashion by 1937 rather than with the circumstances that had brought about the competition.

One of the many striking differences between *Back Door to War* and *The Challenge to Isolation* is that the latter, in considering this competition, provides a detailed and straightforward account of German, Italian, and Japanese intentions. In doing so, however, Langer and Gleason do not omit the complicating factor of the Soviet Union. The policy of the Kremlin, they infer, consisted not only of very ambitious long-range plans, but also of the immediate intention to embroil Britain and France with Germany while Russia sat on the sidelines and awaited an opportunity to advance the Communist cause. Indeed, many American diplomats of the day already foresaw the possibility that the Soviet Union would ultimately become the world's great disturber. But neither they nor their superiors could doubt that the threat of the Axis powers was the more proximate of the two and must have priority of attention. The resources of Britain, France, and the United States were not sufficiently great to permit the three countries to challenge the Soviet Union as well as Germany, Italy, and Japan. At least one major devil had to be invited to the table, and at the time Stalin appeared to be the least objectionable guest. With all the knowledge of retrospect it is difficult to see how any other decision could have been made. The men charged with the responsibility of governing the United States could derive little comfort from the possibility that Hitler and Stalin might fight to the death, or that Japan might stand

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as a trustworthy sentinel in the East. Nor could they accept the comforting proposition that events would automatically favor their cause. With the inevitable handicaps of imperfect knowledge and insight they came ultimately to feel that it would be a dereliction of duty to treat the threat of the Axis as remote and contingent, as Tansill would have us believe it was. Having reached this conclusion they could hardly do otherwise than give aid and comfort to Britain and France.

If the account of Axis intentions rendered by Langer and Gleason is an accurate one—and there is no reason to believe that it is not—then the basic orientation of President Roosevelt's policy becomes acceptable. Obviously the magnitude of the disturbance created by Germany, Italy, and Japan warranted American intervention in European and Asiatic affairs, even if the act incurred the risks of conflict. For surely conflict was preferable to a continuing surrender of principle and interest such as the Japanese demanded, particularly when meekness was so likely to be rewarded only in heaven. The thesis of the plot, of blind and willful ambition, put forth in *Back Door to War* must therefore be exchanged for the theme of irrefutable logic and sober statesmanship which runs through *The Challenge to Isolation.*

But while it is comforting to know that the President did not try deliberately to undermine the safety of the United States, that knowledge by no means exhausts the interest of his foreign policy. The basic decision of Mr. Roosevelt and his advisers may have been a wise one, but why did they take so long to reach it? What prevented them from seeing the danger sooner? And what kept them from acting more forcibly than they did? Langer and Gleason do not address themselves directly to these questions. As their material is organized, it is designed, rather, to provide the reader both with an inventory of all the important events that occurred between 1937 and 1940, and with the administration's explanations of why it acted as it did. They admit in this last connection that "the President was inclined to exaggerate the strength and cohesion" of his opposition, that he "tended to underestimate popular support for his foreign policy," and that "in the early years of his Administration he was so engrossed

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with the problems of the New Deal that he had relatively little time for international issues" (pp. 2-6). They also confess that certain administrative inefficiencies and personal antagonisms made the formulation and implementation of policy more difficult than ideally should have been the case. But on the whole they give the impression of believing that the constraints offered by Congress and isolationist segments of the public were too great to be overcome without the long-drawn debate and hesitation that characterized this period.

In all probability Langer and Gleason are right. But in the course of providing the details of the maneuvers by which the President aligned the United States on the side of Great Britain in the struggle with the Axis, they convey rather strongly the impression that the administration would have groped and fumbled, at least until late 1939, even without the resistance of Congress and the passivity of the public. Unfortunately they do not indicate whether they intend to spread this impression abroad; nor is their narrative organized in such a way that the inference leaps out at the reader. But certainly it is present, and the data which they and other students of the period have accumulated afford the basis for some speculation about the factors which caused the government to move in so stately a fashion. Several of the factors that have occurred to this reader may be worth recording.

(1) The President and his advisers did not possess any formal and consistent philosophy about the character and trends of world politics, and therefore encountered difficulties in adjusting their thoughts and policies to the tempo of events.[1] Langer and Gleason maintain that, among American presidents, Mr. Roosevelt "was certainly one of the best fitted by background, education and experience, as well as by interest and temperament, to understand world conditions and to sense their implications for the national interest and security. His consuming

[1] It should be noted, so soon after a presidential election, that this characteristic was not confined to Democrats. There is no evidence to indicate that the Republican leaders of the day were any better versed in world affairs than Mr. Roosevelt and his advisers. Therefore, these and other remarks should not be taken to indicate criticism or endorsement of either political party.

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interest in geography and his almost passionate devotion to the Navy were only among the more obvious manifestations of his concern for world affairs" (pp. 1-2). But that does not throw much light on the President's thoughts about international relations. Actually, Mr. Roosevelt was saying, and perhaps even believing, as late as August 14, 1936, that "We shun political commitments which might entangle us in foreign wars; we avoid connection with the political activities of the League of Nations. . . . We are not isolationist except insofar as we seek to isolate ourselves completely from war" (p. 16). Up until 1937, "he seems to have assumed a generally negative attitude and apparently shared the opinion that the solution of America's problems would constitute the most effective contribution he could make toward a new and better world system" (p. 16). It would appear likely, in fact, that not until the eve of Munich did the President become fully aware of the character of the situation with which he was confronted, and of the extent to which American interests were in jeopardy.

This failure of appreciation was not due to any lack of information about the trend of events in Europe; on this account the American government was extremely well served. It was due rather to the inability, or unwillingness, of the President and his advisers to engage in systematic and rigorous thought on the subject of foreign affairs. As far as it is possible to determine, they had no working conception of what might constitute the basis for a smoothly operating multi-state system, or of the consequences inherent in a competition for power among some of its members. Nor did they hold any studied views of what might be the role of the United States in this system. Their philosophy was fragmentary and without foundation in reality. They tended to view other nations as fashioned after the American image and assumed that, as with the United States, economic difficulties were causing Europe's troubles. Lowered trade barriers and disarmament were their favorite panaceas for the ailments of the Continent even after Munich. And they could never understand why in Europe and in Asia leading statesmen could not gather about a table and resolve their differences by discus-

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sion and compromise. As the President wrote to his ambassador in Germany: "If five or six heads of the important governments could meet together for a week with complete inaccessibility to press or cables or radio, a definite, useful agreement might result or else one or two of them would be murdered by the others! In any case it would be worthwhile from the point of view of civilization!"[2] The philosophy of Roosevelt and his advisers—if their disjointed and untested assumptions can be called a philosophy—thus was as related to the living world of politics as the Ptolemaic system was to the order of the physical universe, and only after the hard experience of the war did they begin to appreciate the distance between the two.

(2) Neither the President nor the State Department had any positive ideas as to where they wanted to go in the international arena or how they must proceed in order to reach their objectives. Although they were undoubtedly discontented with the world as it stood, the thought that they might use the influence of the United States to create more desirable situations, and forestall disagreeable occurrences, was almost completely alien to them. The trend of events in Europe was, to them, a more or less independent and natural phenomenon which would concern them seriously only in certain well-defined circumstances, namely when Britain and France came under direct attack. In advance of such an eventuality their role, as they saw it, was that of the aged and distant relative, wondering what was going to happen in the family, scolding or commiserating after the event, but rarely feeling called upon to avert the difficulty.

This attitude evidenced itself in several different ways. Langer and Gleason contend that "It is doubtful whether any government in modern times could have been more effectively served with foreign intelligence than the American Administration in this critical period" (p. 125). But if *The Challenge to Isolation* contains a representative sample of that intelligence, what becomes evident is that the information was largely of a crudely predictive character. The State Department apparently asked its

[2] Elliott Roosevelt, ed., assisted by Joseph P. Lash, *F. D. R.: His Personal Letters, 1928-1945*, New York, 1950, 1, p. 649.

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foreign representatives only rarely how some American action could modify the trend of events in a direction favorable to the long-term interests of the United States. More often than not the preferred question was: what is going to happen? The President himself, leaning as he did to colorful metaphor, tended to describe events abroad in terms of conflagrations and epidemics, and recommended buckets of water or quarantines rather than fireproof structures or preventive medicine.

The lack of conception about world politics, and the dependence of American policy upon external stimuli, had several consequences. In a period when forceful American action in European affairs might not only have curbed Hitler, but might also have done so without war, the President and State Department simply were not fully alive to the implications of the Nazi threat. They were incapable of putting together all the pieces in the German puzzle, as Mr. Churchill had done, because their intellectual apparatus did not provide them with a set of principles governing this kind of case. Like the blind man in the story, eventually they succeeded in comprehending the object that confronted them, but the effort consumed more than three years and lost them invaluable opportunities for relatively inexpensive and effective political action. It took massive evidences of change like Munich, the fall of France, and Pearl Harbor itself to shock them into the realization that action on their part was required.

Devoid of systematic thought and probing curiosity, they could content themselves with the belief that a conference on principles of international law and morality might lessen tension in 1938, that Munich might be followed by a genuine *détente*, or that a peace mission early in 1940 might be either desirable or successful. Their lack of conception and the passivity of their approach to politics meant that only rarely were they in a position to grasp the political initiative. Whatever they did was determined by the actions of Germany, Italy, and Japan; having no objectives beyond adherence to the status quo and opposition to the Axis, it was impossible for them to direct the trend of events into a pattern of their own choosing. Until the United

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States became a belligerent, and even thereafter, their thinking fell into defensive molds. How a plot to engage the country in war could have emerged from this atmosphere is beyond the stretch of the imagination.

(3) Insofar as the planning and implementation of particular policies were concerned, the administration appears to have acted almost exclusively by intuition. Judging from the account in *The Challenge to Isolation,* relatively little was known about the other participants in the political drama. Thus, not only was the President, like many American liberals, "unsympathetic to the British 'upper classes' and inclined to think that their policies were designed primarily to ensure their own class interests" (p. 125), but apparently no effort was made to examine the validity of this assumption. Nor is there any evidence in *The Challenge to Isolation* to suggest that the State Department attempted to analyze systematically the social structure of the key countries in the arena in order to determine what groups might be influenced by what means over what political terrain. Totally lacking in this connection was any conception of the effects of the various instrumentalities at the disposal of American statesmen, or of the costs, risks, and advantages accompanying their employment. For analysis they substituted unexamined slogans and an insistence that the proper mode of procedure in the field of foreign policy was to play by ear and precedent. Roosevelt's advice on how to treat Hitler after Munich was to "speak sharply to the little boy and beat him when he sneezes."[3]

Outside of the folklore of the Foreign Service there existed no appraisal of what should be the content of any diplomatic offer or action, to whom it should be directed, what might be the tactics of its presentation, or what expectations might logically be held about its consequences. Perhaps typical was the attitude toward the economic instrumentality. One theory was that if enough economic inducements were offered to the Axis states they would voluntarily abandon their expansionist programs. Another equally popular assumption was that economic deprivations, by making expansion very costly, would persuade the

[3] Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, *American White Paper,* New York, 1940, p. 18.

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Axis to cease and desist. Little or no study appears to have been given to such problems as whether the Axis powers were actually motivated by questions of economic profit and loss, whether economic measures of either character would make them more or less amenable to the orderly conduct of international affairs, or whether any single instrumentality short of force or the threat of force could influence a group of aggressive states to abandon their goals. Secretary Hull, for example, simply believed, with evangelical zeal, in the soft economic theory in spite of the prevailing temper of international relations. His view, as he explained it to Walter Runciman in January 1937, "was that the economic approach should be the spear point of the approach to peace. First, get all the commercial nations in agreement on liberalizing and increasing trade, removing trade restrictions and eliminating discrimination. And then, with nearly forty nations banded together on economic grounds, show recalcitrant nations like Germany and Italy the undoubted benefits of joining in the same movement."[4]

On the one hand, a relatively slight acquaintance with the character of world politics and the nature of the Nazi and Fascist elites, combined with some intelligent speculation about the probable effects of such economic measures on their attitudes, would have shown how little likelihood there was of this approach meeting with success. On the other hand, the advocates of an embargo against Japan, and of abrogation of the Japanese-American Commercial Treaty of 1911, appeared to forget that while Japan would suffer as a result of these measures, she might employ increasingly objectionable methods to obtain her ends, unless of course other, equally forceful, instrumentalities were readied and perhaps used by the United States.

Psychological warfare was another of those means which enjoyed high favor and little understanding. The President was particularly addicted to its use and in some respects proved a masterful exploiter of its potentialities. But he tended to believe that words unsupported by acts, or a knowledge of his audience, would work miracles in the international arena. His speeches of

[4] *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull,* New York, 1948, I, p. 525.

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1938 and 1939 were partly substitutes for the action he felt he could not take. But they were also the vehicles of his conviction that if only the right combination of words could be found, either the desired changes would be rung on Hitler's black soul, or world public opinion—one of those mysterious conceptions of the Western world—would throw insuperable obstacles in the way of the dictators.

In its thinking on military affairs the administration was encumbered with a number of prejudices. The defense establishment was regarded, until after Munich, as an instrument with which to fight wars; something, moreover, that should be relegated to the background of consideration until after the need for it had become obvious. Only the Navy was really exempt from this rule, in large measure because of Mr. Roosevelt's enthusiasm for maritime matters. The Army, living on a pittance and without the benefit of a sympathetic ally in the White House, did not even begin to revise its antiquated war plans until 1939. The axiom that military power in being during peacetime has its advantages as well as its costs received no serious acknowledgment until the opportunity for effective displays of strength had passed. Armaments, if not water-borne, were an unmitigated evil, and while Europe, wicked Europe, might not accept that judgment, at least the United States could not be accused of failing to set an example.

Certainly furthest from the thought of the administration was the idea that this collection of economic, psychological, and military instrumentalities might be employed according to strategical and tactical principles after the manner of a military campaign. There were no specifically formulated objectives, no general staff, no plans, no conception of the battleground or of the nature of the opponent (Roosevelt was content simply to characterize Hitler and Mussolini as madmen), not even a full awareness that a war for political influence was already in progress before 1939. Admittedly the Congress and the public imposed serious limitations upon the Executive's freedom of action; but even so it seems likely that another and equally serious factor in the slow and costly progress of the administration was the lack of disci-

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plined insight and skill on the part of its highest leaders in these important spheres.

III

There can be little mystery as to why material leading to insights of this order should interest both the student of politics and the embryonic statesman. Although the Politburo bears only the most superficial resemblance to Hitler and his cohorts, and the strategy of the Kremlin differs markedly from that employed by the old Wilhelmstrasse, the problems confronting us today contain elements similar to the ones which were present in the thirties and early forties. In these circumstances the policies employed during that period, and indeed in other epochs when the existing political order has been under sharp attack, if systematically analyzed and evaluated, can be of considerable value not only in the formulation of new policies but also in the avoidance of old mistakes. Studies of the general characteristics of the international arena during the Hitlerian age can be of equal value, if only to indicate how different is the Stalinist era and how dangerous it may be to apply to it unthinkingly the precepts that were germane to another situation.

That *The Challenge to Isolation*, unlike *Back Door to War*, contains so much material relevant to these considerations is what gives it its great merit within the context of this review. That it contains much data extraneous to these considerations, and that none of it is organized according to any seriously conceived analytical scheme is what constitutes its great drawback, and indeed the great drawback of most diplomatic history, insofar as the student of politics is concerned.

Such a criticism should not be taken to imply a rejection of the themes presented by Langer and Gleason or a failure to recognize the tremendous service rendered by their book. *The Challenge to Isolation* goes far to dispel the doubts and suspicions surrounding the foreign policy of the Roosevelt administration. In doing so it makes understandable and hence tolerable the position that we find ourselves in today. Moreover, its authors have accomplished their gargantuan task with tolerance and

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objectivity. Their narrative may lack excitement and drama but it certainly moves with authority. As an example of diplomatic history traditionally conceived it leaves a deep impression and has considerable utility. But the question remains whether this conception is the one best suited to acquaint the reader with the problems confronting the statesman, the forces working upon him, and the solutions open to him. The fact that Tansill, described on the dust jacket of his book as "probably the outstanding authority on American diplomatic history," can call *Back Door to War* diplomatic history, and that audiences in the United States can either assign credibility to his narrative or give ear to his advice, suggests that as educational devices the traditional forms leave something to be desired.

It seems clear, for example, that much of the material presented by Langer and Gleason is only indirectly relevant to the themes of their book and could have been summarized or even omitted. That they did not exercise their prerogatives of selection and omission more rigorously would suggest one of two possibilities: either that they had no criteria of relevance and simply swept into their narrative the data necessary to provide an interesting and accurate chronology of events; or (and this seems more likely) that they had another intention not openly acknowledged in their preface: the desire to illuminate the problems connected with the formation of foreign policy; to isolate some of the factors that determine the great decisions of state; and to portray the developing characteristics and consequences of a political order rendered unstable by the persistent demands of the Axis powers.

This is an intention with which every student of politics, whatever his vocation, can sympathize wholeheartedly. But the political process, composed as it is of the interplay of a variety of purposive actions, is very complex indeed. The mere description of a series of events according to some intuitively selected narrative form does not necessarily familiarize the reader with its intricacies. What is required on the part of the narrator is an organizing scheme of analysis, a scheme that will reduce the functionings of the political process to some kind of order, relate it

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to the seeming chaos of reality, and at the same time provide the audience with a more penetrating insight than it could have obtained from the perusal of raw data.

It is this kind of organizing scheme that is missing from the work of Langer and Gleason. The result is that *The Challenge to Isolation* leaves its audience extraordinarily well-informed on a score of important details but uncertain as to what the essential issues were during this period, why events followed the course that they did, whether in the circumstances alternative outcomes were possible, and by what actions and at what costs the United States could have influenced the situation. In concentrating on the *what*, Langer and Gleason, together with a majority of diplomatic historians, have overlooked the *why* and the *wherefore*. They have stayed on the surface of events, satisfied to describe the contents of available documents in some connected form, absorbed in the minutiae of their subject, and prone to judge their creatures on the basis of criteria not clearly articulated. Only rarely have they attempted to convert their findings into illuminating representations or explanations of the political process as it operates in the international arena. It is as if they believed that by merely taking inventory of the actions of two automobiles heading toward each other they could explain usefully the causes of a collision.

Admittedly, the task of developing a more systematic and meaningful approach to the subject of diplomatic history is a difficult one; it will take considerable time and a painful expenditure of energy. But surely the obstacles are not insuperable. Nor are the outlines of a number of conceptions offering the possibility of insight totally lacking. One possible approach, for example, is to consider the nexus of activities taking place within the international arena as directed, on the one hand, toward the ordering of the multi-state system, and as causing it, on the other hand, to pass through certain recurrent stages of development.

The identification of these stages of development would not only help to clarify the *raison d'être* for certain types of action and define the character of the political process; it would also lend form and direction to further inquiry. Thus, in any period

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marked off by the great general wars, one might conceive of this process as consisting essentially of the establishment and operation of a political order, the effort to reconcile that order with demands for change, the development of a competition for power breaking through the existing order, and finally, armed conflict resulting in the establishment of a new political order. In this particular scheme of analysis, of course, the propulsion of the process through these various stages would stem from the interacting policies of the participants in the system, and, to peel the onion further, on the factors that determined the formulation of those policies.

Working with such a conception, it would follow logically for the diplomatic historian to inquire into the behavior of the participants in the system in order to discover not only how differently interacting policies have affected the development of the process, but also what factors appear to have produced the various kinds of behavior evident at various stages in the process.

For the period considered by Langer and Gleason, this approach would involve asking a range of questions of the following order: (a) what were the salient characteristics of the multi-state system at this point, how had it come to reach its existing condition, with what problems did it confront the major participants in the process, and what, conceivably, were its lines of development? (b) how did the major participants visualize their goals, what alternatives of action did they consider open to them, and what factors influenced these perspectives? (c) what factors led them to select one course of action rather than another? (d) what were the effects of these actions on the development of the political process and on their respective attitudes?

In a description of the ways that different individuals and groups have thought about these and related matters, how they have responded in action, what instrumentalities, strategies, and tactics they have employed, and what consequences their policies have had, may lie the possibility of a more profound and useful grasp of international politics than the diplomatic historian is presently affording. The required shift in perspective is not very great, the superstructure of the iceberg at least is visible, and

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certainly the material available for analysis is enormous. The plea is not for more deterministic theories but for orderly, probing curiosity coupled with an imaginative awareness of the kinds of problems with which statesmen must wrestle in the arena of international politics. Narratives oriented toward these problems should bring new vigor to an ancient and invaluable art.

Indeed, an organizing scheme of analysis, however crudely formulated, can enhance the value of diplomatic history not only as a means of gaining understanding about the political process. It can also exercise a restraint upon uninhibited and often irresponsible speculation by the social scientist, and furnish data with which the practicing statesman can work in making his great and difficult decisions. The trained historian is wary—and rightly so—of hasty generalization in a field composed of so many variables. But human beings, for the most part, deal with contemporary problems on the basis of analogy and generalization. One has only to look at current American foreign policy to see the influence exerted upon it by conclusions, however oversimplified, about the experience of the thirties and early forties. It would seem logical in these circumstances for the diplomatic historian, having access as he does to a vast storehouse of information, to present his data in ways that would make fruitful and responsible generalization possible. A developing and flexible scheme of analysis can help him to reach that goal.

It may be argued, of course, that such a line of attack carries with it the gravest sort of risks. In the process of imposing order on and providing categories of analysis for a complex and changing subject, the life blood, the secret essence, may be drained out of the politics that are being represented. Rather than chance such an occurrence, is it not better to attempt the total recall that is at least theoretically the *modus operandi* of the diplomatic historian? To those who have struggled with the problem of writing history the answer to this question should be obvious. A filtering, screening, selective process must take place; a set of criteria must develop; in a word, the formation of premises, hypotheses, and structures of analysis must go on all the time. The problem never arises in such a fashion that the historian

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can choose between the complete recollection of events and some conceptual apparatus or philosophy. It presents itself rather in a manner that forces him to select from alternative systems of analysis. Tansill with his angry narrative offers striking evidence that the diplomatic historian must be something more than a recorder and that his account and judgments, although buttressed by extensive archival research, may have little relation to the political universe as it actually exists. Even Langer and Gleason with their weighty structure of data, their tolerance and restraint, have obviously formed some conception of what constitutes the political process at the level of international relations. How, otherwise, could they have decided what was relevant to their narrative? How could they have determined that the Stimson doctrine of non-recognition served as a deterrent to Japan in the thirties? How else, finally, could they have concluded whether or not the Roosevelt administration followed the wisest available course for the preservation of American values?

The chronological, story-telling form thus is merely a convenience, or, on occasion, a refuge from serious analysis and self-questioning; it is never a complete escape. To those who believe that diplomatic history is one of the great arms of knowledge in the field of international politics, and that its study can throw a piercing light on contemporary dilemmas, the question is not one of utility or lack of utility. Rather is it how, specifically, maximum insight can be obtained from the subject matter. The acceptance by the diplomatic historian of his analytical and generalizing tendencies, the articulation and examination of his assumptions about international politics, the ordering of data so that they will test existing assumptions and raise new questions: these are all ways of approaching the insightful end. Whether or not the diplomatic historian will overthrow the soft tyranny of mere chronology, reject the temptations of stereotyped, topical organization, and accept the challenge of systematic and imaginative research cannot of course be foretold. But there can be no doubt that the knowledge and skills of such able practitioners of the art as Langer and Gleason, valuable as they already are, would be greatly enhanced by a change of approach.

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The challenge has existed for some time. It is not too much to hope that Americans, having discarded the outworn traditions of isolation, will now bring the resources of diplomatic history to bear in more imaginative ways for the solution of their new-found problems.

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CAREER DIPLOMAT:
The Record of Joseph C. Grew

By RICHARD D. CHALLENER

Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945*, edited by Walter Johnson, assisted by Nancy Harvison Hooker, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 2 vols., 1952, pp. xxvi, 1560. $15.00.

"THE best thing about diplomatic life," Joseph C. Grew once confided to his diary, ". . . is that one never knows when some event or development of prime importance is going to occur. We pursue the even tenor of our ways for weeks and months and then, often suddenly and unexpectedly, we find ourselves in the midst of a maelstrom of hectic activity, working day and night, rushing telegrams, drafting press communiqués and speeches, dashing from place to place, doing useful work."[1] *Turbulent Era*, the account of the forty years he spent as a career diplomat in the American Foreign Service, is convincing evidence that Joseph Grew was present on an extraordinary number of occasions when something of importance broke and that, above all, he was always doing useful work for the country he served so faithfully and so well.

The barest outline of Mr. Grew's career is in itself a commentary on many of the most vital problems in American foreign relations since the turn of the century. Following an apprenticeship in Cairo, Mexico City, and several European capitals, he served as First Secretary of Embassy and Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin during the years of American neutrality in the First World War. In 1918 he was chosen as Secretary of the American delegation at the pre-Armistice negotiations and remained in Paris as Secretary-General of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. In the twenties Mr. Grew was Minister to Denmark and to Switzerland, Ambassador to Turkey, and served from 1924 to 1927 in Washington as Under Secretary of State. In 1932 he became Ambassador to Japan, the post which made his name

[1] Grew, *Turbulent Era*, II, p. 888.

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familiar to thousands of Americans. Rounding out forty years in the Foreign Service, Mr. Grew returned to Washington after his release from Japanese detention to serve as a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and finally in 1944-1945, for the second time in his career, as Under Secretary of State.

Turbulent Era, the detailed accounting of the events, personalities, and problems encountered in this long career, is based upon the 168 bound volumes of personal papers which Mr. Grew accumulated throughout the years. Out of this vast storehouse Professor Walter Johnson of the University of Chicago, assisted by Mrs. Nancy Harvison Hooker, has selected the most relevant portions. The bulk of the two volumes consists of entries from the personal and "thoroughly indiscreet" diary which Mr. Grew maintained throughout his career. For those periods of his life in which the pressure of work prevented him from keeping the diary up to date, the editors have utilized despatches, records of conversations, letter carbons, press clippings, speeches, and other materials in the Grew papers. In addition, Mr. Grew himself contributed a short narrative of his early years in the Foreign Service, an extremely precise report of his Japanese mission from 1932 to the bombing of the *Panay* (originally written in 1941 for Cordell Hull before the Ambassador knew what the outcome of his work would be), and, of particular significance, his final reflections on the immediate background of Pearl Harbor. An extremely skillful editing job, comprising carefully prepared introductions for each section and extensive footnote references, gives the volumes exceptional continuity; as a result, there is for the reader none of the feeling of incompleteness which arises from such a book as the Forrestal *Diaries*.

These two volumes are without the slightest qualification the finest memoirs as yet produced by any member of the American Foreign Service and a major contribution to the history of American diplomacy. Future historians will find that *Turbulent Era* is an indispensable source book for an understanding of the twentieth-century Department of State, its policies, and its agents. There is new material on a host of subjects hitherto only partially explored—such as the inner workings of the State Department in

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the twenties and the role of the United States at the Lausanne Conference of 1922-1923. Even when he covers topics familiar to diplomatic historians—as, for example, the Peace Conference of 1919—Mr. Grew adds insights and supplementary information of the highest value. The fact that most of *Turbulent Era* is in diary form is a further merit. It is an extremely frank and unexpurgated record of Mr. Grew's immediate responses to the problems which confronted him, an account presented without alteration even when it shows, for instance, that the young Secretary of the Berlin Embassy believed in the summer of 1914 that the European war had been "carefully cooked up by Russia, England and France. . . ."[2] And because *Turbulent Era* is largely a diary, it is also a "case study" of the diplomatist in action, of how the diplomat at his post, supplied with insufficient evidence and conflicting data, arrives at the decisions he must make and provides his home government with the recommendations it must have.

Despite the fact that Mr. Grew's memoirs concentrate upon diplomatic questions and negotiations, they are perhaps even more important as a history of the growth of the American Foreign Service. When Joseph Grew embarked upon his career in 1904, the foreign relations of the United States were a relatively unimportant item in the minds of his fellow citizens, only fitfully concerned about events in Asia and the Caribbean and blandly indifferent to European affairs. An American embassy subsisted on the barest of appropriations; the operating funds for the entire expenses of the Vienna embassy in 1911 amounted to the princely sum of $5,000. Salary scales for diplomatic personnel were so much less than adequate that only the wealthy could afford the luxury of accepting the offer of a position; from 1904 to 1906, Mr. Grew received the sum of $600 per year as a clerk in Cairo. Life in an American embassy in those peaceful years revolved around the social whirl of receptions, dinners, dances; the work was routine; and the principal national interest being served was the interest of private American citizens. Even when the European war broke out in 1914, the entire staff of the em-

[2] *Ibid.*, I, p. 144.

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bassy in Berlin—including Mr. Grew—devoted all of its labors to securing passports, funds, and transportation for the thousands of American citizens suddenly stranded in Europe. It was only gradually that the realization came that the war concerned vital interests of the United States.

As a result, the American Foreign Service of the pre-1914 period was the happy hunting-ground of the spoilsman. Though Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft took steps to place at least the lower echelons of the diplomatic and consular services upon a Civil Service basis, all important positions were the private property of the politicians. The Service was, as Mr. Grew noted, "a Congressional plum orchard." The idea of a lifetime career in the diplomatic service with the possibility of promotion to an ambassadorial or ministerial post was something beyond imagination. Even T. R. personally advised young Grew that any change in Washington would almost certainly mean his ouster. As late as 1913 Mr. Grew lived in fear that William Jennings Bryan's laudable passion for rewarding deserving Democrats would cost him his job, and under the circumstances he took care to get at least five prominent Democrats—including his friend of Groton and Harvard days, Franklin D. Roosevelt—to intercede in his behalf. Though he was the last man to enter the ranks without taking a competitive examination, Mr. Grew's long career might never have started had it not been for the personal intervention of Theodore Roosevelt. The advocate of the strenuous life was informed that young Grew had shot a tiger under extremely hazardous circumstances. "By jove," he said, "I'll have to do something for that young man." Whereupon followed Grew's appointment to Mexico City. "That tiger-shooting was the only examination I ever took, and what fun I had some twenty years later when, as Chairman of the Examining Board for the Foreign Service, I used to say to the candidates: 'You gentlemen have a very easy time entering the Service. All you have to do is to answer a few questions. I had to shoot a tiger.' "[3]

The results of political domination of the Foreign Service were dismal. While individual political appointees not infrequently

[3] *Ibid.*, I, p. 13.

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turned out better than could have been expected, the United States was often represented abroad by men incompetent for their assignments, incapable of speaking a foreign language, and unconcerned about much beyond the available social life. Typical of the laissez-faire attitude all too prevalent was the reaction of one of Mr. Grew's colleagues in Berlin when he discovered him making a file of all cases involving Americans of German birth who had become involved with the German military authorities. Grew's associate was shocked to see him working so hard, particularly since it was midafternoon, and these were the days when the Berlin Chancery usually closed up shop at one P.M. "Cut it out," advised his friend, "work won't get you anywhere. Only politics count in our Service. Better enjoy yourself while you're in it."[4] Equally harmful was the fact that low pay and the prevalence of political favoritism discouraged competent young men from entering the Service. As Mr. Grew once noted, it was not strange that Americans had such a low estimate of the Service: "The public has hitherto believed that the Diplomatic Service was instituted for the purpose of permitting the gilded youth of the country to shine in foreign society and to afford comfortable berths for undesirable or decayed politicians."[5]

It was thus a lifelong concern of Joseph Grew to help establish a genuine and efficient career service, one divorced from politics, in which entrance and promotion depended upon merit and in which the career man had the expectation, though not the guarantee, of attaining ministerial rank. So eagerly did he pursue this objective that in later years he came to refer to himself half-humorously as "the Cerberus of the Foreign Service—its watchdog and its guardian." But for long years it was tough going. In 1920, for instance, he posed the problem to a friend in words which indicated the seeming hopelessness of Foreign Service reform. The primary difficulty now that the war was over, Mr. Grew noted, was that the American public regarded the diplomat as an expensive luxury and simply didn't care about the political events of Europe. Consequently, "the only element of the Foreign Service which appeals to the public is the ability of the

[4] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 20-21.

[5] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 409-10.

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Service to ensure business, better business, bigger business."[6] This meant, of course, that what popular support there was for the Service was mobilized behind the consular and not the diplomatic branch. Consequently, Mr. Grew explained, the American public would never support a strong Foreign Service until the diplomatic officers could prove by word and by deed that it was only their ability to secure political agreements from foreign countries which made it possible for American overseas business to thrive. The diplomat, in other words, would have to show that he and not the consul was the indispensable agent in promoting business.

Finally, however, Congress did take up the reform of the consular and diplomatic services. The outcome was the Rogers Act of 1924, a law which, despite imperfections that required later attention, was the foundation stone of the modern American Foreign Service. Under its provisions a complete reorganization of both the consular and diplomatic branches was carried out; all personnel from vice consul to counselor of embassy were made appointive and promoted on a merit basis;[7] and the interchange of personnel between the two branches was authorized. It was at this time that Joseph Grew assumed his responsibilities as Under Secretary. Together with Hugh Wilson, he drew up the compromise plans for the Personnel Board which eventually administered the new law, and was one of its original members. The provisions for the Personnel Board were given careful scrutiny by Secretary Hughes to ensure that the Board would be effective whether future Secretaries of State were interested in the professional service or cared only for patronage. It is, indeed, difficult to imagine the success of Mr. Grew's efforts without the work of Hughes. It was the Secretary of State who was himself largely responsible for the Rogers Act and who, in a public speech, referred to the unreformed Service as ". . . something which no American can face . . . without a sense of humiliation."[8] And he

[6] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 410-11.

[7] The Constitution, of course, reserves the appointment of ministers and ambassadors to the President and there can be no legislative restrictions on his powers (Hugh Wilson, *Diplomat Between Wars*, New York, 1941, p. 167).

[8] Merlo J. Pusey, *Charles Evans Hughes*, New York, 1951, II, p. 419.

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loyally supported all of Mr. Grew's attempts to divorce the Service from politics. When, for instance, Republican officials approached the Under Secretary for a statement on the work of the State Department to be used at their 1924 National Convention, Hughes said that Mr. Grew was under no obligation to lend a helping hand and that the report of the Department would be written by Charles Evans Hughes and no other.

Joseph Grew took his role as Cerberus quite seriously. When, for example, he heard of a young career official who had contributed to the campaign fund of Senator Wadsworth, the offender immediately received a sharply worded warning that it was contrary to the guiding principle of the Rogers Act for a Foreign Service officer to take any part in political affairs. The Under Secretary constantly bombarded Hughes and his successor, Kellogg, with appeals to promote outstanding career officers to ministerial or ambassadorial posts. Such promotions, he felt, were a "moral obligation" under the Rogers Act. Mr. Grew had some success, but he pointed out to Kellogg that while the Coolidge Administration had filled six of fourteen such vacancies with career men, only one professional had been sent to Europe and the others appointed to minor South American countries. In 1927, he noted, out of America's fifty ministers and ambassadors, only nineteen were professional diplomats. To Mr. Grew it seemed essential for the morale and effectiveness of the Foreign Service to rectify this situation, and he went so far as to ask Kellogg to request the resignations of a number of chiefs of mission who were originally political appointees, who had served more than the normal terms, and who, Mr. Grew felt, had not rendered the highest type of service.

Joseph Grew's term as Under Secretary ended in 1927 under a cloud. In part this was the result of his inability to satisfy Secretary Kellogg, a petulant and frequently choleric gentleman who failed to cooperate with his assistants and who, from all reports, was unable to delegate authority to subordinates. Mr. Grew's principal difficulties arose from charges of maladministration of the Rogers Act and consequent intra-Departmental feuds. The Department of State in the mid-twenties lacked re-

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liable information on the efficiency of its diplomatic officials. Therefore, the Personnel Board had felt it necessary to make its promotions of Foreign Service officers from two separate lists, one for diplomatic personnel and another for consular, instead of combining the two into a single efficiency list. In practice this system worked to the disadvantage of the consuls; in the first two and a half years the Rogers Act was in effect, 63 per cent of all diplomatic personnel were promoted but only 37 per cent of the consuls advanced in rank; moreover, ten diplomats were promoted twice but no consular officer was so rewarded. There resulted a considerable outcry, charges that Mr. Grew's Personnel Board was dominated by a "Harvard clique," and, of course, a Congressional investigation. While Mr. Grew, like his colleague Hugh Wilson, admitted that the consuls had some justice for their complaints, both felt that the disproportionate number of diplomatic promotions had been inevitable under the circumstances and noted that the decisions of the Personnel Board had always been unanimous. The problem was eventually settled by a mandatory ruling that a single efficiency list would be used in the future and by the promotion of additional consuls. But Mr. Grew resented the methods of the consular malcontents, particularly their ". . . sneaking up to the Hill behind our backs and carrying on their subversive propaganda under cover like contemptible moles. . . . Anything that redounds to the discredit of the old Diplomatic Service and the members thereof is grist to the mill of Congress, the public, the press and the editorial writers; we shall always be associated with pink teas and spats (which a good many congressmen wear, by the way) and the public would be disappointed if they thought we weren't living up to our character as painted."[9]

To record the exceptionally wide range of Mr. Grew's activities

[9] Grew, *op.cit.*, I, p. 703. See also Wilson, *op.cit.*, pp. 171ff. The charge that the "Harvard clique" of the Personnel Board was giving all the breaks to the social diplomats and "tea-hounds of the service" was revived when Mr. Grew received the post of Ambassador to Turkey after completing his Under Secretaryship. Grew, incidentally, was the only Harvard graduate on the Personnel Board, but there were enough Harvard men in high Departmental positions to make other officials believe that the existence of the "clique" was a fact. Mr. Grew's account of the entire difficulty may not be the final answer, but it is certainly a reasoned and documented defense of his policies.

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as a practicing diplomat is manifestly impossible within the confines of a review. His account of the Berlin embassy from 1914 to 1917, analyzing the much-debated question of submarine warfare from the Berlin point of view and not with the usual Washington-Wilsonian approach, indicates that Ambassador Gerard and his associates played a particularly effective role in presenting the American government's views to Germany and even in preventing a diplomatic rupture in May of 1916. Grew's record of the Peace Conference, though brief, is no less informative than the familiar diary of Mr. Harold Nicolson and reinforces the belief that the attendant confusion in Paris formed an important background for many of the failures at Versailles. Discussed in detail are the difficulties with American military authorities who tried to dominate the Commission, the lack of effective liaison between the various members of the American delegation, and the paralyzing lack of initiative by the American representatives who, with Wilson present in Paris, simply left matters up to him and did not bother to work out policy differences among themselves. Mr. Grew, viewing the situation as a professional diplomat, records the appalling fact that, since the Big Four made most decisions, the American Commission frequently found that it knew "very little as to just what is going on." The right hand on more than one occasion didn't know what the left was doing. When, for instance, the Italians requested Mr. Grew—who, of course, was Secretary-General of the American Commission—to inform them about the composition of a new committee approved by the Big Four, Mr. Grew had to reply that not one of the four American commissioners had ever heard of the matter.[10]

That the record of American diplomacy in the decade after Versailles was not as negative as many have charged is amply proven by *Turbulent Era*. To be sure, Secretary Hughes was cautious and willing to go only as far as a reluctant public opinion would support him—which, on most occasions, was not far at all. And the Department itself, lethargic in the early twenties, felt it advisable to inform its agents abroad that a valid criterion in the sending of despatches was "Don't send in too

[10] Grew, *op.cit.*, I, p. 384.

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much stuff." Mr. Grew, when Minister to Switzerland, did not dare run the risk of being seen visiting the offices of the League of Nations; when a correspondent of the *Chicago Tribune* encountered him once near the entrance to that den of internationalists, the American Minister spent several uncomfortable days until the arrival of the Paris papers showed that the meeting had passed unnoticed. Nevertheless, Mr. Grew could write in 1924 that "Our policy is less and less of isolation and we are going as far as we can in every matter without entering into European entanglements."[11]

Proof of this claim came when Mr. Grew was appointed as one of the American observers at the Lausanne Conference in 1922-1923. The Department of State recognized that the United States had a vital interest in any agreement reached between Turkey and the onetime Allies in regard to trade and commercial relations as well as capitulations. Moreover, the Department desired that the American observers, while making no commitments and refusing to sign any Allied-Turkish treaty, use their influence to obtain assurances concerning the freedom of the Straits and the protection of the minorities within Turkey.[12] And, in fact, the American observers, acting in the background, not only had some success in obtaining a hearing for the Department's views but also were of no little importance in assisting the powers to reach their final agreement.[13]

Some evidence of strengthening of ties between the League and the United States does emerge during these years. The relationship was typified by the appointment of a consul in Geneva—

[11] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 627-28.

[12] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 481-85.

[13] Mr. Grew's extensive account of the Lausanne Conference will be of great interest to students of European diplomacy. His interpretations certainly suggest that Harold Nicolson's familiar description of Lausanne in *Curzon: The Last Phase* (New York, 1939, pp. 281ff.) should henceforth be approached with many reservations. To Nicolson, Curzon's "handling of that Assembly will always remain among the classic examples of expert diplomacy," and the British Foreign Secretary's adroit diplomacy restored British prestige. Grew, on the other hand, offers convincing evidence that Curzon's steam-roller tactics, derisive attitude, general browbeating of the Turks and, above all, lack of patience contributed to the disruption of the conference and frequently made the Turks just that much more obstinate. Particularly fascinating are Grew's incisive portraits of the various diplomats, especially that of Ismet Pasha and his devotion to green chartreuse. Similarly, Mr. Grew's account of his Turkish mission from 1929 to 1932 is a detailed and sympathetic analysis of the new Turkey which will be of interest to students of the Near East.

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a step in which Mr. Grew had a large part—who could act as a contact agent without officially embarrassing the American government. As Mr. Grew pointed out, "When I came [to Switzerland] we had practically no contact; our Government refused even to answer polite letters received from the League and its name was anathema. Now we are co-operating in almost every non-political activity, we answer all letters, give all information asked and through my personal correspondence with Drummond and Sweetser we keep in the closest touch with all developments."[14]

In view of the current Asia-mindedness of most Americans, it is likely that the greatest interest will be created by Mr. Grew's account of his mission to Japan, his reflections on Pearl Harbor, and his views on the prosecution of the war in the Far East.

On the critical question of the events which preceded Pearl Harbor, Mr. Grew's conclusions reflect the difference of opinion which can arise between an ambassador in the field and his home government—a problem not unfamiliar to students of diplomatic history. Mr. Grew, confident that his long years in Japan and his familiarity with every phase of Japanese life had put him in closer touch with Tokyo realities than the statesmen in Washington, believes that the American government came to grief because it neglected his recommendations. The crux of the former Ambassador's argument is simply that when the United States government in the summer and early fall of 1941 rejected Premier Konoye's proposal to meet President Roosevelt on American soil—a course of action strongly recommended by Mr. Grew—the decisive opportunity to preserve peace in the Far East was missed. "It was our conviction that in the late summer and autumn of 1941 a unique opportunity was presented to the United States to safeguard our vital national interests in the Far East, as outlined by the President, without sacrifice of principle or at the ultimate expense of any friendly country [e.g. China], and without incurring war with Japan."[15]

Mr. Grew further believes that the chance was missed because

[14] Grew, *op.cit.*, I, p. 609.

[15] *Ibid.*, II, p. 1262.

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the Department of State adopted a rigid, dogmatic attitude and insisted that it was necessary to work out satisfactory preliminary agreements before any Roosevelt-Konoye meeting should take place. His belief that peace was lost because of the State Department's doctrinaire adherence to set principles is strikingly similar to George Kennan's thesis in *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* that the besetting sin of American diplomacy has been the "legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems" which "runs like a red skein through our foreign policy of the last fifty years."[16]

The arguments which Joseph Grew offers in support of his position are eminently fair. His is not the angry intolerance of a Beard or a Tansill. He always admits that the view he presents is necessarily limited to that of the embassy in Japan and that he has no insights into the over-all global problem as it appeared to the men in Washington in 1941. He is further careful to point out that in matters of high policy he had been in full agreement with Hull and Roosevelt up to the summer of 1941. Nor has he the slightest doubts that, whatever the failings in Washington, the Japanese must bear full responsibility for the initiation of war. It is indeed almost exclusively upon the Administration's refusal to sanction the Roosevelt-Konoye talks that he has any *arrière-pensées*. Mr. Grew, for instance, regards the ten-point program that Hull handed the Japanese on November 26 as a statesmanlike, broad-gauge plan which offered the Japanese a real opportunity to settle their differences with honor and advantage; indeed, he believes that had the Hull program been offered some months earlier, it could have been the basis for a genuine settlement. Under no possible interpretation, as the contemporary crop of American "revisionists" try to claim, can the November 26 proposals be considered as an ultimatum by which Hull "maneuvered the Japanese into war."

Ambassador Grew's account does, however, indicate with great clarity that in the crisis year of 1941 the Washington Administration failed to keep him informed of its decisions. This was a chronic failing of American diplomacy; during the First World War Mr. Grew had real occasion to complain that American

[16] George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*, Chicago, 1951, p. 95.

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diplomatists were too frequently treated as office boys, and during the Stimson regime he never knew if Washington appreciated his recommendations, a situation aptly summed up as "all battledore and no shuttlecock." Such failings were inexcusable in 1941. Worse yet was the fact that Ambassador Grew frequently learned of decisions taken in Washington only through Sir Robert Craigie, the British Ambassador in Tokyo, who was himself kept up to date by the British embassy in the American capital. In a cable to Sumner Welles in midsummer 1941 Mr. Grew complained strongly about this situation. Thereupon the State Department began to send him reports of Washington conversations by cable instead of by mail, certainly an improvement over a procedure which had hitherto consumed one or two months. The Department's defense of its reliance upon the mails was, simply, the lack of reliable codes to which to entrust confidential information. For this reason also—though here Washington appears to be on firmer ground—Mr. Grew never knew that the Administration had broken the Japanese codes and through the "Magic" intercepts knew the inner workings of the Japanese diplomatic mind.

The main tenor of Mr. Grew's position on the Roosevelt-Konoye talks is, of course, no revelation. His views, though never presented in this ordered form, were previously indicated in the excerpts from his diary which were published under the title *Ten Years in Japan,* his testimony before the Pearl Harbor investigating committee, and in the State Department's *Foreign Relations* series. In assessing Mr. Grew's conclusions one will want to round out the story with such a book as Herbert Feis's dispassionate study, *The Road to Pearl Harbor,* based upon Japanese and American documents, which, incidentally, reaches an opposite verdict on the possibilities of a Roosevelt-Konoye meeting.[17] This is particularly necessary since Mr. Grew's story is told in terms of the Tokyo view and, therefore, leaves important evidence out of consideration. Grew's argument that Hull and Roosevelt delayed their decision on the Konoye talks and were

[17] Herbert Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor,* Princeton, N.J., 1951, chaps. 32ff., on the Roosevelt-Konoye meeting.

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guilty of an uncompromising rigidity does not, for instance, take into account other factors which must have influenced Administration policy at that time. Winston Churchill in August 1941 was so concerned about a Japanese attack that when he met Roosevelt aboard the *Argentia,* he attempted to get the President to issue a special warning to the Japanese that if they made further aggressive moves the United States would take countermeasures even at the risk of war. Similarly, the proposed meeting of the heads of state raised the problem of its effect upon the other nations with Pacific interests and, in particular, the issue—ironical in 1952—of "selling China down the river." These and other matters were undoubtedly important factors in preventing the Administration from any quick and easy acceptance of the Konoye proposals.

Certainly, it seems as if a great deal hung upon the temperaments and personalities of the men who shaped American policy in the summer and fall of 1941 and upon their personal reactions to the crisis. Joseph Grew was by nature an optimist who, as a professional diplomat, was never willing to abandon the possibilities of a fruitful negotiation as long as a single ray of hope remained. Significantly, in 1916 he had believed a negotiated peace in Europe possible, and even in the most troubled hours at Lausanne he had believed settlement attainable. When at the Pearl Harbor investigation he was asked if he had ever believed that war was inevitable, Mr. Grew's reply was that no Foreign Service officer should ever take such an attitude, and he likened his own position in Japan to that of a candidate running for office who knows he will be defeated but does not admit it until it is all over. Cordell Hull, on the other hand, was a man of deep Wilsonian faith who believed firmly in the moral precepts he proclaimed. He was convinced that any meeting between Roosevelt and Konoye would only lead to a new Munich unless the Japanese indicated in their preliminary negotiations that their attitude had changed—whereas Mr. Grew regarded the quest for a preliminary formula as fruitless and counted upon a single dramatic gesture to reverse the flow of history. It is clear, too, that in the summer of 1941 both Hull and Roosevelt were grow-

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ing increasingly discouraged, believed that Japan's moves into Indo-China showed that Konoye was only seeking to buy time, and were convinced that Washington, with its knowledge of a global situation, was in a better position to judge the advisability of a meeting with Konoye than Ambassador Grew, whose horizons were limited to Tokyo.[18] And the Department of State, able to read the inner thoughts of the Japanese through "Magic," found it hard to believe that these frequently aggressive messages contained the germ of true understanding. It is not hard to understand the Washington view that the Japanese must show good works before the United States manifested faith.

In concluding his reflections on Pearl Harbor, Joseph Grew quotes from Feis—admittedly out of context: "It will always be possible to think that Grew was correct; that the authorities in Washington were too close to their texts and too soaked in their disbelief to perceive what he saw." It is also possible to quote Mr. Grew's own words, spoken in 1945 to the Pearl Harbor investigating committee: "Nobody in the world can prove that even if Konoye had met the President and even if he had been able to give satisfactory commitments, he could have implemented them after he came back. That was definitely in the hands of the military. Nobody could answer that question, and it cannot be answered today. It is not susceptible to proof."[19]

Mr. Grew rounded out his long career in wartime Washington where, as Under Secretary to the peripatetic Stettinius and, for a very brief period, to Byrnes, he was closely connected with the early developments of postwar policy and, as Acting Secretary of State for several months, saw and clearly recognized the rapidly emerging Russian threat. The Stettinius regime, criticized by many, was a distinct pleasure to Mr. Grew. As one who had frequently suffered from the disorganization of the Department, he was favorably impressed by the attempts the Secretary of State made to keep the top-ranking officials free from petty and routine

[18] For a concise summary of Hull's views, see *Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, New York, 1948, II, pp. 1025-26.

[19] U.S. Congress, *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Washington, U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1946, Part II, p. 717.

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details and to hold daily policy meetings with the ranking Departmental officials for the coordination of activities. "You and I know," he wrote a friend shortly after his resignation, "that the old Department had never in all its history been so effectively organized as under the Stettinius regime. He understood teamwork better than any chief I have ever served under."[20]

The documents and commentary covering the first seven months of 1945 are, essentially, a balanced defense of his own and of Administration policy. It is not without significance that a man like Grew, of unimpeachable reputation and conservative inclinations, should feel that the record of these months merits defense. He, after all, was at this time a special target of such organs as *PM* and the *New Republic* which regarded him as a proven reactionary and suspected him of desiring a "soft peace" with Japan. He cannot, therefore, be accused of being an unrealistic liberal whose testimony is automatically suspect.

The documentation of these hectic months, to be sure, is highly selective, but it goes a long way toward confirming the fact that the State Department and the Administration, particularly at the start of the Truman era, were not as naïve as many would like to believe. In the first place, his evidence seems to show that many of the political decisions so roundly criticized today had their origin in military logic and military reasoning. Yalta, Mr. Grew writes, was "squarely based upon a military estimate of the war against Japan. . . . I believe that the Yalta action was based upon a badly mistaken estimate of Japan's ability to continue the war after the German surrender."[21] Similarly, the long delay in making any statement about the future of the Japanese Emperor occurred because the War Department believed there were valid military reasons for holding up any announcement. It is also clear that the responsible officials were by V-E Day well aware of Russian intransigence, but at the same time lacked any long-range plans for the future. This was a situation well summed-up by Averell Harriman who, on May 15, 1945, at a conference to consider American protests of Russian actions in Poland, said that ". . . with regard to Poland we had

[20] Grew, *op.cit.*, II, p. 1524.

[21] *Ibid.*, II, p. 1444.

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laid down our present position very definitely but had not sufficiently planned our future course."[22] As Mr. Grew analyzes the total situation, President Truman at first felt bound by the commitments made by his predecessor and by the general "get-along" policy with Russia, but "even before his death Roosevelt began to see the handwriting on the wall, and it was not long before the true picture began to take shape in Truman's mind if it was not there at the very start of his Administration."[23] And then "concrete steps began to be taken to meet the Soviet menace."

Joseph Grew himself had no illusions. Not two weeks after the end of the war in Europe, he confided his darkest suspicions to a private memorandum: that all the war would accomplish would be to free the United States from the danger of Japanese and German militarism. World War II could never be a "war to end wars" since its effect had merely been to transfer the center of totalitarian power from the Axis to Russia—a nation which would be an even graver menace in the future. The UN, where the veto power blocked action against Russia, would be powerless to avert war. The spread of Russian control throughout Europe and Asia was inevitable, and "a future war with Soviet Russia is as certain as anything in this world can be certain" (though in 1950 Mr. Grew softened this last blow with the comment that if his memorandum had been a public and not a private document he would have appended the phrase, "unless we recognize the danger and take steps to meet it in time"). The United States, Mr. Grew concluded, must place no trust in Russian promises, retain its fighting power, maintain strategic bases, and strengthen its relations with the free world.[24] Had more Americans in May of 1945 shared these sober thoughts and expected so little of military victory, it seems unlikely that the disillusion and bitterness of recent years would have been so deep or so prevalent.

[22] *Ibid.*, II, p. 1482. [23] *Ibid.*, II, p. 1448. [24] *Ibid.*, II, pp. 1445-46.

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